Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-15T15:33:09.925Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The German Question, the Unification of Europe, and the European Market Strategies of Germany's Chemical and Electrical Industries, 1900–1992

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Harm G. Schröter
Harm G. Schröter*
Affiliation:
Harm G. Schröter is Privat-Dozent at the Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsgeschichte at the Freie Universität Berlin.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recent events in Europe have given rise to renewed speculation about the possible economic threat of a resurgent united Germany. This article examines six leading German firms in the electrical and chemical industries over the course of the twentieth century in an attempt to understand the historical realities of the foreign market strategies of Germany's largest firms. The author concludes that the changed configuration of international markets, the post-Second World War “Americanization” of German management, and the growing perception of a “European home market” have combined to remove the threat implicit in “the German question.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 67 , Issue 3: German Business History , Autumn 1993 , pp. 369 - 405
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Heavy industry has long been outgrown by its chemical and electrical counterparts, and it has been studied quite thoroughly. See Gillingham, John, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991 CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Wengenroth, Ulrich, “Partnerschaft oder Rivalität? Die Beziehungen zwischen der deutschen und der französischen Schwerindustrie vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Montanunion,” in Frankreich und Deutschland: Forschung, Technologie und industrielle Entwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Cohen, Yves and Manfrass, Klaus (Munich, 1990), 321–30Google Scholar; Feldenkirchen, Wilfried, “The Export Organisation of the German Economy,” in Business History of General Trading Companies, ed. Yonekawa, Shin'ichi and Yoshihara, Hideki (Tokyo, 1988), 295–336 Google Scholar.

2 Stürmer, Michael, “Deutschlands Rolle in Europa,” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 265 (14 Nov. 1991): 14 Google Scholar.

3 Financial Times, 28 Nov. 1991, 2.

4 See Fritsch-Bournazel, Renata, Europe and German Unification (Warwick, England, 1990 Google Scholar); Cutler, Tony et al. , Building Europe? 1992 and After (Warwick, England, 1992 Google Scholar).

5 Porter, Michael, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York, 1990), 358 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 604 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Quoted in Bäumler, Ernst, Farben, Formeln, Forscher: Hoechst und die Geschichte der industriellen Chemie in Deutschland (Munich, 1989), 131 Google Scholar.

8 Siemens, Geschäftsbericht '90, 31.

9 One must remember that the chemical and electrical industries represented the brighter part of the German economy; if the whole of it were considered and the weaker sides taken into account as well, many structural defects would be revealed.

10 Pollard, Sidney, “Probleme für europäischen Integration im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Berding, Helmut (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 10) (Göttingen, 1984), 9–33 Google Scholar.

11 Schröter, Harm, “Continuity and Change: German Multinationals since 1850,” in The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe, ed. Jones, Geoffrey and Schröter, Harm (Aldershot, England, 1993), 28–48 Google Scholar.

12 Schröter, Harm, “Risk and Control in Multinational Enterprise: German Businesses in Scandinavia, 1918–1939,” Business History Review 62 (Autumn 1988): 420–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 In this article Europe is defined by the continent and so includes Russia.

14 The EC of Twelve includes the five states mentioned (and Germany) and the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark (all from 1973), Greece (1981), Portugal, and Spain (both 1986). Scandinavia is taken to include Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

15 There is no comprehensive study of the extent to which foreign direct investment stimulated exports (as in the case of Bosch) or substituted for them (as in the case of Siemens).

16 Feldenkirchen, “The Export Organisation of the German Economy”; Schröter, Verena, Die deutsche Industrie auf dem Weltmarkt, 1929–1933 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1984 Google Scholar). In this context, the size of an enterprise is measured by its assets or its sales.

In 1987 the export quota (exports as a percent of total sales) of enterprises with up to 99 employees was only one-third of that of enterprises with more than 1,000 employees. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft: Unternehmensgrößenstatistik 1989–90 (Bonn, 1990), 178–84Google Scholar.

17 Stokes, Raymond, Divide and Prosper: The Heirs of I.G. Farben under Allied Authority, 1945–1951 (Berkeley, Calif., 1988 Google Scholar).

18 “Deutschlands grosse 500,” in Die Welt, special ed., 25 July 1990.

19 Beer, John J., The Emergence of the German Dye Industry (Urbana, Ill., 1959 Google Scholar).

20 This history has been studied by Hertner, Peter, “Financial Strategies and Adaptation to Foreign Markets: The German Electrotechnical Industry and Its Multinational Activities, 1890 to 1939,” in Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective, ed. Teichova, Alice, Lévy-Leboyer, Maurice, and Nussbaum, Helga (New York, 1986), 145–59Google Scholar; Hertner, “The German Electrotechnical Industry in the Italian Market before the Second World War,” in Jones and Schröter, eds., Rise of Multinationals, 155–72; and Feldenkirchen, Wilfried, “Zur Finanzierung von Großunternehmen in der chemischen und elektrotechnischen Industrie Deutschlands vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Beiträge zur quantitativen vergleichenden Unternehmensgeschichte, ed. Tilly, Richard (Stuttgart, 1985), 94–125 Google Scholar.

21 Gross output in 1911–12 in £ million: British Westinghouse: 1.35; Siemens Brothers: 1.28; British Thomson Houston: 1.07; Dick/Kerr: 0.44; General Electric Company: 0.22. Byatt, I. C. R., The British Electrical Industry, 1875–1914: The Economic Returns of a New Technology (Oxford, England, 1979), 150, 166 Google Scholar, tables 32 and 37.

22 Salings Börsenjahrhuch (1914–15), 1422.

23 Jürgen Kocka, “Siemens und der aufhaltsame Aufstieg der AEG,” in Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte/Tradition (1972), 125–42; Kocka, , “Expansion—Integration—Diversiflkation: Wachstumsstrategien industrieller Grossunternehmen in Deutschland vor 1914,” in Vom Kleingewerbe zur Grossindustrie, ed. Winkel, Harald (Berlin, 1975), 203–26Google Scholar.

24 Market leadership is represented by that company that undisputedly holds the largest share of the market in question.

25 See Hertner, “Financial Strategies”; Feldenkirchen, “Finanzierung.”

26 Calculated from Salings Börsenjahrbuch (1914). See Jacob-Wendler, G., Deutsche Elektroindustrie in Lateinamerika: Siemens und AEG (1890–1914) (Stuttgart, 1982 Google Scholar).

27 Another example is Telefunken, founded as a joint venture of AEG and Siemens in the radio sector.

28 Plumpe, Gottfried, Die IG Farbenindustrie AG: Wirtschaft, Technik und Politik, 1904–1945 (Berlin, 1990), 57ff.Google Scholar; Schröter, Harm, “Die Auslandsinvestitionen der deutschen chemischen Industrie 1870 bis 1930,” in Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 35 (1990): 1–22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 See the complete overview of German investment in the United States before the First World War by Wilkins, Mira, The History of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States to 1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1989 Google Scholar); Kabisch, Thomas, Deutsches Kapital in den USA (Stuttgart, 1982 Google Scholar).

30 For example, for firms that had focused on the electrochemical process, such as Wacker, the international cartels in carbides, ferrous metal products, etc., were vital.

31 For market domination, we apply the criteria of the German law on competition: a dominant position exists if one enterprise has a market share of 33 percent, or up to three firms a combined share of 50 percent.

32 Wilkins, History of Foreign Direct Investment, 436–38ff.

33 Stürmer, “Deutschlands Rolle in Europa,” 14.

34 Calculated from Chandler, Scale and Scope, Appendixes A.2 and C.2.

35 Reader, William J., Imperial Chemical Industries: A History (London, 1975), 1:412 Google Scholar.

36 See Chandler, Scale and Scope, 538–49, 563–83.

37 Morris, Peter J., “The Development of Acetylene Chemistry and Synthetic Rubber by I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft: 1926–1945,” MS, Oxford, England, 1982 Google Scholar.

38 The basic types of automatic switches (Strowger and rotary) were invented in the United States, as was the coaxial cable. See M. D. Fagen, A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System: The Early Years (1875–1925) (1975); Schröter, Harm, “The German Long Distance Telephone Network as a Large Technical System, 1919–1939, and Its Spin-offs for the Integration of Europe,” in Sources and Diffusion of Innovation in Interwar Europe, ed. Caron, François and Fischer, Wolfram (Berlin, 1993 Google Scholar).

39 “Dr. Felix Deutsch zum 70. Geburtstag,” Special Number of AEG Rundschau, 16 May 1928, 36ff.; Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, Die deutsche Inflation, 1914–1923: Ursachen und Folgen in internationaler Perspektive (Berlin, 1980 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

40 Schröter, Harm, Außenpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteresse: Skandinavien im außenwirtschaftlichen Kalkül Deutschlands und Großbritanniens, 1918–1939 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983), 328 Google Scholar.

41 Feldman, Gerald, “Foreign Penetration of German Enterprises after the First World War: The Problem of Uberfremdung,” in Historical Studies in International Corporate Business, ed. Teiehova, Alice, Lévy-Leboyer, Maurice, and Nussbaum, Helga (New York, 1989), 87–110 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Schröter, “Risk and Control.”

43 See Harm Schröter, “A Typical Factor of German International Market Strategy: Agreements between the U.S. and the German Electrotechnical Industries up to 1939,” in Teichova et al., eds., Multinational Enterprise, 160–70.

44 Holdings in Fusi Denki were less than 50 percent (Salings Börsenjahrbuch [1931], 1591, 1598).

45 See Siemens's organization scheme for Southeast Europe in Schröter, Harm, “Siemens and Central and South-East Europe between the Two World Wars,” in International Business and Central Europe, 1918–1939, ed. Teichova, Alice and Cottrell, Philip (Leicester, England, 1983), 173–92Google Scholar.

46 GE also had a minority stake in Osram. Hertner, Peter, “Vom Wandel einer Unternehmensstrategie: Die deutsche Elektroindustrie in Italien vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg und in der Zwischenkriegzeit,” in Politik, Wirtschaft und Internationale Beziehungen: Studien zu ihrem Verhältnis in der Zwischenkriegzeit (Mainz, 1991), 139–48Google Scholar.

47 75 Jahre Bosch (Stuttgart, 1961 Google Scholar).

48 Das Spezial-Archiv der deutschen Wirtschaft, Der AEG-Konzern 1928, 8.

49 Peter Hertner, “How They Changed Their Strategy: German Electrotechnical Industry in the Italian Market before 1914 and between the Two Wars,” in Jones and Schröter, eds., Rise of Multinationals, 155–72.

50 In 1938 Siemens had 187,000 people on its payrolls, which was by far the largest number among the electrical firms. AEG: 85,000; GE: 69,000; Philips: 44,000; Westinghouse: 42,000; Western Electric: 30,000. Feldenkirchen, Wilfried, “Zur Unternehmenspolitik des Hauses Siemens in der Zwischenkriegzeit,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 33 (1988): 22–57 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, graph 4, p. 30. The rate of profits to sales was much higher at GE and Westinghouse than at Siemens and AEG (ibid., table 7, p. 52). Sales per head was fluctuating around RM 1,000 during 1925–38 (ibid., Graph 9).

51 Gottfried Plumpe in his chapter “Die Rückkehr auf den Weltmarkt,” correctly stressed that IG Farben looked to the world market, but he underestimated that for IG Farben, too, Europe represented the bulk of that market, as well as the stepping-stone for the rest. (See his IG Farbenindustrie AG, 114–31.)

52 The exception to this policy was the United States. See Verena Schröter, “Participation in Market Control through Foreign Investment: IG Farbenindustrie AG in the United States, 1920–38,” in Teichova et al., eds., Multinational Enterprise, 171–84.

53 See Plumpe, IG Farbenindustrie, 115ff.

54 Gottfried Plumpe, “Ansätze zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen der deutschen und französischen Chemieindustrie vor und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Cohen and Manfrass, eds., Frankreich und Deutschland, 224–33.

55 IG Farben helped especially the French ETS Kuhlmann and the smaller producers of Europe to sell their products. Harm Schröter, “Cartels as a Form of Concentration in Industry: The Example of the International Dyestuffs Cartel from 1927 to 1939,” in German Yearbook on Business History (1988), 113–44.

56 Plumpe, IG Farbenindustrie AG, 197–200; Schröter, Harm, “The International Dyestuffs Cartel, 1927–1939, with Special Reference to the Developing Areas of Europe and to Japan,” in International Cartels in the New Industries, ed. Hara, Takeu and Kudo, Akira (Tokyo, 1992), 33–52 Google Scholar. Another example is the nitrogen cartel, which was built from 1929 onward. The core was formed by the so-called DEN-Group (Germany-England-Norway). Nearly all European firms were included. Again national home markets were granted to the indigenous firms, but all exports, except the British ones, were directed through the German cartel. This control went so far that in the case of France the allocation of the official French import quota was handed over to be conducted by the German cartel in 1937. Except Britain and France, most European markets for nitrogen were dominated by IG Farben. Plumpe, IG Farbenindustrie AG, 217ff; Harm Schröter, “Privatwirtsehaftliche Marktregulierung und staatliche Interessenpolitik: Das Internationale Stickstoffkartell, 1929–1939,” in Schröter and Wurm, eds., Politik, 117–37.

57 Hayes, Peter, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era (New York, 1987), 218ff., 267ffGoogle Scholar. Plumpe gives evidence of several cases of sense-changing citations by Marxist authors. IG Farbenimlustrie AG, 21ff., 546ff.

58 Hayes, Industry and Ideology, 217ff; Ludwig, Johannes, Boykott, Enteignung, Mord: Die “Entjudung” der deutschen Wirtschaft (Hamburg, 1989 Google Scholar); Ranki, György, Unternehmen Margarethe: Die deutsche Besetzung Ungarns (Vienna, 1984 Google Scholar). In those states with little activity by Nazi enterprises such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, there was little preparation for the Großraumwirtschaft that was to come after the war. Schröter, Harm, “Bürokratie zwischen Organisation und Chaos: Deutsche Besatzungsverwaltungen und Großwirtschaftsraumplanung in Norwegen und Dänemark, 1940–1945,” in Das organisierte Chaos: Zur Besatzungspolitik des NS-Staates, ed. Pirker, Theo and Schulten, Cornelis (Munich, 1993 Google Scholar).

59 For the chemical industry, see Stokes, Divide and Prosper; Ludman-Obier, Marie-France, Le Contrôle de l'Industrie Chimique en Zone Française d'Occupation en Allemagne, 1945–1949 (Paris, 1988 Google Scholar).

60 Winnacker, Karl, Nie den Mut verlieren: Erinnerungen on Schicksalstunden der deutschen Chemie (Düsseldorf, 1971 Google Scholar).

61 Bäumler, Farben, 264.

62 Ibid., 386.

63 Berghahn, Volker, The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945–1973 (New York, 1986 Google Scholar).

64 Chandler, Scale and Scope, 592.

65 Berghahn, Volker, “Technology and the Export of Industrial Culture: Problems of the German-American Relationship, 1900–1960,” in Innovation and Technology in Europe: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day, ed. Mathias, Peter and Davis, John A. (Oxford, England, 1991), 142–61Google Scholar; see also Berghahn, Americanization of West German Industry.

66 Herbst, Ludolf, “Die Bundesrepublik in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften,” in Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Benz, Wolfgang, vol. 2, Wirtschaft (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1989), 212–47, 211ff.Google Scholar; quotation, 211.

67 Christoph Buchheim, “Die Bundesrepublik in der Weltwirtschaft,” in Benz, ed., Geschichte, 169–209, 176ff.

68 Bäumler, Farben, 340, 381.

69 Sammet, Rolf, “Die Rolle der deutschen Chemie in der Weltwirtschaft,“ in Wirtschaftsdienst (1970), 1: 96 Google Scholar.

70 Harm Schröter, “Die Auslandsinvestitionen der deutschen chemischen Industrie 1930 bis 1965,” in Die deutschen Auslandsinvestitionen, ed. Richard Tilly and Peter Hertner, Zeitschrift für Unternehmengeschichte (forthcoming, 1994).

71 See also 75 Jahre Bosch, 126. The same is to be seen with Bayer. In 1951, even before the company was officially refounded on 19 December, it had opened an R&D station in Florida for tropical and subtropical plants. The next year Bayer formed sales organizations in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States. Then Bayer started its first foreign production in 1953 in the United States with a 33.3 percent minority interest in a joint venture called Chemagro. A year later it built a plant in New Martinsville, Ohio, and together with Monsanto it founded Mobay. Verg, Erik, Meilensteine (Köln, 1988) 317 Google Scholar.

72 Verg, Meilenteine, 316.

73 The three were SOGEP, Distri, and Bayer-Phytochim; ibid., 311.

74 Schröter, Harm, “Außenwirtsehaft im Boom: Direktinvestitionen bundesdeutscher Unternehmen im Ausland, 1950–1975,” in Der Boom, 1948–1973: Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa, ed. Kaelble, Hartmut (Opladen, 1992), 99 Google Scholar, table 7.

75 Bäumler, Farhen, 297ff.

76 Verg, Meilensteine, 436ff.

77 In 1990, 57.2 percent of all German foreign direct investment was placed in Europe. H. Schröter, “Continuity and Change,” table 3.

78 Schröter, Harm, “Legacies and Integrations: Europe's Role in the Reconstruction of German Foreign Direct Investment after the Second World War,” in The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era, ed. Gillingham, John (St. Louis, 1993 Google Scholar).

79 Bosch, Geschäftsbericht (1981), 3. Sales abroad amounted to: for Siemens, 47 percent in 1984–85 (Geschäftsbericht, 1985); for AEG, 43 percent in 1981 (Geschäftsbericht, 1981).

80 Calculated from Bosch, Geschäftsbericht, 1981 and 1990. Total work force in 1980 was 121,584, and in 1990, 179,636 (ibid.).

81 Production abroad accounted for 29.6 percent of total sales. Calculated from Siemens, Geschäftsbericht '90. Total work force in 1980 was 344,000; in 1990, 373,000 (ibid.).

82 Eighty-seven percent of its sales occurred in Europe, of which Germany took 56 percent (AEG, Geschäftsbericht, 1990). Total work force in 1980 was 135,900 (ibid.).

83 In 1989 Siemens's share of the West European market of Unix systems (network of personal computers) was 18 percent; Unisys followed with 10 percent (Siemens, Geschäftsbericht '90). Additional market leadership was held in the following fields: systems for automation of processes and production, hospital and studio technology, private systems for communication, and others.

84 BASF, Geschäftsbericht (1988).

83 Verg, Meilensteine, 523.

86 Calculated from “Bericht über die 39. Hauptversammlung der Bayer AG am 19. Juni 1991 in Köln,” in Aktionärsbrief, '91.

87 BASF, Geschäftsbericht (1990).

88 Verg, Meilensteine, 489.

89 On the basis of sales. “Die 100 grössten europäischen Industrie-Untemehmen,” Die Zeit, 23 Aug. 1991.

90 Calculated from Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V., Binnenmarkt 1992: Chancen für die deutsche Chemie (Hamburg, 1988), 60ffGoogle Scholar.

91 The bulk market for dyes is in textiles. In the mid-1980s, the principal world market shares of the “Big Six” were: Ciba-Geigy, 13 percent; Bayer, 11 percent; Hoechst, 10 percent; ICI, 9 percent; Sandoz, 9 percent; and BASF, 8 percent. Bäumler, Farben, 498.

92 Herman J. Strenger, “Trotz Gegenwind erfolgreich auf Kurs” (statement of account for 1990), in Bayer, Aktionärsbrief '91, 3.

93 Siemens, Geschäftsbericht '90.

94 Ibid., 41. Altogether, Siemens employed 373,000 people in 1990.

95 Strenger, “Trotz Gegenwind erfolgreich auf Kurs,” 9.

96 In the region of Bitterfeld Bayer will invest DM 500 million, which will create no more than 500 jobs. Der Tagesspiegel, 30 Oct. 1991.

97 AEG, Geschäftsbericht (1990), 13.

98 BASF founded Kemipur for the production of polyurethane; AEG's joint venture Remitel Electronics produced electronic components for cars. Siemens founded joint ventures in several states, which represent the vehicle for expectations in telecommunication. From each company's Geschäftsbericht (1990).

99 Siemens, Geschäftsbericht '90, 29.

100 BASF, Geschäftsbericht (1988), 40.

101 Ibid. (1990), 40.

102 Because of this, BASF placed its largest investment in its history, a steameracker costing several billion dollars, at Antwerp, Belgium and not at its traditional site at Ludwigshafen. In return, BASF now has the option to shift major lines of production from Germany into Belgium. Similar considerations influence the production of dyestuffs in Germany. Hofman, Ulla, “Wandert die deutsche Chemie ab? Das Beispiel BASF,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 258 (6 Nov. 1991): 15 Google Scholar.

103 Fitzky, Helmut, “Dem Binnenmarkt wieder ein Jahr näher,” Wirtschaftspolitische Nachrichten 3 (19 Jan. 1990 Google Scholar). The author thanks the Verein der Chemischen Industrie e. V. (VCI) for sending this cutting.

104 People from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom will take part in the European Forum beginning in 1992. Bayer, Aktionärsbrief '91, Zwischenbericht 1, Halbjahr 1991, 7.

105 See Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations.

106 Fitzky, Binnenmarkt.

107 ECN 1992 Review, May 1989, 48 (cutting sent by the VCI).

108 Plumpe, assistant to Bayer's chairman, in a lecture in Munich, at a meeting organized by the Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte on transnational investment, on 13 Aug. 1992.

109 In France: JS Télécommunication S.A.; in Italy, Telettra SpA; in Portugal, Vulcano Thermo-Domésticos SA; in Spain, Balay SA. Bosch, Geschäftsbericht (1988, 1990), 1.

110 Siemens's internal organization was reshaped too, for quicker action, but this was not seen as having a direct connection with preparing for the European home market.

111 See Borner, Silvio et al. , Internationale Wettbewerbsvorteile: Eine strategisches Konzept für die Schweiz (New York, 1991), 231ffGoogle Scholar. In their contributions to The Rise of Multinationals, all the authors writing on multinational enterprises based in small nations also stressed this point about denationalization. See Greta Devos, “Belgian Multinational Investment”; B. P. A. Gales and Keetie Sluyterman, “Outward Bound: The Rise of Dutch Multinationals”; Ulf Olsson, “Securing the Markets: Swedish Multinationals in a Historical Perspective”; Harm Schröter, “Swiss Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective.” A prototype of such an enterprise is represented by Nestlé of Switzerland. Its sales at home have constituted only 2 percent of the whole since the 1980s. Employment at home was about 4 percent during this period. Nestlé's exports from Switzerland are small. The chairman is not a Swiss, but a German. (Geschäftsberichte, various years.)

112 Stürmer, “Deutschlands Rolle in Europa,” 14.