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Democrats' 1916 Tariff Commission: Responding to Dumping Fears and Illustrating the Consumer Costs of Protectionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Karen Schnietz
Karen Schnietz
Affiliation:
KAREN SCHNIETZ is an assistant professor of business at the Jones Graduate School of Management atRice University.
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Abstract

The 1916 Tariff Commission, created to provide expert analyses of tariffs, is an example of Progressive-Era reliance on technical analysis. However, the Commission was motivated not only by a desire to improve technical understanding of tariffs, but also by distinctly political goals. President Woodrow Wilson and Treasury Secretary McAdoo adopted this Republican invention in response to pressure to prevent potential foreign “dumping” after the First World War. Congressional Democrats supported the Tariff Commission for this and an additional reason: they hoped Commission analyses of the consumer welfare costs of protectionism would undermine future electoral support for Republican high-tariff candidates.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , Spring 1998 , pp. 1 - 45
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1998

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References

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13 Kitchin claimed, “all facts necessary to write a revenue bill … can easily be secured through other sources than a Tariff Commission.” 15 Apr. 1916 letter to R. Bowker, roll 9, Claude Kitchin Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library [herafter Kitchen Papers]. Wilson's statement to Governor J. Cox of Ohio was representative of his publicly-stated opposition to the Tariff Commission: “the functions of a Tariff Commission have already been lodged in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.” 27 Aug. 1915 letter, series 4, subject 180, reel 233, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereafter Wilson Papers]. See also references in footnote 24.

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17 Historians have described the Ways & Means Committee during the Wilson administration as one of the best ever assembled. Sarasohn, David, The Party of Reform: Democrats in the Progressive Era (Jackson, Miss., 1989), 93–95Google Scholar. Indeed, the Ways and Means committee reporting the Tariff Committee bill was also the same committee responsible for the highly progressive income tax structure of the 1916 Revenue Act—a tax structure that Wilson did not propose but which has been called one of the great achievements of the Progressive Era. Link, Arthur, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace (Princeton, N.J., 1965), 65Google Scholar.

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19 For example, in a public address on 10 July 1916, Wilson said “party politics ought to have nothing to do with the question of what is for the benefit of the business of the United States, and that is the reason we ought to have a Tariff Commission.” PWW 37, 392. See also 28 July 1916 letter from Wilson to S. Hastings, PWW 37, 492-3. In private, however, to trusted advisor Colonel Edward House, Wilson “expressed the belief that the tariff was a political question which one could not relegate out of active politics.” PWW 36, 177. See also “Tariff: Economic Argument” (1913) in Wilson Papers, series 12, reel 525; and 12 May 1916 memo of Ray Baker on conversation with Wilson, PWW 37, 37.

A Tariff Commission supporter in the Wilson cabinet, Agriculture Secretary David Houston, also said that expecting a Tariff Commission to take the tariff out of politics would be futile since “taxation [constitutes] the very essence of political difference.” Houston, David F., Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920 (New York, 1926), I, 196–7Google Scholar. See also 18 Dec. 1915 letter from Houston to F. Taussig, in box 335, General Correspondence File, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, National Archives II, Record Group 16 [hereafter Agriculture Records].

20 On the relationship between tariff protection and trusts, and the anti-monopoly movement this spawned during the Progressive Era, see Pierce, Franklin, The Tariff and Trusts (New York, 1907Google Scholar), and Rodgers, Daniel T., “In Search of Progressivism” in Kutter, Stanley I. and Katz, Stanley N., eds., The Promise of American History: Progress and Prospects (Baltimore, Md., 1984), IV, 4Google Scholar.

21 U.S. Statutes at Large, Ch. 6, 61st Congress, 1st sess., 83. For more information on Republican Tariff Board proposals and support see Congressional Record 53 (1916): 13803–4Google Scholar [hereafter CR]; Kenkel, “Tariff Commission Movement”; Margulies, Herbert, Reconciliation and Revival: James R. Mann and the House Republicans in the Wilson Era (Westport, Conn., 1996): 55, 78–79Google Scholar; and Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin (Columbia, Mo., 1977), 112, 163-5, 194Google Scholar; 13 Aug. 1910 letter from I. Lenroot to F. Gray, box 2, Irvine L. Lenroot Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, and “The Legislative History of the Law Creating the U.S. Federal Tariff Commission,” box 134, William S. Culbertson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereafter Culbertson Papers], The last Tariff Board proposal prior to the Democrats' Tariff Commission was the 1911 Longworth bill to study production cost differences. The bill passed in the House with the support of 99 percent of Republicans and 28 percent of Democrats, mostly from midwestern states where the tariff board movement originated and where popular and business support was highest. In the Senate, Democrats filibustered and killed the bill (CR 46 [1911]: 1676, 1679-81, 1683, 1688-9, 1693).

22 See CR 62 (1922): 7570, 7646, 7821Google Scholar.

23 See Houston Chronicle, 16 Oct. 1915. New York Times, 25 July 1915; 22, 26 & 29 Sept. 1915; 8 & 23 Oct. 1915; 5 Nov. 1915; 10 & 20 Dec. 1915. On the pressure to establish a Tariff Commission, Wilson replied during a press conference on 29 Nov. 1914, to a question about whether he'd given more thought to a Tariff Commission, “Well, it is called to my attention about once every twenty-four hours.” PWW 50, 661. Industrial and organized interest groups demanding a permanent tariff commission included the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Clothiers, the Tariff Commission League (Chicago), the National Grange, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Tariff Commission Association, the Eastern Supply Association, the Silk Manufacturers Association, and the Chemical Industry Association.

24 In a 8 Jan. 1915 speech, Wilson claimed the FTC “is authorized and empowered to inquire into and report to Congress, not only upon the conditions of trade in this country, but upon the conditions of trade, the cost of manufacture, the cost of transportation—all the things that enter into the question of the tariff—in foreign countries as well as in the U.S.” PWW 32, 37. See also 29 Nov. 1914 Press Conference, PWW 50, 661; 14 Jan. 1915 interview, PWW 32, 4; 17 Aug. 1915 letter from Wilson to M. Mathew, series 4, subject 180, reel 233, Wilson Papers.

25 28 Nov. 1915 diary of E. House, PWW 35, 261. 23 Nov. 1915 letter from McAdoo to Wilson, container 520, William G. McAdoo Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereafter McAdoo Papers].

26 23 Sept. 1882 testimony in Atlanta, PWW 2, 140–3, 285–6. In 1882 Republican President Arthur appointed a temporary Tariff Board to make recommendations on tariff decreases to reduce the $100 million federal budget surplus that had been produced by the highly protectionist tariffs of the Republican post-Civil War congresses. Congress ignored the recommendation to lower tariffs by 20 percent, raising them by that amount instead. Wilson had no allusions that the Arthur Tariff Board, comprised of Republican protectionists, would be sympathetic to his free trade arguments; he appeared in the hopes that his testimony would be included in the Board's published report and influence the tariff debate through print.

27 The Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1975), 888Google Scholar.

28 Series 12, reel 525, Wilson Papers. In the same reel, see other campaign literature: “What High Tariff Sugar Means to You Mr. and Mrs. Consumer,” “Wilson Exposes High Tariff System of Favors,” and “Twelve Reasons Why Laboring Men Should Vote for Wilson.” Of the dozens of pieces of campaign literature in these folders, more than half focus on how Republican tariff protection led to high consumer prices and how the promised Democratic tariff cuts would bring prices down.

29 See New York Times, 16 Jan. 1914, 6; 19 Jan. 1914, 11; 8 Feb. 1914, viii, 10; 28 Mar. 1914, 12; 9 Apr. 1914, 2, 10; 19 Apr. 1914, ix, 12; 21 Apr. 1914, 10; 4 May 1914, 11; 10 May 1914, ix, 12; 22 May 1914, 12; 5 June 1914, 14; 21 June 1914, ii, 3; 30 June 1914, 12; 1 July 1914, 1; 5 July 1914, viii, 8; 19 July 1914, viii, 16; 29 July 1914, 12; 8 Oct. 1914, 7; 11 Oct. 1914, ii, 4; 14 Dec. 1914, 4; 21 Dec. 1914, 6; 27 Dec. 1914, 7. Wall Street Journal, 26 Feb. 1914, 2; 7 Mar. 1914, 3; 5 June 1914, 2; 11 June 1914, 8; 22 June 1914, 2; 1 July 1914, 1; 8 July 1914, 6.

30 1 June 1916 press release of R. McCulloch, reel 234, Wilson Papers. See also 11 June 1914 letter from W. Hirth to D. Houston, box 130, Agriculture Records.

31 See 28 May 1914 Wilson press release, PWW 30, 93-6; New York Times, 29 May 1914. Privately, Wilson confided: “There is a real fight on. The Republicans are every day employing the most unscrupulous methods of partisanship and false evidence to destroy this administration.” 31 Jan. 1915 letter from Wilson to N. Toy, PWW 32, 165.

32 On the complaints by the Business Association of Montgomery County and attending publicity see 23 July 1914 and 29 Dec. 1914 press conferences, PWW 50, 519, 664; Houston Chronicle, 27 Dec. 1914: 18; New York Times, 27 Dec. 1914; and Washington Post, 20 July 1914. On the Commerce Department investigation see New York Times, 24 Feb. 1915, 7; and 8 Mar. 1915, 8; 9 Mar. 1915, 6, 8; and 30 Apr. 1915 letter from G. Weber to E. Pratt and “Effects of the Tariff of 1913,” box 1, U.S. Tariff Commission Records, National Archives II, Record Group 81 [hereafter Tariff Commission Records].

33 In Feb. 1915, Attorney General Gregory concluded that collusion by trusts was not the cause of rising food prices. See Houston Chronicle, 14 & 17 Aug., 1914; New York Times, 13, 14, 15 & 20 Aug. 1914 and 24 Feb. 1915; and Wall Street Journal, 13 & 26 Aug. 1914. Wilson press conferences of 1 June 1914, 24 Aug. 1914, 3 Sept. 1914, 1 Oct. 1914 and 2 Mar. 1915 in PWW 50, 478, 548, 561, 586, 703; and PWW 31, 79. See also the following 1914 documents: 13 Apr. letter from Houston to Tumulty, 23 July letter from C. Marvin to A. Green, 22 Aug. letter from Houston to Rep. J. Eagan, 9 Sept. letter from Houston to A. Ricqles, 10 Sept. letter from G. Woolley to Wilson, Sept. “Workers' Monster Petitions,” 14 Oct. memo from C. Brand to W. Callendar, and 16 Dec. letter from C. Vrooman to Rep. G. O'Shaunessy, box 130, Agriculture Records.

34 The U.S. exported 67 percent of U.S. raw cotton production in 1913. U.S. Statistical Abstract (Washington, D.C., 1915), 521, 562Google Scholar.

35 See Houston Chronicle, 5 Jan. 1915, 14; 28 Feb., 1915, 39; 14 Mar. 1915, 43; 14 Apr. 1915, 1; 5 May 1915, 1; 1 June 1915, 18; 17 July 1915, 7; 21 July 1915, 6; 24 Aug. 1915, 9; 27 Aug. 1915, 4; 2 Nov. 1915, 1; 3 Dec. 1915, 20; 17 Dec. 1915, 16. New York Times, 4 Feb. 1915, 15; 6 Feb. 1915, 15; 12 Feb. 1915, 15; 14 Feb. 1915, 11; 2 Mar. 1915, 11; 29 Apr. 1915, 14; 23 Apr. 1915, 12; 28 Apr. 1915, 3; 8 May 1915, 19; 8 July 1915, 16; 3 Aug. 1915, 13; 15 Aug. 1915, 3; 17 Aug. 1915, 9; 20 Aug. 1915, 20; 24 Aug. 1915, 20; 4 Sept. 1915, 12; 21 Sept. 1915,1; 13 Oct. 1915, 1; 24 Oct. 1915, 9; 29 Oct. 1915, 18. Wall Street Journal, 14 Jan. 1915, 1; 6 Feb. 1915, 1; 9 Mar. 1915, 7; 8 May 1915, 8; 15 June 1915, 2; 3 July 1915, 8; 24 July 1915, 8; 4 Aug. 1915, 8; 26 Aug. 1915, 8; 31 Aug. 1915, 3; 30 Dec. 1915, 3. See also 29 June 1915 letter from Rep. John Williams (D-Miss.) to Wilson, 12 July 1915 letter from A. Leven to Wilson, and 24 July 1915 letter from J. Williams to Wilson, container 1, John Sharp Williams Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereafter Williams Papers].

36 29 July 1915 letter from E. House to Wilson, PWW 34, 42. On correspondence Wilson received regarding the cotton crisis, see 22 July 1915 letter from M. Sheppard to Wilson; various correspondence to Wilson of 27 July 1915; 31 July 1915 letter from Rep. H. Sumners (D-Tex.) to Wilson; PWW 34, 13, 32, 34, 62, 99, 106. See also 13 Jan. 1916 letter from O. Brothers to W. McAdoo, and 20 Jan. 1916 letter from E. Pringle to W. McAdoo, McAdoo Papers, containers 152 and 153. On Republican criticism, see Marguiles, Reconciliation and Revival, 123. See also Link's, Arthur account in Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-15 (Princeton, N.J., 1960), 107-8, 124-8, 171–4Google Scholar.

37 The 1913 Tariff put dyestuffs on the free list. As both Chair of the House Ways and Means committee and Representative from a textile state, Claude Kitchin received much mail from textile manufacturing constituents expressing concern over potential dumping and support for a protective tariff for dyestuffs. Roll 6, Kitchin Papers. See also 4 Nov. 1915 letter from Assistant Treasury Secretary J. Peters to W. McAdoo outlining the dyestuffs situation, container 156, McAdoo Papers; 1 Feb. 1916 letters from A. Allen (Sherwin Williams) to J. Williams, and from J. French (Cardinal Mills) to J. Williams, box 15, Williams Papers; and 6 Nov. 1915 letter from Trade and Transportation Bureau to J. Tumulty, box 9, Joseph Patrick Tumulty Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereafter Tumulty Papers]. Between Jan. and Mar. 1916, the House Ways and Means Committee received 702 petitions and letters, either directly or forwarded to them from eighty-eight other legislators, from businesses urging that the committee support H.R. 702, a bill introduced by Rep. Ebenezer Hill (R-Conn.) to place a protective tariff on dyestuffs. Boxes 468 and 469, Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, 64th Congress, National Archives I, Record Group 233.

38 14 Jan. 1916 letter to Wilson, PWW 35, 475.

39 The Administration was also legitimately concerned about the threat as a policy issue. A 1915 report on “Dumping and Monopoly” prepared for Wilson concluded that Germany had “fostered foreign trade by every means available,” including plans to subsidize industries while they ruined foreign competitors through dumping. The report also suggested that Germany would recuperate swiftly, given the extraordinary industrial strength she was demonstrating in the war. Series 12, reel 525, Wilson Papers. The American Consul in Denmark was convinced that “a great dumping plan is being worked out by [German manufacturers and bankers] by which Germany intends to export vast quantities of cheap goods when peace comes.” The industries said to be particularly vulnerable were toys, optical and surgical instruments, electrical machinery, machine tools, and clothing. 25 Apr. 1916 memo from E. Winslow to C. Kitchin, roll 12, Kitchin Papers.

40 4 Nov. 1915 letter from McAdoo to F. Cobb; 5 Nov. 1915 letter from McAdoo to House; 8 Nov. 1915 letter from McAdoo to T. Love; 10 Nov. 1915 memo from McAdoo, container 487, McAdoo Papers. 5 Nov. 1915 diary entry of E. House, PWW 35, 177.

41 6 Jan. 1916 letter from B. Rosenthal to McAdoo, container 151, McAdoo Papers. See also in container 147: 26 Oct. 1915 letter from J. Hawthorne of King County Democratic Club; 29 Oct. letter from W. Miller to McAdoo; 8 Nov. letters from W. Sands and S. Untermyer. In container 148: 13 Nov. letter from J. Cathey; 14 Nov. letter from H. Green. In container 149: 26 Nov. letters from A. Billingslea and from L. Williams. In container 150: 21 Dec. letter from F. Hall of California Democratic State Committee. In container 151: 29 Dec. letter from A. Chapman; and 1915 letter from G. Brosius. In container 153: 28 Jan. 1916 letter from F. Plachy. See also 18 Dec. 1915 letter from American Consul in Greece to McAdoo and forwarded to Wilson, series 2, reel 75, Wilson Papers.

42 27 Sept. 1915 letter from Democratic Central Committee, Placer, California to Wilson. Relatedly, M. Mathew argued on 11 Aug. 1915, “The opposition party advocated a [Tariff Commission]. Should the Republicans come into power again they will create it among the first things they do. Let us prevent them from having that weapon. [Creating a Tariff Commission] will disarm and leave them without a constructive idea on which to wage next year's battle.” See also the following letters to Wilson: 28 July 1915 from J. Gaines; 17 Aug. 1915 from T. Robinswan; 24 Aug. 1915 from Gov. J. Cox of Ohio and from J. Ano; 11 Sept. 1915 from H. Gross; 13 Oct. 1915 from Philadelphia Mayor R. Blankenburg; 30 Nov. 1915 from Wilson to S. Mead; 30 Nov. 1915 from G. Bretzfelder; 7 Dec. 1915 from G. Loft (D-N.Y.); 15 Dec. 1915 from W. Winchester; 22 Dec. 1915 from C. Weninger; 27 Dec. 1915 from J. Farwell; 5 Jan. 1916 from J. Landstreet; 7 Jan. 1916 from S. Berton; 24 Jan. 1916 from E. Farrar; and 26 Jan. 1916 from W. Cox (D-Ind.). All in series 4, file 180, reel 233, Wilson Papers. See also the editorials urging Wilson to adopt a Tariff Commission cited in footnote 23. Other Wilson cabinet members received similarly pessimistic letters and warnings. To Joseph Tumulty see 16 Nov. 1915 letter from R. Mitchell, 29 Nov. 1915 from E. Grosscup, 23 Jan. 1916 from S. Lynch, and 19 Feb. 1916 from O. Carmichael, box 9, Tumulty Papers; 4 Oct. 1915 letter from E. Wood to A. Burleson and 7 Feb. 1916 from R. Hudson to W. McAdoo, box 6, Albert Burleson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division; 10 Dec. 1915 letter from F. Lane to J. Daniels, reel 55, Josephus Daniels Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division; and 30 Apr. 1915 letter from J. Week to W. Redfield, box 1, Tariff Commission Records.

43 “Resolutions Unanimously Adopted by the National Grange,” 10 Nov. 1915, container 147; Nov. letter from McAdoo to Wilson, container 520; and 8 Nov. 1915 letter from G. Emerson to McAdoo, container 150; McAdoo Papers.

44 28 Nov. 1915 diary entry of E. House; State of the Union Address; and Democratic National Committee address, PWW 35, 261, 298, 312-6.

45 Indeed, in his letter to Kitchin explaining the reasons for his switch, Wilson noted: “You will remember that in my last message to Congress I foreshadowed just the considerations which were operating in my mind in this matter [of changed economic conditions necessitating a Tariff Commission to make thorough study of them].” 26 Jan. 1916 letter from Wilson to Kitchin, reel 6, Kitchin Papers.

46 Secretary of State Robert Lansing's diaries reveal that the topic of dumping was discussed in the Cabinet meetings of 7, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 28 Jan. 1916, reel 2, Robert Lansing Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.

47 4 Jan. 1916 letter from Redfield to Wilson, PWW 36, 428.

48 “Dumping and Monopoly,” series 12, reel 525, Wilson Papers.

49 On Redfield's antidumping bill see 13 Dec. 1915 “Proposed Draft of Antidumping Bill,” transmitted by A. Thurman, series 2, reel 75, Wilson Papers, and 3 Feb. 1916 letter from Redfield to Wilson, PWW 36, 127. On McAdoo's opposition to the antidumping proposal, see 14 Jan. 1916 memo from McAdoo to Wilson, PWW 35, 477.

50 20 Dec. 1915 letter from Houston to Taussig, and memo on “Tariff Commission,” in box 335, Agriculture Records.

51 Houston, Eight Years I, 196-7. 17 Dec. 1915 letter from Redfield to Houston, 18 Dec. 1915 letter from Houston to Taussig, and 20 Dec. 1915 letter from Houston to Taussig, box 335, Agriculture Records. 17 Dec. 1916 report by F. Taussig on a Tariff Commission, with transmittal letter to D. Houston, series 2, reel 75, Wilson Papers. Taussig was skeptical that a Tariff Commission could really predict post-war conditions, but felt an independent commission of experts to study the fiscal effects of tariffs could greatly improve tariff-making. 10 Jan. 1916 memo from A. Peters to McAdoo attaching “Essentials of a draft of a Tariff Commission bill,” container 520, McAdoo Papers. See also the following letters from W. Redfield: 7 Dec. 1915 letter to P. Brown and 23 Dec. 1915 to Taussig, in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of Commerce, National Archives II, Record Group 40 [hereafter Commerce Records].

52 Historians have not appreciated McAdoo's pivotal role in persuading Wilson and shepherding the legislation through Congress. Wilson biographer Arthur Link overlooks McAdoo entirely in his account of the Tariff Commission, overemphasizing the influence of Sen. R. Owen, who wrote one letter of support for the Tariff Commission to Wilson. Link, Arthur, Confusion and Crisis (Princeton, N.J., 1964), 342Google Scholar. Other accounts of the Tariff Commission have relied too heavily on Agriculture Secretary Houston's assertion that he was the Commission's primary advocate within the Wilson Administration. See Houston, Eight Years I, 196, Kenkel, “Tariff Commission Movement,” 113-5 and Wolman, Most Favored Nation, 206. However, these accounts are not supported by the historic record. Houston's main role was in putting economist Frank Taussig in touch with the Administration, and in convincing McAdoo of the value of a Tariff Commission (see references in footnote 51). But McAdoo, not Houston, convinced Wilson of the merits of a Tariff Commission and then oversaw the Administration's efforts to secure its passage. McAdoo's files are filled with correspondence between himself, Wilson, congressional leaders and interest groups on drafts of the Tariff Commission bill and strategies for its passage. See 31 Jan. 1916 letter from D. Roper to Kitchin, reel 6, Kitchin Papers. In the McAdoo Papers, see the following letters from 1916: 1 Feb. from H. Gross to McAdoo, and McAdoo to D. Roper, Burleson, and Houston; 5 Feb. from Houston to McAdoo; 7 Feb. from A. Peters to McAdoo; 9 Feb. from H. Gross to McAdoo, container 154. 14 Feb. to McAdoo from B. Taylor, and 28 Feb. from W. Tucker, container 155. 28 Mar. from G. Cooksey, container 157. See also 1 Feb. 1916 memo from McAdoo to Houston, box 335, Agriculture Records.

53 5 Nov. 1915 diary entry of E. House, and 4 Mar. 1916 letter from Burleson to Wilson, PWW 36, 177, 249; 8 Dec. 1915 letter from Lane to Redfield, Commerce Records; and 4 Sept. 1915 letter from McAdoo to William Wilson, container 165, McAdoo Papers.

54 Redfield felt that creating a Tariff Commission to study some of the same issues then being addressed in the Commerce Department's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce sent a signal that federal agencies were incapable of providing credible, technical studies. 22 Dec. 1915 letter from Redfield to Wilson, series 2, reel 75, Wilson Papers, and 23 Dec. 1915 letter from Redfield to Taussig, box 335, Agriculture Records.

55 Redfield stressed the importance of taking action on the dumping issue during the election year and urged Wilson to approach Congress as early as possible in its newly-opened session, to ensure that legislative action on dumping would be completed before the fall elections. 4 Jan. 1916 letter from Redfield to Wilson, PWW 35, 428-9.

56 14 Jan. 1916 letter from McAdoo to Wilson, PWW 35, 476-7. Wilson was also receiving direct pressure from legislators to support a Tariff Commission to address the dumping scare. For instance, Sen. R. Owen wrote on Jan. 5th, “It is of the greatest importance to prevent the Republicans coming together and using the protective tariff issue to the disadvantage of the Democratic Party…. [A]s a matter of party expediency, such a tariff commission would conciliate two or three millions of progressive men.” Wilson met with the Senator a few days later to discuss the matter in person. PWW 35, 433-4.

57 19 Jan. 1916 memo from Wilson to McAdoo, container 520, McAdoo Papers; 21 Jan. 1916 letter from J. Fitzgerald to Wilson, series 4, subject 180, reel 233, Wilson Papers; and 24 Jan. 1916 letter from Wilson to Kitchin, roll 6, Kitchin Papers.

58 For Taussig's draft legislation, see 28 Jan. 1916 letter from D. Roper to C. Kitchin, reel 6, Kitchin Papers. For Wilson's draft legislation (which was modified from the Taussig draft by McAdoo and Houston), given to second-ranking Ways and Means member Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) and submitted to Congress as H.R. 10585, see 3 Feb. 1916 letter from McAdoo to Rainey, container 154, McAdoo Papers, and 23 Feb. 1916 letter from W. Kent (R-Calif.) to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers.

59 The Tariff Commission could also be used to advance another policy interest of Wilson's: expanding export opportunities for U.S. manufacturers, to simultaneously resist pressures for protectionism and aid businesses. McAdoo worked hard on such trade expansion, particularly with his Pan-American Conferences (Proceedings of the Pan American Financial Conference [Washington, D.C., 1915Google Scholar]). The Tariff Commission prepared several early studies consistent with this interest (see Figure 6, reports on Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties and Free Zones in Ports of the U.S.). Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address this issue. See instead Wolman, Most Favored Nation.

60 On the reasons for Kitchin's opposition see 15 Apr. 1916 letter from Kitchin to R. Bowker, reel 6, Kitchin Papers, and 17 Jan. 1916 letter from Houston to Taussig, box 335, Agriculture Records. On the meeting between Wilson and Kitchin see 25 Jan. 1916 letter from Tumulty to Wilson, PWW 36, 524. On constituent and colleague support for a Tariff Commission see the following letters from 1916: 25 Jan. from T. Thacher; 25 Jan. from E. Rumely and from M. Cuff; 26 Jan. from W. Richardson; 27 Jan. from G. Randall, and from J. Livingston, reel 6, Kitchin Papers. And finally, Wilson explained his switch: “I have changed my mind because all the circumstances of the world have changed and it seems to me that in view of the extraordinary and far-reaching changes which the European war has brought about it is absolutely necessary that we should have a competent instrument of inquiry.” 26 Jan. 1916 letter from Wilson to Kitchin, reprinted in part on the front page of the New York Times that day, emphasizing that the Commission was a step to prevent dumping; 31 Jan. 1916 from D. Roper to Kitchin and 1 Feb. 1916 from McAdoo to Kitchin, reel 6, Kitchin Papers. On Wilson's reasons for his switch, see also public addresses on 3 and 10 Feb. 1916, PWW 36, 113 and 156; 12 May 1916 memo by R. Baker, PWW 37, 37; and New York Times, 27 Jan. 1916, 4.

It is also possible that the friction and conflict between Kitchin and Wilson over the military “preparedness” issue was spilling over into unrelated issues. See Arnett, Alex, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (New York, 1937Google Scholar). There are frequent references to the strained relations between the Wilson administration and Kitchin in the papers of Progressive-Era politicians. See 9 Nov. 1915 letter from J. O'Neil to McAdoo and 11 May 1916 letter from McAdoo to A. Farquahar, containers 147 and 158, McAdoo Papers. 18 Oct. 1915 letter from Kitchin to V. Murdock, box 58, Victor Murdock Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. Wilson described Kitchin as “That distinguished stubborn North Carolinian who when he made up his mind would never open it.” Daniels, Cabinet Diaries, 330.

61 27 Jan. 1916 letter from Rainey to McAdoo, container 153, McAdoo Papers. The New York Times also noted how foolish the sudden Republican opposition looked, 4 Feb. 1916, 8. Unfortunately, we know very little else about Rainey's thoughts on the Tariff Commission. His papers are sparse and there is only one letter in twenty containers that makes any reference to the Tariff Commission: a constituent urging Rainey's support, 20 Apr. 1916 letter from C. Brown, container 1, the Henry Rainey Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.

62 18 Apr. 1916 letter from Underwood to R. Bowker, roll 9, Kitchin Papers, and 17 Jan. 1916 letter from Houston to Taussig, box 335, Agriculture Records. During legislative debate, Underwood warned: “… even if every [Commissioner] when first appointed should be a rank free trader, in a few years he will be a rank high protectionist… Every complainant and every petitioner that come before him will be a protectionist.” CR 53 (1916): 13788, A1949Google Scholar. Underwood's fear was well-founded: the majority of the correspondence the Tariff Commission received from businesses consisted of appeals for increased tariff protection, reels 1 & 2, General Correspondence, Records of the U.S. International Trade Commission, National Archives II, Record Group 81 (hereafter USITC Records). Interestingly, Underwood praised the Tariff Commission in his 1928 memoirs (see footnote 80).

63 For evidence of Glass and Owen's support see: 3 June 1916 letter from A. Peters to McAdoo, container 160, McAdoo Papers and 5 Jan. 1916 letter from Owen to Wilson, PWW 35, 433-4. Evidence of support for or opposition to the Tariff Commission is also available for the following other legislators. In favor: Sen. J. Alexander (D-Mo.), 26 Aug. 1916 letter to McAdoo, container 165, McAdoo Papers; H. Barnhart (D-Ind.), CR 53, A1416; C. Cline (D-Ind.), CR 53, 10611; J. Collier (D-Miss.), CR 53, 10584; Sen. A. Cummins (R-Iowa), CR 53, 13795; Sen. C. Curtis (R-Kans.), CR 53, 12971; C. Dickinson (D-Mo.), CR 53, 10601; L. Dixon (D-Ind.), CR 53, 10579; Sen. J. Gallinger (R-N.H.), CR 53, 13797; F. Gillet (R-Mass.), CR 53, 10603; G. Helvering (D-Kans.), CR 53, A1771; W. Green (R-Iowa), CR 53, 10588; Sen. F. Newlands (D-Nev.), box 335 Agriculture Records; R. Olney (D-Mass.), CR 53, 10615; Sen. A. Pomerene (D-Ohio), CR 53, 13804; P. Quin (D-Miss.), CR 53, 10613; C. Randall (R-Calif), CR 53, Appendix 1500; A. Sabath (D-Ill.), CR 53, Appendix 1872; Sen. H. Smith (D-GA), CR 53, 13794; C. Sloan (R-Nebr), CR 53, 10593; W. Stephens (Progressive-Calif), 25 Mar. 1916 letter to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers; Sen. F. Simmons (D-N.C.), 1 Sept. 1916 letter to McAdoo, container 165, McAdoo Papers. Opposed: I. Bacharach (R-N.Y.), CR 53, A1536; W. Bailey (D-Pa.), CR 53, 10616; Sen. J. Bankhead (D-Ala.), CR 53, 13868; L. Dyer (R-Mo.), CR 53, A1466; H. Emerson (R-Ohio), CR 53, A1456; J. Fordney (R-Mich.), CR 53, 10517; E. Hamilton (R-Mich.), CR 53, 10599; Sen. T. Hartwick (D-Calif), CR 53, 13868; Sen. P. McCumber (R-N.D.), CR 53, 13801; J. Meeker (R-Mo.), CR 53, 10605; J.H. Moore (R-Pa.), CR 53, 10579, A1415; Sen. J. Shields (D-Ind.), CR 53, 13868; I. Siegel (R-N.Y.), CR 53, A1450; Sen. T. Sterling (R-S.D.), CR 53, 13794; and Sen. J. Vardaman (D-Miss.), CR 53, 13868.

64 28 Mar. 1916 letter from G. Cooksey to McAdoo, and 28 May 1916 letter from House Speaker C. Clark to McAdoo, containers 157 & 159, McAdoo Papers.

65 Interestingly, only four House Republicans and eight Senate Republicans opposed the appropriations bill. Republicans disliked the Revenue Act. CR 53 (1916): 9190, 11383Google Scholar.

66 This focus of the Commission's studies on the consumer costs of tariff protection provides support for research that has examined the growing importance of consumer versus producer interests during the Progressive Era. Research in this area has demonstrated how antitrust, health and safety, and other laws increasingly considered and protected consumer interests. See Aduddell, Robert and Cain, Louis, “Public Policy Toward the ‘Greatest Trust in the World’,” Business History Review 55 (Summer 1981): 217–242CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York, 1955Google Scholar); and Mayer, Robert, The Consumer Movement (Boston, Mass., 1989Google Scholar).

67 Republican quote in CR 53 (1916): 13063. For additional Republican claims that foreign exporters paid U.S. tariffs see CR 53 (1916): 10604, 10618, 10659, 12972, 13044, 13063, A1475, A1496, A1505. First Democratic quote by Rep. Goodwin (D-Alaska), CR 53 (1916): 10510. Second Democratic quote by Woodrow Wilson, New York Times, 9 Jan. 1915, 1. For additional Democratic arguments that tariff incidence fell on consumers see 14 Apr. 1913 and 11 Nov. 1913 Wilson press conferences, PWW 50, 21, 230; “Tariff: Economic Argument” (1913): series 12, reel 525, Wilson Papers; and 18 Dec. 1915 letter from Wilson to Kitchin, PWW 35, 370. For further illustrations of conflicting partisan claims, see the majority and minority opinions in the Aldrich Report (Senate Report No. 2332; 50th Congress, 1st sess.), 4 Oct. 1888; McKinley Report (House Report No. 1466; 51st Congress, 1st sess), 16 Apr. 1890; Wilson Report (House Report No. 234, 53d Congress, 2d sess.), 19 Dec. 1893; and Dingley Report (House Report No. 1, 55th Congress, 1st sess.). See also Allen, William, “Issues in Congressional Tariff Debates, 1890-1930,” The Southern Economic Journal 20 (1954): 340–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Edwards, Richard, “Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth Century Congressional Tariff Debates,” The Journal of Economic History 30 (Dec. 1970): 802–838CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 See CR 53 (1916): 10604, 10619, 10647, 10659, 13062, 13116, 13122, 13802, 13834.

69 For pro-Democratic articles see: Literary Digest, 10 Jan. 1914. New York Herald, 17, 20, 21 & 22 Feb. 1914. New York Times, 2 & 6 Feb. 1914; 20 Mar. 1914; 30 June 1914; 10 July 1914; 14 & 16 Mar. 1915; 11 Apr. 1915; 9 Nov. 1915; 20 Feb. 1916. Saturday Evening Post, 21 June 1913, 2 Aug. 1913. Washington Post, 16 Jan. 1916, 23 Aug. 1916. For pro-Republican articles see: New York Herald, 16 Aug. 1916. New York Times, 21 Jan. 1914; 19 May 1914; 21 June 1914; 29 July 1914; 8 & 10 Mar. 1915; 5 Oct. 1915; 30 Nov. 1915; 12, 28 & 30 Apr. 1916. St. Louis Globe Democrat, 17 Aug. 1916. McAdoo quote in 25 Feb. 1916 letter to W. Brown, container 156, McAdoo Papers.

70 Blakey, Roy, “The New Income Tax,” American Economic Review 4 (Mar. 1914): 35–47Google Scholar; Callender, Guy, Economic History of the U.S., 1765-1860 (Boston, Mass., 1909Google Scholar); Dunbar, Donald, The Tin Plate Industry (Boston, Mass., 1915Google Scholar); Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics (London, 1890Google Scholar); Plehn, Carl, Introduction to Public Finance (New York, 1916Google Scholar); Taussig, Frank, Principles of Economics (New York, 1911Google Scholar); Wright, Chester, Wool Growing and the Tariff (New York, 1910CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

71 Emery, Herbert, “Democrats and the Tariff,” Yale Review 2 (1913): 193–214Google Scholar; Franklin, Fabian, Cost of Living (New York, 1915Google Scholar). Most economists agreed that the rising cost of living during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the result of gold devaluation; see Fisher, Irving, “A Remedy for the Rising Cost of Living,” American Economic Review Supplement 3 (Mar. 1913): 20–28Google Scholar, and Taussig, Principles. However, economists and statisticians noted that better data and indices were needed; see Fairchild, Henry Pratt, “The Standard of Living,” American Economic Review 6 (Mar. 1916): 9–25Google Scholar, and Wilcox, Walter, “The Statistical Work of the U.S. Government,” Quarterly Publication of the American Statistical Association 14 (1914): 416–421CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 Pierce, Tariff and Trusts; Segilman, Edwin, The Shift and Incidence of Taxation (London, 1902Google Scholar); and Wooster, Harvey, “The Tariff and the Ultimate Consumer,” American Economic Review 6 (Mar. 1916): 26–39Google Scholar.

73 Emery, Henry, “The Tariff and the Ultimate Consumer,” American Economic Review 5 (Sept. 1915): 534–553Google Scholar (this Yale economist chaired the 1909 Taft Tariff Board); Holland, Bernard, The Fall of Protection (New York, 1913Google Scholar); Patten, Simon, The Economic Basis of Protection (London, 1890Google Scholar); and Whepley, James, The Trade of the World (New York, 1913Google Scholar).

74 Jevons, W., Theory of Political Economy (London, 1911Google Scholar); and Marshall, Principles.

75 From the end of the Civil War until Democrats' 1913 Underwood Tariff, the average tariff rate set by Republican Tariff Acts during the period was 47 percent. Democrats' 1894 Wilson-Gorman Act reduced tariffs to an average rate of 41 percent, while Democrats' 1913 Underwood Act set an average rate of 28 percent. Historical Statistics, Table U207-212.

76 There are four welfare effects associated with a tariff: (1) the transfer of consumer surplus to protected domestic producers in the form of higher prices; (2) the transfer of consumer and foreign producer surpluses to the government in the form of the tariff duty; (3) the consumer surplus lost through inefficient domestic production; and (4) the consumer loss associated with having less supply of the dutied product than would exist under free trade. See Beth, and Yarbrough, Robert, The World Economy (New York, 1988), 194Google Scholar. In 1916 many economists believed tariffs were responsible for resource allocation distortions, even though they were unable to formally articulate these hunches. Widespread consensus on the precise welfare costs of protection was reached with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Stolper, Wolfgang and Samuelson, Paul, “Protection and Real Wages,” Review of Economic Studies 9 (1941): 58–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 Compare H.R. 10585 transmitted with 23 Feb. 1916 letter from Kent to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers, with Taussig's “Draft for a Tariff Commission” transmitted with 28 Jan. 1916 letter from Roper to Kitchin, reel 6, Kitchin Papers. Sabath quote in CR 53 (1916): A1873Google Scholar. Cox quote in 21 Feb. 1916 letter to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers. In same series, see also 2 May 1916 letter from D. Dolan to J. Tumulty.

78 “Tariff Commission” memo and 18 Dec. 1915 letter from Houston to Taussig, box 335, Agriculture Records. A Harvard economist had suggested to Houston that the real value of a Tariff Commission was in addressing ignorance about tariffs' effects: “All students of taxation are agreed that every tax has some effect aside from the mere putting of money into the public treasury, and that a tariff duty is no exception to this rule. [This issue is so complicated and difficult that it] could be handled only by a permanent body of trained and expert investigators.” 4 Jan. 1916 letter from T. Carver to Houston, box 335, Agriculture Records. Wilson was receptive to these arguments because of his sensitivity to the importance of public opinion, having argued earlier in his Presidency against the sugar lobby's attempt to influence the sugar tariff reductions under the 1913 Underwood Tariff Act with a misinformation campaign: “… [G]reat bodies of astute men seek to create an artificial opinion and overcome the interests of the public for their private profit. It is thoroughly worth the while of the people of this country to take knowledge of this matter. Only public opinion can check and destroy it.” PWW 50, 84. McAdoo was also keenly aware of the importance of publicizing Democratic achievements and views, suggesting many ways to do so. See 27 Dec. 1915 letter from T. Pence to McAdoo; 13 June 1916 letter from F. Howe to McAdoo; 29 June 1916 memo of W.P.G.H., 24 Aug. 1916 letter from Sen. Hollis to McAdoo; and 4 Sept. 1916 letter from McAdoo to G. Cooksey, containers 151, 10, 161 and 165, McAdoo Papers.

79 23 Feb. 1916 letter from Kent to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers.

80 CR 53 (1916): 10525Google Scholar. Underwood, Oscar, Drifting Sands of Party Politics (New York, 1928), 230Google Scholar. Similarly, Taussig felt the Commission's value lay not so much in responding to the dumping situation, but rather in “its value as a permanent policy of [information gathering].” 17 Dec. 1915 letter from Taussig to Houston, series 2, reel 75, Wilson Papers.

81 CR 53 (1916): 13804 and 10611Google Scholar. See also 28 Jan. 1916 letter from D. Roper to Kitchin, reel 6, Kitchin Papers. 28 Nov. 1915 diary of E. House, PWW 35, 261. 28 Dec. 1916 letter from Houston to Wilson, series 2, reel 84, Wilson Papers. Additionally, tariff studies needed to be broadly disseminated to influence the public. One legislator noted that studies of a separate Tariff Commission might receive broader publicity than those of the FTC or Commerce Department. CR 53 (1916): 10611Google Scholar.

82 Compare H.R. 10585 transmitted with Feb. 23, 1916 letter from Kent to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers with the final legislation. The Taft Tariff Board and all Republican Tariff Board proposals had five commissioners, no doubt contributing to Democratic legislators' dislike of this structure. See also 13 Mar. 1916 letter from Houston to Wilson in which Houston says he understands that a six-member board is necessary to secure congressional support because only an even number of commissioners can be perceived as nonpartisan. Box 335, Agriculture Records.

83 See CR 53 (1916): 10611, 13823Google Scholar. See also 24 Jan. 1916 letter from J. Fahey to Rep. R. Olney, container 153, McAdoo Papers; 18 Dec. 1915, and 4 Jan. 1916 letters from Houston to Taussig, and memo “Tariff Commission,” box 335, Agriculture Records.

84 20 Dec. 1915 and 4 Jan. 1916 letters from Taussig to Houston, box 335, Agriculture Records; 5 June 1916 memo from G. Weber to Redfield, box 1, Tariff Commission Records; 12 Jan. 1915 Wilson Press Conference, PWW 50, 676; and 8 Dec. 1915 letter from Lane to Redfield, Commerce Records.

85 While the bill was still in the Ways and Means committee, the section ennumerating the kinds of studies the Commission could undertake was expanded to include cost-of-production studies. This was inserted against the wishes of some Commission supporters such as Houston in the hopes that the bill would thereby secure greater Republican support. However, cost-of-production studies were the last of over a dozen kinds of investigations the bill suggested were appropriate for the Commission; Republican Tariff Board proposals had always had as their central mandate the investigation of production-cost differences. See 13 Mar. 1916 letter from Houston to Wilson, box 335, Agriculture Records.

86 On Republican opposition during legislative debate see CR 53 (1916): 10651, 13044, 13257, 13805, A1457, A1466, A1474Google Scholar. For behind-the-scenes Republican opposition see 9 Feb. 1916 letter from H. Gross to McAdoo and 28 Feb. 1916 letter from W. Tucker to Wilson, container 155, McAdoo Papers; and 1 June 1916 letter from R. McCulloch (R-Ohio) to Wilson, reel 234, Wilson Papers. On amendment activity see CR 53 (1916): 10767, 10756, 13848-9, 13869Google Scholar.

87 “Tariff: Economic Argument” (1913): series 12, reel 525, Wilson Papers. Wilson once remarked: “There is no such animal as the cost-of-production…. [Cost] differs always with management.” Collier's 53 (28 Oct. 1916): 5Google Scholar.

88 See following 1916 letters to Wilson: 31 Jan. from E. Wood; 28 Jan. from T. Love; 31 Jan. from Massachusetts State Board of Trade; 3 Feb. from C. Reeves; 11 Feb. from T. Gibbons, series 4, subject 180, reel 233, Wilson Papers. 1 July from F. Heney, PWW 37, 341. See also 10 Aug. 1916 letter O. Carmichael to J. Tumulty, box 9, Tumulty Papers, and 26 Jan. 1916 letter from J. Levi to J. Williams (D-Miss.), box 14, Williams Papers.

For editorials see Chicago Daily News, 26 Apr. 1916. New York Commercial, 29 Jan. 1916. New York Times, 30 Jan. 1916; 1, 3, 4, 9 & 17 Feb. 1916; 3 Mar. 1916; 17 May 1916; 7 June 1916. For Wilson endorsements see the following 1916 letters: 29 Feb. from National Association of Manufacturers to Tumulty; 16 Feb. from Economics Club of St. Louis to Wilson; 16 Mar. from N.Y. Weavers to Tumulty; 28 Apr. from Tariff Commission League to Tumulty; 1 May from Chicago Businessmen's Association to Wilson; 20 May from American Tariff Reform League to Wilson; and 27 July from Ohio Valley Manufacturers to Wilson, series 4, file 180, reel 234, Wilson Papers. Democrats referred to the Tariff Commission in their 1916 National Platform, PWW 37, 193.

89 28 Oct. 1916 speech, PWW 38, 55-56. Other 1916 speeches in which Wilson referred to the Tariff Commission included: 27 Jan. to the New York Railway Business Association (Houston, Eight Years I, 197), 3 Feb. to the Businessmen's League of St. Louis (PWW 36, 113), 10 Feb. to U.S. Chamber of Commerce (PWW 36, 11), 10 July to the World's Salesmanship Congress (PWW 37, 387), 2 Sept. accepting Presidential nomination, Sept. 25 to Grain Dealer's Association, 30 Sept. to Young Democrats, 17 Oct. for Wilson Day, 19 Oct. to Chicago Press Club, 19 Oct. Nonpartisan Women, 1 Nov. to Ellicot Club (PWW 38, 136-7, 266, 308,463 478, 486, 574). 9 Sept. in Long Branch, N.J. (New York Times, 3 Sept. 1916, 4).

90 14 Feb. 1916 letter from W. Redfield to P. Brown, Commerce Records.

91 See the Tariff Commission meeting minutes of 3 Apr. through 14 Nov. 1917, box 1, Minutes of Commission Hearings and Meetings, USITC Records.

92 U.S. Tariff Commission, First Annual Report (Washington, D.C., 1917Google Scholar). Report on Interim Revenue Legislation (Washington, D.C., 1917Google Scholar). U.S. Tariff Commission, Tariff Information Series Report No. 2: The Dyestuff Situation (Washington, D.C., 1918Google Scholar). See also 25 Jan. 1918 memo from D. Lewis and W. Culbertson to Tariff Commission, and 18 July 1918 letter from Taussig to Wilson, container 45, Culbertson Papers.

93 Second Annual Report (1918), 5, and box 1, Minutes of Commission Hearings and Meetings, USITC Records. Only William Culbertson did not consider this the Commission's most important report. 15 Feb. 1918, 18 Mar. 1918 and 3 Apr. 1918 memos from Culbertson to Tariff Commission, container 45, Culbertson Papers.

94 For example, the Commission voted at its 15 June 1917 meeting to investigate the glass, pottery, sugar, textile and chemical industries. On 14 Nov. 1917, it voted to study cutlery, paper, and leather. And on 16 Jan. 1918, it voted to investigate brushes, files, needles, and pins. Other than the dyestuff investigation ordered during this period, not one investigation ordered by the Tariff Commission during the first year-and-a-half was of an industrial product. Box 1, Minutes of Commission Hearings and Meetings, USITC Records.

95 Second Annual Report (1918), 65, 73.

96 Second Annual Report (1918), 54, 58. For additional examples, see also pages 104 and 113.

97 U.S. Tariff Commission, Tariff Information Series Miscellaneous Report: Dumping and Unfair Competition in the U.S. (1919). See also Third Annual Report (1919), 6.

98 To better see the crippling effects of slashed appropriations and two vacant Commissioner positions, compare the kind and volume of work accomplished by the Commission in 1918 with that in 1920, Minutes of Commission Hearings and Minutes, USITC Records.

99 Compare the letters written by the Democratic-appointed Commission, such as 14 Oct. 1917 from the Tariff Commission to Gentlemen informing business owners that “the object of the Tariff Information Catalog is to bring together data concerning the effect of the tariff laws upon the industries of this country,” with those of the Republican-appointed Commission, such as a 15 Apr. 1920 letter from the Tariff Commission to Gentlemen requesting for inclusion in the Tariff Information Catalogue “information on wages at home and abroad, other cost-of-production differences, and suggested tariff changes.” General Correspondence, USITC Records.

100 U.S. Tariff Commission, Survey of British Wool-Manufacturing Industry (Washington, D.C., 1920Google Scholar); The Foreign Exchange Situation (1921).

101 A similar fate awaited the Federal Trade Commission in the 1920s. Davis, G. Cullom, “The Transformation of the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1929,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (Dec. 1962): 437–455CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 Sen. McCumber (R-N.D.), CR 62 (1922): 11110, 8716, 9299, 11402Google Scholar. See also CR 61 (1921): 3479, 3513, 3704Google Scholar.

103 Houston, Eight Years II, 187. Regarding Houston's and other politician' naiveté, recall that this was the era of great hope and optimism in scientific analysis and progressive reform of most major social institutions.

104 The 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act created the flexible tariff, under which a petitioning firm could ask the Tariff Commission to study production-cost differences on a product and, based on the Commission's assessment of whether production-cost differences existed, the President was authorized to raise the tariff duty to equalize production costs. Of the thirty-eight flexible tariff cases fully investigated by the Tariff Commission between 1922 and 1929, thirty-five resulted in tariff increases (Thirteenth Annual Report [1929], Tables I and II). This system allowed even more protectionism than before, in that firms could now obtain tariff increases between major omnibus tariff revisions. Schnietz, Karen, “To Delegate or Not to Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Foreign Trade, 1916-1934” (Ph.D. diss., U. of California, Berkeley, 1994Google Scholar), chap. 5.