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The Birth of Joint-Stock Banking: England and New England Compared

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 April 2011

Lucy Newton
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Abstract

By the end of the nineteenth century, the banking systems of England and New England were very different. England possessed a small number of large-scale clearing banks that had established extensive branch networks and dominated the domestic market. In contrast, New England banking was characterized by a large number of small-scale institutions. Yet, a century earlier, there were striking similarities between the two systems. An analysis of their evolution over the course of the nineteenth century provides an international and comparative perspective on the continuing debate over banking institutions, lending patterns, and economic growth.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , Spring 2010 , pp. 27 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © Harvard Business School 2010

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References

1 This study follows a tradition of international comparisons in banking history, notably those of Rondo Cameron. See Cameron, Rondo, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation (Oxford, 1967)Google Scholar; and Cameron, , ed., Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons from History (Oxford, 1972).Google Scholar

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59 Lending data that corresponded in time to shareholding data were found for twelve of the forty-six banks surveyed. Lending data were sampled, taking three years that corre sponded with shareholding data from the following sources: LTSBGA: Halifax Joint Stock Bank (Securities notebook, 1668), LUBC, BDM, 93; HSBCGA: BBC (BDM, A12 and A16), BradBC (BDM, B2 and B28), HBC (BDM, H4 and H7), CWBC (BDM, 45 and 47), SUBC (BDM, AD2); and RBSGA: ASHGBC (BDM, 10144 and 10145), Bilston District Banking Co. (BDM, 11342), NNBC (BDM, 574), Sheffield & Rotherham Banking Co. (BDM, SR/1/1, 01095S and SR/1/5, 01097S).

60 SUBC, BDM, AD2, HSBCGA.

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