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The Invisible Handshake:Cartelization in the Netherlands, 1930–2000

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 April 2011

Bram Bouwens  and
Joost Dankers
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Abstract

Cartels were critical to the shaping of twentieth-century market structures. Although laws against cartels began to be passed in the 1950s, the attitude toward these collusive organizations remained constant over most of the century. Enforcement did not begin until well into the 1990s. Dutch policy within the European framework underwent a series of adjustments, and changes in the Dutch business system indicate a shift toward a more liberal market economy, which was accompanied by an increasingly negative view of cartels.

Type
National Business Systems: Focus on the Netherlands
Information
Business History Review , Volume 84 , Issue 4: Business History and Varieties of Capitalism , Winter 2010 , pp. 751 - 771
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2010

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References

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