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IBM's Early Adaptation to Cold War Markets: Cuthbert Hurd and His Applied Science Field Men

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Atsushi Akera
Atsushi Akera
Affiliation:
ATSUSHI AKERA is assistant professor in the Department of Science and Technology Studies atRensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
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Abstract

The International Business Machines Corporation adapted early on to the opportunities created by the cold war economy in the United States. This account of IBM's adjustment to the circumstances of that time unveils the detailed process by which a firm situated outside the traditional defense industries forged new institutional allegiances between business and government and between science and industry. Beginning in 1949, IBM's Applied Science Department, under the leadership of Cuthbert Hurd, enabled the company to enter new technical markets that had been created by federal research and defense expenditures. But there were also broader consequences to IBM's decision to embrace scientific culture, among them the transformation of its traditional sales and product development strategies in ways that were not indisputably functional.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 76 , Issue 4: entrepreneurs, regulation, and technological innovation in America , Winter 2002 , pp. 767 - 802
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2002

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References

1 There is clearly a need for studies that directly examine this broader transformation of American industry engendered by the cold war, during which commercial firms altered their conduct in response to significant changes in the broader social and economic context. Works that already proceed in this direction include Hounshell, David, “Du Pont and the Management of Large-Scale Research and Development,” in Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, eds. Galison, Peter and Hevly, Bruce (Stanford, Calif., 1992)Google Scholar; Hounshell, David and Smith, John Kenly Jr, Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902–1980 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], 1988)Google Scholar; and Graham, Margaret, RCA and the Video Disc: The Business of Research (New York, 1986).Google Scholar On the postwar relationship between the federal government and U.S. universities, see Geiger, Roger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II (New York, 1993)Google Scholar; Leslie, Stuart, Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993)Google Scholar; and Chomsky, Noam et al., The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years (New York, 1997).Google Scholar I am also indebted to Pap Ndiaye, who is examining similar issues. The specific figures on postwar federal spending can be found in National Science Foundation, “Federal Funds for Research and Development: Detailed Historical Tables: Fiscal Years 1951–2001,” http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsfo1334/pdfstart.htm.

2 A prior account of Hurd's activities can be found in Weiss, Eric, “Eloge: Cuthbert Corwin Hurd (1911–1996),” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 19 (Winter 1997): 65–73.Google Scholar For general histories of IBM, see Pugh, Emerson, Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and Its Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1995)Google Scholar; and Fisher, Franklin M., McKie, James W., and Mancke, Richard, IBM and the U.S. Data Processing Industry: An Economic History (New York, 1983).Google Scholar The notion of technical capabilities, and the historical significance of the IBM System/360 product line is described in Alfred Chandler's recently published Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries (New York, 2001). The emphasis on the historical significance of IBM's installed base in office machinery can be found in Martin Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, William, Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York, 1996).Google Scholar

3 Significant works on the history and rationalization of sales methods include Friedman, Walter, “John H. Patterson and the Sales Strategy of the National Cash Register Company, 1884 to 1922,” Business History Review 72 (Winter 1998): 552–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Koehn, Nancy, “Henry Heinz and Brand Creation in the Late Nineteenth Century: Making Markets for Processed Food,” Business History Review 76 (Autumn 1999): 349–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davies, Robert, Peacefully Working to Conquer the World (New York, 1976)Google Scholar; and Spears, Timothy, “‘All Things to All Men’: The Commercial Traveler and the Rise of Modern Salesmanship,” American Quarterly 45 (1993): 524–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Other studies that specifically deal with technical intermediaries of the sort represented by the Applied Science Department include Goldstein, Carolyn, “From Service to Sales: Home Economics in Light and Power, 1920–1940,” Technology and Culture 38 (1997): 121–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rose, Mark, Cities of Light and Heat: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in Urban America (University Park, Pa., 1995), 65–89.Google Scholar Given the breadth of cold war interest in technical computing, Hurd and his field men played a more vital role as technical intermediaries in analyzing and synthesizing the needs of diverse users. By contrast, the life insurance industry (similar to the nuclear weapons labs described in this article) influenced IBM's early products directly, or through their own industry associations. The role of technical intermediaries, or “brokers,” is also described in the organizational studies literature. See Barley, Stephen, “Technicians in the Workplace: Ethnographic Evidence for Bringing Work into Organizational Studies,” Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1996): 404–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Zunz, Olivier, Making America Corporate, 1870–1920 (Chicago, 1990), 154–6.Google Scholar

6 See, for instance, Trice, Harrison, Occupational Subcultures in the Workplace (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993).Google Scholar Also Zunz, Making America Corporate.

7 Pugh, Building IBM, 1–57.

8 The evolution of IBM products in response to the requirements of the life insurance industry, for instance, is described in a study by Yates, JoAnne, in “Co-evolution of Information-Processing Technology and Use: Interaction between the Life Insurance and Tabulating Industries,” Business History Review 67 (Spring 1993), 1–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Pugh, Building IBM, 14–15, 37–8, 47–8. General works on how users contribute to product innovation, as also cited by Yates, include Hippel, Eric von, The Sources of Innovation (New York, 1988)Google Scholar; and Thomson, Ross, The Path to Mechanized Shoe Production in the United States (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989).Google Scholar On the office-equipment industry as a whole, see Cortada, James, IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the Industry They Created, 1865–1956 (Princeton, 1993).Google Scholar For a historiographic essay on the history of industrial research, see Hounshell, David, “The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States,” in Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial Research and the End of an Era, ed. Rosenbloom, Richard and Spencer, William (Boston, 1996).Google Scholar On product innovation at NCR, see Leslie, Stuart, Boss Kettering (New York, 1983), 18–37.Google Scholar

9 Friedman, “John H. Patterson”; Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 47–9. The general importance of a sales force and the manufacturers' home service departments in securing information about customer demand can be found in Passer, Harold, The Electrical Manufacturers, 1875–1900: A Study in Competition, Entrepreneurship, Technical Change and Electrical Growth (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 105–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldstein, “From Service to Sales,” 142–6; Rose, Cities of Light and Heat, 80–81; and Davies, Peacefully Working to Conquer the World, 50. Of these sources, Passer, and to some extent, Davis, also describes the unique sales relations found with producer goods.

10 On Edison and system selling, see Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, 105–28. The high-resistance filament light bulb was an important component of an economical system for electric power distribution. This gave the Edison Electric Light Company a unique patent position. As one example of the kind of technical rationale that could exist for purchasing an integrated system, using a generator closely matched to a light bulb's rated voltage resulted in better operating efficiencies. See Passer, 126–7.

11 Although the Methods Research Department had direct interactions with customers during the early years of the Great Depression, it became a special product-development group located at company headquarters. The first systems service women were hired in 1935. Pugh, Building IBM, 42–4, 57–60, and 62–4. On women and the role of mechanization in supporting complex bureaucratic operations, see Strom, Sharon, Beyond the Typewriter: Gender, Class, and the Origins of Modern American Office Work, 1900–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1992).Google Scholar Feminization and mechanization were quite related.

12 Croarken, Mary, Early Scientific Computing in Britain (Oxford, 1990), 23–32Google Scholar; Pugh, Building IBM, 67–107; Owens, Larry, “Mathematicians at War: Warren Weaver and the Applied Mathematics Panel, 1942–45,” in The History of Modern Mathematics, Volume 2: Institutions and Applications (Boston, 1989), 286–305.Google Scholar On the spread of the IBM method and of wartime computing in general, see Akera, Atsushi, “Calculating a Natural World: Scientists, Engineers, and Computers in the United States, 1943–68” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1998), 186–207.Google Scholar

13 Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 110–17; Pugh, Building IBM, 117–29; Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 527–36; Grosch, Herbert, Computer: Bit Slices from a Life (Novato, Calif., 1991), 26–31, 69–77.Google Scholar Eckert's group was generally known by the name of its laboratory, the Watson Scientific Computing Laboratory at Columbia University, or simply the Watson Lab. It is worth considering this curious arrangement, in which Columbia basically agreed to play host to a corporation's basic research facility.

14 L. A. Ohlinger to T. J. Watson, Jr., 26 June 1950; [Cuthbert Hurd,] memo [c. Summer 1949]. Both in Cuthbert Hurd Papers (hereafter CBI 95), Box 6, folder 9, University of Minnesota Libraries, Charles Babbage Institute, Minneapolis, Minn, (hereafter CBI). Also Pugh, Building IBM, 152–7; Bashe, Charles, Johnson, Lyle, Palmer, John and Pugh, Emerson, IBM's Early Computers (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 68–72Google Scholar; Ceruzzi, Paul, “Crossing the Divide: Architectural Issues and the Emergence of the Stored Program Computer, 1935–1955,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 19 (no. 1, 1997): 5–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Pugh, Building IBM, 156–8.

16 For biographical information on Hurd, see Weiss, “Eloge.” Alston Householder to C. C. Hurd, 29 Mar. 1949, CBI 95, Box 6, folder 11, CBI.

17 Weiss, “Eloge,” 66; Truman Hunter to Atsushi Akera, 8 August 1999 (letter in author's possession); Pugh, Building IBM, 158. See Hurd's correspondence with Alston Householder at Oak Ridge in CBI 95, Box 6, folder 11, CBI; Hurd, Cuthbert, “A Note on Early Monte Carlo Computations and Scientific Meetings,” Annals of the History of Computing 7 (1985): 141–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 Weiss, “Eloge,” 66; Cuthbert Hurd to J. Neyman, 7 Feb. 1949. CBI 95, Box 6, folder 11, CBI. T. V. Learson to R. W. Hubner, 1 Nov. 1949, CBI 95, Box 3, folder 11, CBI. See also Hurd's correspondence with Cecil Hastings of the Rand Corporation in CBI 95, Box 6, folder 23, CBI. Several events related to technical computing had already taken place, including a Scientific Computing Forum organized by Wallace Eckert's Pure Science Department in 1948. See Weiss, 66; and Grosch, Computer: Bit Slices, 105–12.

19 Cecil Hastings to Cuthbert Hurd, 31 Oct. 1949, CBI 95, Box 6, folder 23, CBI.

20 Pugh, Building IBM, 157; Weiss, “Eloge,” 66; and Learson to Hubner, 1 Nov. 1949. See the early trips made by Ralph Hopkins in late 1949, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 11, CBI.

21 Cuthbert Hurd to Cecil Hastings, 8 Nov. 1949, CBI 95, Box 6, folder 23, CBI.

22 Weiss, “Eloge,” 66–7; Grosch, Computer: Bit Slices, 102; Hurd to Hastings, 8 Nov. 1949. On women and mathematics, see Green, Judy and LaDuke, Jeanne, “Women in American Mathematics: A Century of Contributions,” in A Century of Mathematics in America, Part 2, ed. Duren, Peter (Providence, R.I., 1988).Google Scholar On postwar retrenchment and gender-based segmentation, see Milkman, Ruth, Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation by Sex During World War II (Urbana, Ill., 1987), 99–152.Google Scholar

23 Though anecdotal, the best description of the informal organization within IBM is Watson, Thomas J. Jr and Petre, Peter, Father Son & Co.: My Life at IBM and Beyond (New York, 1990), 151, 253–4, 284–9.Google Scholar IBM's new organizational structure was put in place by Thomas Watson Jr., who succeeded his father as chief executive. See also Pugh, Building IBM, 263–5. T. V. Learson to H. R. Keith, memo, 31 Mar. 1952, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 1, CBI.

24 Weiss, “Eloge,” 67. Although I do not describe it here, the initial recruiting posed a sub-stantial challenge for Hurd. Hurd obtained his staff from the Service Bureau, the staff of the Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator, and other places, including direct hires by the field offices. Hunter to Akera, 8 Aug. 1999.

25 This initial focus on the efforts of the applied science representatives constitutes, in essence, an interactionist mode of analysis that stresses the flexibility of individual actions and strategies. However, the underlying point of the larger essay is to weigh the structural significance of this flexibility in light of the emerging structure of the Applied Science Department and that of the larger IBM organization. It is to attempt a synthesis between organization and individual action, or between structural and interactionist modes of analysis, as echoed by recent efforts to integrate the sociology of work into organizational analysis. See, for example, Barley, Stephen and Kunda, Gideon, “Bringing Work Back In,” Organizational Science: A Journal of the Institute of Mangement Sciences 12 (2001): 75–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Barley, Stephen and Tolbert, Pamela, “Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the Links between Action and Institution,” Organizational Studies 18 (1997): 93–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On salesmen and their identities, see Spears, “‘All Things to All Men’,” and Strasser, Susan, “‘The Smile that Pays’: The Culture of Traveling Salesmen, 1880–1920,” in The Mythmaking Frame of Mind: Social Imagination in American Culture, ed. Gilbert, James et al. (Belmont, Calif., 1993), 155–77.Google Scholar Carolyn Goldstein and Olivier Zunz both make the further point that all those who enter a newly established occupation must begin by reworking their former disciplinary and occupational identities. See Goldstein, “From Service to Sales,” 128, and Zunz, Making America Corporate, 154.

26 Cuthbert Hurd to Donald Pendery, 21 Feb. 1950. CBI 95, Box 2, folder 8, CBI.

27 S. W. Dunwell to D. W. Pendery, 2 Mar. 1950; G. A. Roberts to C. C. Hurd, memo, 14 Apr. 1950. Both in CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI. On U.S. air power and its relation to postwar military strategy, see Edwards, Paul, Closed World: The Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 83–90.Google Scholar On technical computing in the aviation industry, see Wolanski, H. S., “Applications of Computing in the Aircraft Industry,” in The Computing Laboratory in the University, ed. Hammer, Preston (Madison, Wis., 1957), 91–102Google Scholar; and Akera, Atsushi, “Volunteerism and the Fruits of Collaboration: The IBM User's Group Share,” Technology and Culture 42 (2001): 710–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 The computing staff at aviation firms also had to answer to the specific standards of “methods work” found in the firm's accounting operations. The staff at Los Alamos, which did not create a computing unit based on an existing accounting facility, did not experience this pressure.

29 See various correspondences from Pendery to Hurd in CBI 95, Box 2, folder 9 and 10, CBI. See, for example, D. W. Pendery to C. C. Hurd, 11 Oct. 1951 and 28 May 1952.

30 Carolyn Goldstein's observations about the role of home economists in selling light and power are relevant here. Home economists used their familiarity with domestic work to gain a special rapport with housewives. However, even though the utilities made a specific appeal to science during their better-lighting campaigns, the particular distribution of knowledge between producer and consumer ensured that science in this instance would be used more as an instrument of persuasion than as an object of mutual exchange. IBM sales and systems service representatives were able to sustain a technical exchange in the larger domain of commercial accounting and statistics. Goldstein, “From Service to Sales,” 135–6, 142–6. On sales representatives, image, and the art of social improvisation, see Spears, “’All Things to All Men.“

31 Evidence of how Pendery became enmeshed in a regional and national system of technical exchange can be found throughout his correspondence with Hurd, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 9 and 10, CBI. See, for example, D. W. Pendery to C. C. Hurd, memo, 11 Oct. 1951 and 20 May 1952.

32 D. W. Pendery to C. C. Hurd, memo, 7 Jan., 7 May, 10 July, 26 Nov. 1951, and 28 Feb. 1952. CBI 95, Box 2, folders 9 and 10, CBI.

33 D. W. Pendery to C. C. Hurd, memo, 10 Aug. 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 5, CBI. This item is misfiled in Daniel Mason's correspondence to Hurd. Also, D. W. Pendery to C. A. O'Malley, memo, 8 Jan. 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 9, CBI.

34 While I have not located a copy of Hurd's memo of 3 May 1951, the six categories of information that Hurd requested can be seen in W. A. Johnson, “Call Report,”22 May 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 1. Helen Dunn to D. W. Pendery, 2 Feb. 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 9; [D. W. Pendery], “Prospects for Technical Computing in Southern California,” 25 Aug. 1950, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 8; D. W. Pendery to C. C. Hurd, Summary Report, 7 Jan. 1951 [sic, 1952], CBI 95, Box 1, folder 4. All CBI.

35 Although northern California was part of District 10, Hubbard had to cover for Pendery after Pendery's reassignment to Los Angeles. Pendery was first assigned to District 10 because of the work at Boeing. See Hubbard's early correspondence to Hurd in CBI 95, Box 1, folder 12, CBI.

36 Hurd's correspondence with Los Alamos can be found in CBI 95, Box 5, folder 8, CBI.

37 L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, memo, 9 Feb., 31 May and 30 July 1951, and 11 Jan. 1952, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 12, CBI.

38 See, for example, L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, memo, 28 May and 30 July 1951, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 12, CBI; L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, personal and confidential memo, 2 Oct. 1951, CBI 95, Box 5, folder 9, CBI; C. C. Hurd, “Visit to Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Oct. 29–30, 1951,” CBI 95, Box 1, folder 2, CBI. Olivier Zunz describes how McCormick sales agents also established themselves as important members of their local communities in Making America Corporate, 165–9. Mark Rose also makes a similar argument regarding the value of local agents in Cities of Light and Heat, 111–46.

39 Preston Hammer to Cuthbert [Hurd], 24 July 1951, CBI 95, Box 5, folder 9, CBI; L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, 31 May and 30 July 1951, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 12, CBI; R. B. Thomas to C. C. Hurd, personal and confidential memo, 10 Sept. 1951, CBI 95, Box 5, folder 9, CBI; L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, memo, 25 Oct. 1951, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 12, CBI.

40 Mason, Daniel, “The 701 in the IBM Technical Computing Bureau,” Annals of the History of Computing 5 (1983): 176–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The work at MIT was on radar, not nuclear radiation.

41 D. R. Mason to C. C. Hurd, 29 June 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 5, CBI. Verzuh's confidence came from his early work with the IBM 602 calculating punch and its use in producing mathematical tables and solving simultaneous linear equations. Verzuh was already recognized for this work prior to 1949. For additional information on Verzuh, see Akera, “Calculating a Natural World,” 608–21.

42 D. R. Mason to C. C. Hurd, memo, 26 Sept. 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 5, CBI. One of the anonymous reviewers has suggested that this was to turn systems service on its head, where the authority over matters of machine configuration lay with the customer rather than the manufacturer. However, the situation at MIT was unique. As an academic facility with some ties to the well-known Center of Analysis at MIT, Verzuh had specific aspirations to advance computing techniques. He eventually obtained a Ph.D. from MIT. Moreover, both Pendery and Hubbard's work should demonstrate the extent to which systems selling found a place in technical computing.

43 See, for example, D. R. Mason to C. C. Hurd, call report, 24 June, 4 Sept., and 26 Sept. 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 5, CBI.

44 Mason, “The 701,” 176; On correspondence from G. W. Petrie, see CBI 95, Box 2, folder 14, CBI; from Truman Hunter, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 14, CBI; from John Chancellor CBI 95, Box 1, folder 8, CBI.

45 On the value of a hard and soft sell, see Goldstein, “From Service to Sales,” 135, 158. Perhaps not surprisingly, the quote itself was from Donald Pendery. D. W. Pendery to C. A. O'Malley, memo, 5 Mar. 1951, CBI 95, Box 2, folder 9, CBI.

46 The best prior descriptions of the systematic use of a sales organization as an intelligence network are Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, 123–4; and Rose, Cities of Light and Heat, 80–1.

47 Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 70–1; Pugh, Building IBM, 154; [C. C. Hurd,] memo, [c. Summer 1949]; and L. A. Ohlinger to T. J. Watson Jr., 26 June 1950. Both in CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI.

48 Ohlinger to Watson Jr., 26 June 1950; S. W. Dunwell to D. W. Pendery, 2 Mar. 1950. Both CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI. The CPC's IBM 417 was a modified IBM 402 and is often referred to as the latter in the literature.

49 Don Pendery to S. W. Dunwell, 5 Mar. 1950, CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI.

50 Ohlinger to Watson, Jr., 26 June 1950. The decision to employ the IBM 417 instead of the IBM 405 posed at least three specific problems. First, the IBM 417 gave no provision for “split column controls,” which allowed data within individual counters to be split into separate sections and processed in different ways. Second, the IBM 417 had an insufficient number of “selectors,” which were basically switches used to alter the control sequence of the machine. Finally Northrop was running more signal lines between the two machines than the IBM 417's built-in channels would allow. The general character of IBM's engineering department is described by Emerson Pugh in Building IBM, 150–2, and is described in greater detail throughout Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers.

51 Dunwell to Pendery, 2 Mar. 1950; Pendery to Dunwell, 5 Mar. 1950; Cuthbert Hurd to C. A. O'Malley, Telegram or scheduled cable, 27 Mar. 1950; and Ohlinger to Watson, Jr., 26 June 1950. All CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI.

52 Ohlinger to Watson Jr., 26 June 1950; G. A. Roberts to C. C. Hurd, memo, 29 June 1950; Cuthbert Hurd to L. A. Ohlinger, 7 July 1950; L. A. Ohlinger to Cuthbert Hurd, 17 July 1950; Cuthbert Hurd to L. A. Ohlinger, 27 July 1950; and [lC. C. Hurd,] “Conversation with Dayger,” 17 Oct. 1950. All CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI. Carolyn Goldstein writes more directly about the work technical intermediaries do in redefining the respective roles of the consumer and producer. See “From Service to Sales,” 151–2. On organizational responses to crisis, see Vaughan, Diane, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996).Google Scholar

53 The Eckert–Mauchly Computer Corporation was established by J. Presper Eckert (no relation to Wallace Eckert) and John Mauchly, the two principal inventors of the ENIAC. On the history of the Eckert–Mauchly Computer Corporation and the Univac I, see Stern, Nancy, From ENIAC to UNIVAC: An Appraisal of the Eckert–Mauchly Computers (Bedford, Mass., 1981).Google Scholar

54 Watson and Petre, Father Son & Co., 194–5; Ralph Hopkins to L. H. LaMotte, memo, 16 Dec. 1949, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 11, CBI. Although IBM had an electronic computer, the Tape Processing Machine, in the early stages of engineering development at Poughkeepsie since early 1950, the very design of this machine indicates the incremental product-development strategy that dominated much of IBM's marketing and engineering organizations. There was also no commitment as of yet to turn the machine into a product. Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 102–29.

55 Greg Toben to Cuthbert [Hurd], [c. Dec. 1949], CBI 95, Box 6, folder 9, CBI; C. C. Hurd to C. E. Love and T. V. Learson, memo, 27 Feb. 1950, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 3, CBI; and for instance, L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, 11 July 1951, CBI 95, Box 5, folder 9, CBI; and C. C. Hurd to O'Malley, “Rand Corporation 2/14/51,” Trip Report, n.d., CBI 95, Box 6, folder 24, CBI.

56 Pugh, Building IBM, 163–5, 326; Watson Jr. and Petre, Father Son & Co., 200–1.

57 The principal accounts of these events are: Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 129–64; Pugh, Building IBM, 167–9; Hurd, Cuthbert, “Early IBM Computers: Edited Testimony,” Annah of the History of Computing 3 (1981): 166–7Google Scholar; Birkenstock, James, “Preliminary Planning for the 701,” Annals of the History of Computing 5 (1983): 112–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Watson Jr. and Petre, Father Son & Co., 203–7; and Weiss, “Eloge,” 67–8.

58 For two of the more balanced accounts, see Pugh, Building IBM, 117–29, 145–82; and Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 105–30. In 1950, executive authority over the firm was beginning to shift from the senior to junior Watson, a process completed by Watson Jr.'s ascent to IBM's presidency in January 1952.

59 Hurd and Birkenstock received initial authorization to proceed with the project in January of 1951. This included preliminary engineering assessments, so that by February, Hurd had a rough schematic along with an approximate price with which to approach prospectiv clients. See Pugh, Building IBM, 167–70; Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 130–6. Bashe et al. specifically note that Hurd had a list of nearly sixty installations that were using IBM equipment for defense-related work.

60 Notably, both men would later claim that they had “independently” come to the same conclusion regarding the Defense Calculator's design. Pugh, Building IBM, 170; Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 130–4; Weiss, “Eloge,” 67–8. On the Defense Calculator's departures from the IAS design, see Bashe et al., 137–42.

61 Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 135.

62 The records of Hurd's trips in early 1951 are filed with the correspondence pertaining to individual installations, in the files of individual representatives, and in CBI 95, Box 1, folder 2, CBI.

63 Pugh, Building IBM, 180; and Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 116–17, 123–4.

64 On the history of the IBM 650, see Pugh, Building IBM, 178–82; Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 73–101, 165–72; and “Special Issue: IBM 650,” Annals of the History of Computing 8 (1986): 1–88.

65 L. C. Hubbard to C. C. Hurd, 9 Feb. and 28 May 1951, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 12, CBI; D. W. Pendery to C. C. Hurd, memo, 1 Oct., 17 Oct., and 29 Oct. 1951; and C. C. Hurd to D. W. Pendery, 9 Oct. 1951. All CBI 95, Box 2, folder 9, CBI.

66 On IBM's magnetic-dram computer projects, see Pugh, Building IBM, 178–82; Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 73–101, 165–72; and Glaser, E. L., “The IBM 650 and the Woodenwheel,” Annals of the History of Computing 8 (1986): 30–1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar To provide some sense of Hurd's intelligence mechanism and the rapport he enjoyed with the users, Hurd obtained the CRC's specifications from at least three different sources. In the end, the CRC computers were not the primary competition to the IBM 650. However, in 1952, as indicated by the field reports, CRC posed the principal competitive challenge within technical computing installations.

67 Ralph Harris to John McPherson, memo, 20 July 1952; H. R. Keith to C. C. Hurd, memo, 22 July 1952. Both CBI 95, Box 6, folder 10, CBI. On Hurd's involvement with the magnetic dram computer decision, see Bashe, et al., IBM's Early Computers, 165–72.

68 C. C. Hurd to R. Harris, memo, 9 Sept. 1952, CBI 95, Box 6, folder 24, CBI.

69 C. C. Hurd to W. A. Johnson, 20 Dec. 1951, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 4, CBI. See above section in text, “Historical Background,” on Hurd's reference to women.

70 T. V. Learson to H. R. Keith, memo, 31 Mar. 1952, CBI 95, Box 1, folder 1, CBI. In fact, as suggested earlier, the tension was amplified by the fact that the field men reported to Hurd on “technical” matters, but to Learson on all “administrative” matters. What was under contention was how these two words were defined. Learson became general sales manager for IBM the following year.

71 Ibid.

72 Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer, 151–3; Weiss, “Eloge,” 67–70. Learson's concern also serves as an indication that the level of systems selling implied by “bundling” was not a forgone conclusion for IBM's marketing strategy. In fact, Learson represented a different sales tradition whose main interest was in rationalizing a sales force by standardizing the representatives' skills and abilities. The details of such an effort are described in Susan Strasser's “The Smile that Pays.” In part, Hurd was able to resist Learson's move because of his growing stature within IBM. At the same time, Hurd and his men defended their position through the demonstrated value of their expertise. By contrast, the home economists described by Carolyn Goldstein were unable to defend their professional status as home service representatives. Although this was partly because of a structural shift in the electric appliance industry—namely, increased price competition due to greater sales—it seems also plasible that home economists lost their ground simply because electrical appliances became a familiar commodity. Useful knowledge, in other words, began to circulate among the consumers themselves. Goldstein, “From Service to Sales,” 147–9.

73 Bashe et al., IBM's Early Computers, 416–58; Pugh, Building IBM, 232–7.

74 Weiss, “Eloge,” 69–70; Pugh, Building IBM, 175–7, 263–4.

75 Pugh, Building IBM, 307–11. On the importance of sales and service, see, for instance, the assessment by Campbell-Kelly and Aspray in Computer, 151–3.