The traditional model of ethical decision making in business suggests applying an initial set of principles to a concrete problem and if they conflict the decision maker may attempt to balance them intuitively. The centrality of the ethical conflict in the accepted notion of “ethical problem” has diverted the attention of moral decision modelers from other ethical problems that real-world managers must face—e.g., compliance problems, moral laxity, and systemic problems resulting from the structures and practices of the business organization. The present article proposes a new model for ethical decision making in business—the Phase-model—designed to meet the full spectrum of business-related ethical problems. Drawing on the dominant moral theories in business literature, the model offers additional strategies for tackling ethical issues beyond the traditional cognitive operations of deductive application of principles to specific cases and the balancing of ethical considerations. Its response to the problems of moral pluralism in the context of decision making lies in its structural features. The model distinguishes between three phases of the decision-making process, each having a different task and a different theoretical basis. After an introductory stage in which the ethical problem is defined, the first phase focuses on a principle-based evaluation of a course of action; the second phase provides a virtue-based perspective of the situation and strategies for handling unsettled conflicts and compliance problems; and the third phase adapts the decision to empirical accepted norms. An illustrative case demonstrates the applicability of the model to business real life.

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. When grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers.

Many academic authors, policy makers, NGOs, and corporations have focused on top-down human rights global norm-making, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). What is often missing are contextual and substantive analyses that interrogate rights mobilization and linkages between voluntary transnational rules and domestic governance. Deploying a socio-legal approach and using a combination of longitudinal field and archival data, this article investigates how a local, indigenous community in Northern Chile mobilized their rights over a period of almost two decades. We found that rights mobilization was largely shaped by tensions between the different logics of legality and the business organization. In our case, the UNGP implementation process has been ineffective in giving rightsholders access to genuine remedy. On the contrary, it has led to weakened rights mobilization, dividing the local community. We conclude that greater attention to rights mobilization and domestic governance dynamics should be given in the business and human rights debate.

Utilitarianism is commonly defined in very different ways, sometimes in a single text. There is wide agreement that it mandates maximizing some kind of good, but many formulations also require a pattern of distribution. The most common of these take utilitarianism to characterize right acts as those that achieve “the greatest good for the greatest number.” This paper shows important ambiguities in this formulation and contrasts it (on any plausible interpretation of it) with the kinds of utilitarian views actually defended by major proponents of utilitarianism. The aim is not to defend any of these views but to formulate them in a way that facilitates using them—or, more likely, some revised version suggested by the paper—in guiding decisions in business. The analysis provided here should also facilitate appraisal of utilitarianism, contribute to clarity in discussions of business ethics, and suggest a range of ethical standards that merit consideration for certain kinds of decision. If the results of the analysis are correct, a distributive reading of utilitarianism is at best misleading as a representation of its central thrust; it should not be described as the view that ethics calls for achieving “the greatest good for the greatest number”; and, understood as its major proponents take it, utilitarianism differs more from Kantian ethics than distributive readings imply and is more difficult to defend than it appears to be when viewed as intrinsically distributive.

Why does it matter that every negative thought you have had about car salespeople, they have likely had about you? The answer to this question opens up the distinctive challenges, and opportunities, facing business ethics. Those challenges and opportunities emerge from the significant bearing organizational reality has upon individuals’ conduct. As we consider how to assign responsibility for misconduct; how to provide guidance to organizational actors about what they ought to do; and how to develop responsive ethical theory, we need to take psychological and social forces into account. Organizations shape human behavior in ways that pose unavoidable questions about responsibility, practical guidance, and the enterprise of business ethics itself. Adopting the agents’ perspective suggests that business ethics can take a leading role in addressing these vexing questions that confront ethical inquiry and social science more broadly.

The paper explores the problem of motivation in organizations. This problem arises because people may prefer to pursue their own interest instead of the firm’s common goals (the two underlying forces in any organization). First, the most representative economic proposals to motivate people are studied and summarized. The study leads us to the conclusion that those proposals do not mitigate the conflict of interests, because they do not make people pursue the common goals. To solve the problem, the common elements of the firm must be promoted. In order to be really “common,” those elements must be composed of “non-material” goods, which are the only perfectly shareable ones. They motivate workers by attracting their internal faculties, making the job more interesting and appealing, and providing it with a meaning. Finally, these considerations imply that a richer model of human motivation must be developed in order to reach more comprehensive conclusions.

Psychological forces in play across individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis increase the likelihood that people in business organizations will engage in misconduct. Therefore, it is argued, we must turn our attention from dominant normative and empirical trends in business ethics, which revolve around boundaries and constraints, and instead concentrate on methods for promoting ethical behavior in practice, exploiting psychological forces conducive to ethical conduct. This calls for a better understanding of how organizations and their inhabitants function, and, in turn, it points to pragmatic solutions. Ethical conduct can be promoted by (1) normatively justifying vivid aims worthy of pursuit alongside economic objectives, and (2) empirically identifying the conditions and practices that advance those aims in firms. This approach challenges us to bring empirical and normative inquiry together—in ways unsettling to both. It pushes us to move beyond an empirical preoccupation with decision making and judgment, and it requires us to cope with political liberalism’s legitimate qualms about discussions of the good.

The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the Business Ethics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers given to the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is in stagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses for our students once they graduate to the corporate world.

In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses in Business Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy.

Japan’s economy has stagnated since the bursting of the twin real estate and stock bubbles in 1990. Construction employment rose after the bubbles burst despite a real estate glut.

Systemic corruption is delaying recovery. The key is the dango—Japan’s system of bid rigging, which is pervasive in public construction. The firms rotate who will win the “competitive” bid. The bureaucrats leak the highest price bid that will be accepted in return for favors from the industry and lucrative sinecures when they retire (amakudari—”descent from heaven”). The ruling politicians (the “construction tribes”) get kickbacks and ensure the adoption of enormous public construction programs.

The result is that Japanese public and private capital flows are corruptly routed to uses that are not simply inefficient, but outright harmful to society. Pervasive corruption is the primary obstacle to Japanese economic (and environmental) health and political reform.

Increasing research attention to the ways that firms seek to influence the emotions of employees, consumers, and other stakeholders has not been accompanied by systematic attention to the ethical dimensions of emotion management. In this article we review and discuss research that informs the morality of influencing and regulating the emotions of others. What are the moral limits of the use of emotion as a management tool for shaping workplace behavior and influencing the thoughts and actions of consumers? Do the ethics of emotional labor and emotional appeals (e.g., in consumer advertising) depart from moral rules that apply in “non-emotional” contexts? To explore these questions we examine research on the means by which individuals’ emotions are shaped and on the organizationally relevant consequences of individual emotional experience. We then discuss a number of potential ethical issues that are implicit or explicit in the organizationally sanctioned use of emotion management, incorporating existing literature in management and business ethics that has addressed the moral obligations of organizations in this context, and highlighting areas where there is yet work to be done. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis.

We respond to Moses Pava's defense of the “Triple Bottom Line” (3BL) concept against our earlier criticisms. We argue that, pace Pava, the multiplicity of measures (and units of measure) that go into evaluating ethical performance cannot reasonably be compared to the handful of standard methods for evaluating financial performance. We also question Pava's claim that usage of the term “3BL” is somehow intended to be ironical or subversive.

The purpose of this paper is to present an understanding of business ethics based on a theory of internal social criticism. Internal social criticism focuses on how members of a business organization debate the meanings of their shared traditions for the purpose of locating and correcting hypocrisy. Organizations have thick moral cultures that allow them to be self-governing moral communities. By considering organizations as interpretive moral communities, I challenge the conventional notion that moral criticism is based primarily on exogenous moral principles delivered by outside critics. I describe an interpretive process of business ethics and develop a theoretical model of internal social criticism. I also propose that organizational identification serves as a mechanism for inducing ethical behavior. I conclude by calling for more research that understands the development and use of existing moral principles inside of organizations.

In a recent paper, Kenneth Goodpaster formulates three versions of the stakeholder theory of corporate social responsibility. He rejects the first two versions and endorses the third. I argue that the theory that Goodpaster defends under the name “stakeholder theory” is a version (albeit a somewhat different version) of Milton Friedman’s theory of corporate social responsibility. I also argue that the first two formulations of the stakeholder theory which Goodpaster discusses are at most only slight modifications of other theories. I conclude by formulating a fourth version of the stakeholder theory which I believe does constitute a substantial departure from earlier theories of social responsibility.

We examine whether religion influences company decisions related to corporate community involvement (CCI). Employing a large US sample, we show that the CCI initiatives of a company are positively associated with the level of Christian religiosity present in the region within which that company’s headquarters is located. This association persists even after we control for a wide range of firm characteristics and after we subject our results to several econometric tests. These results support our religious morality hypothesis which holds that companies headquartered in regions with higher levels of Christian religiosity will engage in more CCI initiatives. We also find that while Catholic and mainline Protestant religiosity have a positive influence on firms’ CCI initiatives, evangelical Protestant religiosity does not. This supports our differentiated responses hypothesis which holds that institutional differences among religious groups will produce different effects on companies’ CCI. This hypothesis is based on institutional theory.

Relational leadership invokes an ethics involving a leader’s affective engagement and genuine concern with the interests of others. This ethics faces practical difficulties given it implies a seemingly limitless responsibility to a set of incommensurable ethical demands. This article contributes to addressing the impasse this creates in three ways. First, it clarifies the nature of the tensions involved by theorising relational leadership as caught in an irreconcilable bind between an infinitely demanding ethics and the finite possibilities of a response to those demands. Second, it examines this ethical challenge in acknowledgement of the hierarchical discourses and power dynamics in which leadership relationships are constrained and enacted. Third, it proposes “ethical irony” as a way leaders can respond to the demand for ethics without resulting in either an escape from ethics, or being crushed by its burden. Three dimensions of ethical irony are examined: ironic perspective, ironic performance, and ironic predilection.

Disputes regarding the ethics of work by children have intensified in recent years, with little resolution. The impasses stem from failure to recognize the diverse forms of child work and a lack of empirical research regarding its causes and consequences. We report on data gathered in Brazil’s export-oriented shoe industry, which is notorious for the employment of children. Central findings are: 1) the causes of child work have less to do with backwardness and more to do with how shoe workers are integrated into the global order; 2) local employers and children regard this work as benign, but the U.S. government sees it as hazardous to children and unfair to U.S. producers; 3) efforts to remove children from the shoe industry have been frustrated by local resistance and raise ethical questions; and 4) in certain circumstances, efforts to eliminate hazards from the workplace are morally superior to campaigns to remove child workers from employment.

A significant effect of China’s rejection of a planned economy for a free market is the stimulus this has given to discussion of the relationship between morality and the market. Some Chinese believe that the introduction of a market economy has had a negative effect on public morality. Others disagree and maintain that it has had only a positive effect. Besides this particular debate there are two others. In the first of these debates, it is maintained on the one side that conduct in the market is amoral and essentially contractual or transactional in nature: a boundary must be drawn between economic conduct and conduct in other spheres of social life. Against this it is argued that ethical norms apply equally to all aspects of social life including the economy. In the second debate one side holds that the market engenders its own “ethical” norms. In opposition it is argued that the moral categories articulated in moral philosophy are applicable to behaviour in the market.

In this paper I explore the topic of moral compromise in institutional settings and highlight how moral compromise may affirm, rather than undermine, personal integrity. Central to this relationship between moral compromise and integrity is a view of the self that is responsive to multiple commitments and grounded in an ethic of responsibility. I elaborate a number of virtues that are related to this notion of the self and highlight how these virtues may support the development of individuals who are responsive and reasonable in moral discourse and discerning in establishing moral limits on compromise. I look at how moral regret is closely connected to moral compromise and emphasize its significance for reinforcing personal integrity. The paper closes with a discussion of the relevance of these topics to the field of business ethics.