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The Origins And Evolution of Japanese Direct Investment in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Mark Mason
Mark Mason
Affiliation:
Mark Mason is assistant professor in the School of Organization and Management at Yale University.
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Abstract

Common misperceptions notwithstanding, Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has a long history. Such investment first penetrated European markets in the 1870s, and it has since evolved through a number of important historical phases. In quality, sectoral composition, location, motivation, and several other characteristics, Japanese FDI in Europe exhibited striking continuities during its first century of development. In more recent years, however, each of these characteristics has undergone substantial change as compared to earlier times.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 66 , Issue 3 , Autumn 1992 , pp. 435 - 474
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1992

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References

1 On representative Japanese perspectives see, for example, the Special Edition of Tōyō Keizai (28 Feb. 1992) entitled “Jipangu in yōroppa” Japan in Europe); typical of one viewpoint expressed by many Europeans is Donnet, Pierre-Antoine, Le Japon Achète le Monde (Japan Buys the World) (Paris, 1991Google Scholar).

2 See, for example, Micossi, Stefano and Viesti, Gianfranco, “Japanese Direct Manufacturing Investment in Europe,” in European Integration: Trade and Industry, ed. Winters, L. Alan and Venables, Anthony J. (New York, 1991), 200–233CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thomsen, Stephen and Nicolaides, Phedon, The Evolution of Japanese Direct Investment in Europe: Death of a Transistor Salesman (London, 1991Google Scholar); and Yoshitomi Masaru et al., Japanese Direct Investment in Europe: Motives, Impact and Policy Implications (Aldershot, England, n.d.). (All Japanese names in this article are presented in the Japanese manner, with surnames preceding given names.)

3 Virtual or total neglect of the history of Japanese FDI in prewar Europe is evident in the otherwise excellent historical studies of, for example, Mitsuo, Fujii et al., eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai (The Historical Development of Japanese Multinational Enterprise) (Tokyo, 1979), vol. 1Google Scholar; Mataji, Miyamoto et al. , eds., Sōgō shōsha no keieishi (The business history of general trading companies), (Tokyo, 1976Google Scholar); and Gen, Numaguchi, “Nihon no kaigai jigyō katsudō: sono rekishiteki katei to keieiteki shoyōin” (The overseas activities of Japanese enterprise: the historical process and various managerial factors) in Chiba shōdai ronsō, no. 13–B, June 1970, 244–68Google Scholar. For an overview of recent work on Japanese FDI before the Second World War, see Tetsuya, Kuwahara, “Trends in Research on Overseas Expansion by Japanese Enterprises Prior to World War Two,” in Japanese Yearbook on Business History 7 (1990); 61–81Google Scholar.

The development of Japanese FDI in postwar Europe gets short shrift in such analyses as Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” in Ryutaro, Komiya, The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry and Government (Tokyo, 1990Google Scholar), chap. 3; Yoshino, Michael, Japan's Multinational Enterprises (Cambridge, Mass., 1976Google Scholar), and Yoshino, , “The Multinational Spread of Japanese Manufacturing Investment since World War II,” Business History Review 48 (Autumn 1974): 357–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hideki, Yoshihara, “Multinational Growth of Japanese Manufacturing Enterprises in the Postwar Period,” in Overseas Business Activities, ed. Akio, Okochi and Tadakatsu, Inoue (Tokyo, 1984), 95–120Google Scholar. Ozawa Terutomo, to his credit, does provide a brief overview of Japanese FDI in Europe in his Multinationalism, Japanese Style: The Political Economy of Outward Dependency (Princeton, N.J., 1979), 154–56Google Scholar.

In recent years, a number of scholars in Japan and elsewhere have contributed to our understanding of the history of Japanese FDI in the industrialized nations by examining in particular the development of such investment in the United States. See, for example, Wilkins, Mira, “Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 1879–1990,” Business History Review 64 (Winter 1990): 585–629CrossRefGoogle Scholar, a study whose findings on the development of Japanese FDI in the United States in many respects parallel those presented in this article on Japanese FDI in Europe, and relevant portions of Wilkins, , “Japanese Multinational Enterprise before 1914,” Business History Review 60 (Summer 1986): 199–231CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nobuo, Kawabe, “Japanese Business in the United States before World War II: The Case of Mitsubishi Shōji Kaisha, the San Francisco and Seattle Branches” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1980Google Scholar), largely summarized in Kawabe, “Senzen ni okeru sōgō shōsha no zaibei shiten katsudō: Mitsubishi Shōji San Furanshisuko, Shiattoru ryō shiten no jirei kenkyū” (The Prewar Activities of the American Branches of the General Trading Companies: Case Studies of the Mitsubishi Corporation's Branch Offices in San Francisco and Seattle) in Keieishi gaku 16, no. 3 (Oct. 1981): 26–49Google Scholar, and Kawabe, , “Development of Overseas Operations by General Trading Companies, 1868–1945” in Business History of General Trading Companies, ed. Shinichi, Yonekawa and Hideki, Yoshihara (Tokyo, 1987), 71–103Google Scholar.

4 Although FDI was rarely the focus of their attention, some business historians of Japanese trading companies such as Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corporation, of Japanese banks such as the Yokohama Specie Bank, and of other Japanese firms that historically have invested abroad do mention Japanese FDI in Europe in their studies. For references to many of these studies, see notes following.

5 The trading companies' role as importer into Japan apparently was more important than their role as exporter to Europe during these years, which explains why they were often referred to as “import trading companies” in this era. Comments of Kudo Akira.

6 In 1881, just three years after its establishment, the Paris branch was closed. See Togai Yoshio, “Saisho ni shutsugen shita sōgō shōsha: Mitsui Bussan” (The first general trading company to move abroad: Mitsui & Co.) in Miyamoto Mataji et al., eds., Sōgō shōsha no keieishi, 91.

7 Yamazaki Hiroaki, “The Logic of the Formation of General Trading Companies in Japan,” in Business History of General Trading Companies, ed. Yonekawa Shinichi and Yoshihara Hideki, 53; and Kawabe Nobuo, “Overseas Operations, 1868–1945,” 77.

8 Susumu, Hijikata, Yokohama shōkin ginkō (The Yokohama Specie Bank) (Tokyo, 1980), 67, 237Google Scholar. According to Hijikata, the YSB's earliest overseas offices were located in New York (1880), London (1881), San Francisco (1886), Honolulu (1892), and Shanghai (1893). Ibid., 237–38. Tamaki Norio reports that, in addition, the YSB had established an agent's office in Lyon by 1889. See Norio, Tamaki, “The Yokohama Specie Bank: A Multinational in the Japanese Interest, 1879–1931,” in Banks as Multinationals, ed. Jones, Geoffrey (London, 1990), 196Google Scholar.

9 In March 1905, for example, the London branch of the YSB distributed prospectuses and application forms, and handled subsequent business, for a 4.5 percent sterling loan of 30 million pounds for the Japanese Imperial Government. Yokohama shōkin ginkō (Yokohama Specie Bank), Yokohama shōkin ginkō shi furoku (Supplement to the history of the Yokohama Specie Bank) (Tokyo, 1976), 3: 719–24Google Scholar. The YSB arranged a number of other such loans in London at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Comments of Ian Nish.

10 Wray, William D., Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870–1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 14, 248–49, 290, 308–11, 523–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Tokio Marine later (1899) closed this London office and entrusted its local representation to Wills Trading Company. kenkyūjo, Nihon keieishi (Japan Business History Institute), ed., Tokyo kaijō no 100 nen (One hundred years of Tokio Marine) (Tokyo, 1979), 344–46Google Scholar.

12 Nihon keieishi kenkyūjo, ed., Tokyo kaijō no 100 nen, 79–86.

13 Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 289, 308, 529.

14 See Patrick, Hugh, “Japan 1868–1914,” in Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, ed. Cameron, Rondo (New York, 1967), 267–68Google Scholar; and Allen, G. C., A Short Economic History of Modern Japan (London, 1962), 53Google Scholar, as cited in Wilkins, “Japanese Multinational Enterprise before 1914,” 215n.

15 Nihon keieishi kenkyūjo, ed., Tokyo kaijō no 100 nen, 345.

16 Mitsui & Co., The 100-Year History of Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (Tokyo, 1977), 31–32Google Scholar.

17 Indeed, a Bank of Japan survey of Japanese business abroad reports that total foreign investments of Japanese companies stood at roughly $197 million in 1914. Of that amount, China accounted for roughly $152.7 million, followed by $24.6 million in the United States and Hawaii, and $19.7 million in the rest of the world. Apparently because of the small amounts involved, neither individual European countries nor even the European region as a whole are mentioned by name in this official survey. Bank of Japan data, as reported in Wilkins, “Japanese Multinational Enterprise before 1914,” 209.

18 Exceptions include the impacts of Japanese FDI on the pre-Second World War French silk industry and on the turn-of-the-century London money markets. See following text.

19 Mitsui & Co., The 100-Year History of Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 81–82.

20 See, for example, Wilkins, “Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 1879–1990,” 588–99; and Kawabe Nobuo, “Overseas Operations, 1868–1945,” 79–80.

21 Yoshio, Ando, Kindai nihon keizai shi yōran (An Overview of Modern Japanese Economic History) (Tokyo, 1975), 23Google Scholar.

22 Yamazaki Hiroaki, “General Trading Companies in Japan,” 34, 57; and Archives, Public Record Office [hereafter, PRO], Board of Trade [hereafter, BT] 271/430. These firms, which included specialists in the textile trade together with generalists dealing in a wider range of commodities, all ranked among the top twenty Japanese trading companies in terms of paid-up capital during the mid-1920s. For a more detailed description of some of the chief activities of these companies, see Yamazaki Hiroaki, “General Trading Companies in Japan,” 24–31.

23 Archives, PRO, BT 271/430.

24 Mishima Yasuo, “Sekitan kaisha kara sōgō shōsha e: Mitsubishi Shōji” (From coal company to general trading company: Mitsubishi Corporation), in Miyamoto Mataji et al., eds., Sōgō shōsha no keieishi, 132; Yamazaki Hiroaki, “General Trading Companies in Japan,” 33; Mitsubishi Shōji (Mitsubishi Corporation), Mitsubishi Shōji: sono ayumi (Mitsubishi Corporation: its development) (Tokyo, n.d.), 94; Kawabe Nobuo, “Senzenni okeru sōgō shōsha no zaibei shiten katsudō,” 33; Yasuaki, Nagasawa, “The Overseas Branches of Mitsubishi Limited during the First World War: With Particular Reference to the London Branch,” in Japanese Yearbook on Business History 6 (1989): 132–33Google Scholar. Nagasawa reports that Mitsubishi Gōshi (Mitsubishi Limited) established between 1915 and 1919 the trading operations throughout Europe later (1921) taken over by Mitsubishi Shōji (Mitsubishi Trading Company). Ibid., 133, 139.

According to French records, Mitsubishi's Paris office operated continuously until 1945. Archives Économiques et Financières, Ministère de l'lndustrie, côte 79, 0720/185, Compte rendu no. 204 of the Comite des Investissements Étrangers. In the inter-war period, Mitsubishi Shōji apparently became the dominant Japanese trading firm in Germany, whereas Mitsui & Co. was key in the United Kingdom. Comments of Kudo Akira.

Kudo Akira reports that Okura Shōji also maintained an office in Germany during the years preceding the Second World War. See Akira, Kudo, Nichidoku kigyō kankeishi (A History of Japanese-German Industrial Relations) (Tokyo, 1992), 30, 32Google Scholar.

25 See, for example, Kawabe Nobuo, “Overseas Operations, 1868–1945,” 84; Nagasawa Yasuaki, “The Overseas Branches of Mitsubishi Limited during the First World War,” 126–28, 132.

26 Mitsui & Co., The 100-Year History of Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 91. On Mitsubishi Shōji's third country trade, see Nagasawa Yasuaki, “The Overseas Branches of Mitsubishi Limited during the First World War,” 127–28, 132.

27 See, for example, Mitsui & Co., The 100-Year History of Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 113; and Mason, Mark, “United States Direct Investment in Japan: Studies in Government Policy and Corporate Strategy” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988Google Scholar), chap. 4.

28 Mitsuo, Fujii et al. , eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai, 1: 153Google Scholar; Bank of England Archive OV 16/31. Mitsubishi Gōshi operated a foreign exchange business out of its London office from 1916. This business was taken over by Mitsubishi Bank when the latter opened its London branch for business in 1920. Nagasawa Yasuaki, “The Overseas Branches of Mitsubishi Limited during the First World War,” 123, 137–38.

29 Hijikata Susumu, Yokohama shōkin ginkō, 229. The YSB also operated an office in Lyon, but closed this office the same year it established the Paris and Berlin offices. Tamaki Norio, “The Yokohama Specie Bank,” 196–97, 212. In addition, the Bank of Chosen operated a London branch by 1931. Comments of Mira Wilkins.

30 On those companies see, for example, Keiichiro, Nakagawa, “Ryōtaisenkan no nihon kaiungyō” (The Japanese shipping industry in the interwar period) in Keiichiro, Nakagawa, ed., Ryōtaisenkan no nihon kaiji sangyō (The interwar Japanese maritime industry) (Tokyo, 1985Google Scholar), chap. 1. Also, see Wray, William, “NYK and the Commercial Diplomacy of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 1896–1956,” in Business History of Shipping: Strategy and Structure, ed. Tsunehiko, Yui and Keiichiro, Nakagawa (Tokyo, 1985), 279–305Google Scholar.

31 Tōkio Kaijō no 100 nen, 350–51; Archives, PRO, BT 271/488. The other Japanese insurance companies were Imperial, Kyodo, Nippon, Osaka, Tomei, and Yokohama.

32 For details, see Archives, PRO, BT 271/637.

33 See, for example, Ippei, Yamazawa and Yuzo, Yamamoto, Bōeki to kokusai shūshi (Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments—Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868) (Tokyo, 1979Google Scholar), as cited in Yasumuro Kenichi, “The Contribution of Sogo Shosha to the Multinationalization of Japanese Industrial Enterprises in Historical Perspective,” in Overseas Business Activities, ed. Akio Okochi et al., 84; and Moulton, Harold, Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal (Washington, D.C., 1931), 282–86Google Scholar. Indeed, in his extensive survey of foreign multinationals in British manufacturing and utilities before 1945, Geoffrey Jones lists a total of more than 120 such firms from eleven countries—but found that not even one came from Japan. See Jones, Geoffrey, “Foreign Multinationals and British Industry before 1945,” Economic History Review, 2d ser., 41 (1988): 429–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Kawabe Nobuo, “Overseas Operations, 1868–1945,” 92; The New York Times, various issues.

35 Bank of England Archive OV 16/117. Although located British records do not provide estimates of the total value of Japanese assets in the United Kingdom frozen by the British authorities in 1941, estimates of the value of all Japanese assets in the United Kingdom in 1952 (see text) and other related evidence suggest that the value of these frozen assets was not large.

36 Archives, PRO, BT 271/385, BT 271/637, and BT 271/654.

37 Article One, Agreement Between Japan and Germany Concerning Economic Cooperation, as cited in Mason, “United States Direct Investment in Japan,” 232. According to an official analysis of the Allied Occupation of Japan's Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by this treaty “[b]oth governments [would] consider favorably applications for capital investments in industrial enterprises of the treaty partner's country.”

38 At least two factors help explain the apparent paucity of Japanese direct investment in wartime Germany. First, Japan took a far greater interest in investing in China, Manchuria, and elsewhere in Asia during the war years. Second, significant economic tensions between Germany and Japan also served to limit bilateral investment flows. (Similar to Japanese FDI trends in wartime Germany, German FDI apparently did not grow significantly in wartime Japan.) On (often cool) German-Japanese economic relations from the late 1930s, see, in particular, Akira, Kudo, “The Tripartite Pact and Synthetic Oil: The Ideal and Reality of Economic and Technical Cooperation between Japan and Germany,” in Occasional Papers in Social and Economic History, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, no. 4, March 1992Google Scholar, and Kudo Akira, Nichidoku kigyō kankeishi; Mason, “United States Direct Investment in Japan,” 232–33; and Pauer, Erich, “Lots of Friendship, But Few Orders: German-Japanese Economic Relations in the Late 1930s,” in German-Japanese Relations in the 1930s, ed. Nish, Ian (London, 1986), 10–37Google Scholar. Japan and Italy presumably entered into a similar cooperative economic arrangement in wartime, although the relative importance of such an accord surely would have been far less significant than the German-Japanese tieGoogle Scholar.

39 Certain minor exceptions were permitted. See General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, “Japanese Property Administration,” in History of the Nonmilitory Activities of the Occupation of Japan, vol. 2: Reparations and Property Administration, Part C (unpublished), 65.

40 Ibid., 64–68ff. On the general results of this inventory, see General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, “Japanese Property Administration,” 65–75.

41 Ibid., 74.

42 For the limited exceptions, see ibid., 74 –75.

43 Archives, PRO, BT 271/385.

44 Ibid.

45 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, “Japanese Property Administration,” 75.

46 Ibid., 71. These estimates of external assets do not include Japanese military and naval materiel located abroad.

47 Archives, PRO, BT 271/429. By contrast, the British estimated that total Japanese assets in British territories in the Far East as of 1952 amounted to about ten million pounds. Ibid.

48 See, for example, Numaguchi Gen, “Nihon no kaigai jigyō katsudō,” 252–57.

49 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (English ed.), 17 Nov. 1970.

50 According to one expert, during at least part of this era MITI required that prospective Japanese direct investors sign a written pledge that they would not export back to Japan goods that they might produce in overseas factories. See Yoshino, “The Multinational Spread of Japanese Manufacturing Investment since World War II,” 370–71.

51 On Japanese government policies and practices toward outward direct investment in this period, see Encarnation, Dennis, Rivals Beyond Trade: America versus Japan in Global Competition (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992), 108Google Scholar; Zaisei kinyū tōkei geppō, no. 452, Dec. 1989, 3; Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” 117–18; and Koichi, Hamada, “Japanese Investment Abroad,” in Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Peter Drysdale (Sydney, 1972), 188–89Google Scholar. Hamada suggests that concerns over loss of autonomous control over domestic monetary policy also may have figured among the government's motivations.

52 Encarnation, Rivals Beyond Trade, 110; and Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” 118.

53 Archives Économiques et Financières, Ministère de l'lndustrie, côte 79, 0720/185, Compte rendu no. 204 of the Comité des Investissements Étrangers. It is possible that certain Japanese banks and insurance companies directly invested in postwar France prior to the entry of the Mitsubishi Corporation, yet such investments apparently were not recorded in the Bank of Japan data as cited in Table 2.

54 kyōkai, Keizai hatten (Economic Development Association), Fuyō guruupu kigyō no kaigai jigyō (The overseas enterprises of the Fuyo Group) (Tokyo, 1972), 112–13ffGoogle Scholar.

55 Bank of England Archive, OV 16/83; Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” 248. The European investments of these banks had been preceded by that of the Bank of Japan, however, which managed to open for business in London in late 1951. “A very important position is occupied by England and other countries of the Sterling Area in Japan's progress toward realization of a self-supporting economy,” Bank of Japan governor Ichimada Hisato had written the British government in June 1951, explaining the reasons for his institution's interest in returning to London. “It has been our earnest desire for some time to station a representative of this bank, a central bank, in London,” he went on, “which is the nucleus of these areas and the economic and financial centre of Europe.” Bank of England Archive, OV 16/109.

56 Bank of England Archive, OV 16/83.

57 Morita, Akio, Made in Japan (New York, 1988), 329Google ScholarPubMed. Also, see Table 2.

58 Morita, Made in Japan, 137–38. Also, see Table 2.

59 Morita, Made in Japan, 137–41, 324–30.

60 Kinugasa Yosuke, “Japanese Firms' Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: The Case of Matsushita and Others,” in Overseas Business Activities, ed. Okochi Akio et al., 30–31.

61 Toyota Motor Corporation, “EC Market Unification and Toyota Activity in Europe,” unpub. report, 5.

62 Keizai hatten kyōkai (Economic Development Association), Fuyō guruupu kigyō no kaigai jigyō, 100–101; and Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., “Facts File 1991,” 28–29.

63 Toyota Motor Company, “EC Market Unification,” 5.

64 Zenji, Katagata, Tatakau nihon kigyō (Fighting Japanese Enterprise) (Tokyo, 1967), 51ffGoogle Scholar.; and shinsho, Jiji (Jiji Press), Nihon kigyō no kaigai shinshutsu: ōbei hen (The overseas advance of Japanese enterprise: Europe and America) (Tokyo, 1969), 172Google Scholar. Also, see Table 2.

65 MOF data, as cited in Yoshitomi Masaru et al., Japanese Direct Investment in Europe, 9.

66 For a description of the inward capital liberalization process, see Mason, , American Multinationals and Japan: The Political Economy of Japanese Capital Controls, 1899–1980 (Cambridge, Mass., 1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar), chap. 5; and Encarnation, Dennis and Mason, Mark, “Neither MITI nor America: The Political Economy of Capital Liberalization in Japan,” International Organization 44, 1 (Winter 1990): 42–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” 118–20; Krause, Lawrence B. and Sekiguchi, Sueo, “Japan and the World Economy,” in Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, ed. Patrick, Hugh and Rosovsky, Henry (Washington, D.C., 1976), 447Google Scholar.

68 Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” 120. Rising trade protectionism in the key American market and elsewhere also motivated Japanese business to invest more abroad during this period. See Encarnation, Rivals Beyond Trade, 110.

69 Japan continued to invest directly large sums into Europe during the early 1990s, although neither during the 1990 nor 1991 Japanese fiscal years did annual outflows reach levels registered in the peak (fiscal) year of 1989 (see Fig. 5).

70 Burton, F. N. and Saelens, F. H, “The European Investments of Japanese Financial Institutions,” Columbia Journal of World Business, Winter 1986, 32;Google Scholar and Fujii Mitsuo et al., eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai, 2: 92–93.

71 Fujii Mitsuo et al., eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai, 2:94–95.

72 Ibid., 104–5.

73 Komiya Ryutaro, “Japan's Foreign Direct Investment,” 126.

74 Burton and Saelens, “The European Investments of Japanese Financial Institutions,” 30.

75 See, for example, Crowley, Anthony, “A Southern Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 Aug. 1989, 55Google Scholar.

76 See, for example, Burton and Saelens, “The European Investments of Japanese Financial Institutions,” 30–32; Dinand, Jean-Michel, “Séduire les Banquiers Japonais,” France Japon Eco 45 (1991): 45–48Google Scholar; and MacKinnon, Neil, “Japanese Corporate and Financial Strategy in the Single European Market,” European Management Journal 8, 3 (Sept. 1990): 313–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 Mitsuo, Fujii et al. , eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai, 2: 40–41Google Scholar.

78 Burton, F. N. and Saelens, F. H., “Direct Investment by Sogo-Shosha in Europe,” Journal of World Trade Law 17, 3 (May-June 1983): 249–58Google Scholar.

79 On the significance of the sōgō shōsha in bilateral trade between the EC and Japan during the 1980s see, for example, Thomsen and Nicolaides, The Evolution of Japanese Direct Investment in Europe, 79–80.

80 Kinugusa Yosuke, “Japanese Firms' Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: The Case of Matsushita and Others,” 31; and Panasonic Europe (Headquarters), Ltd., Uxbridge, England, “Panasonic—Integrating With Europe” (n.d.), 18–20.

81 Toyota Motor Corporation, unpub. report, n.d.

82 Invest in Britain Bureau, “List of Japanese Manufacturing Companies in the UK,” unpub. report, n.d.

83 DATAR, “Liste des Unités de Production Japonaises en France,” unpub. report, n.d.

84 Panasonic Europe (Headquarters), Ltd., “Panasonic-Integrating with Europe,” 8–11, 18–20.

85 Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota: History of the First 50 Years, 494.

86 Mitsuo, Fujii et al. , eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai, 2: 166Google Scholar.

87 Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, various pamphlets; company brochures. The start-up dates of these several Japanese auto plants in Europe naturally were later than the dates on which their parent companies committed capital to build these operations.

88 MOF data, as cited in various MOF and BOJ publications; and data cited in Yoshitomi Masaru et al., Japanese Direct Investment in Europe, 9

89 Calculated on the basis of Japanese FDI data as reported by MOF through March 1992.

90 Micossi and Viesti, “Japanese Direct Manufacturing Investment in Europe,” 207–8; Crowley, “A Southern Spree,” 55. Indeed, Crowley echoed the author's own interview findings that, at least by 1989, there had developed a “growing awareness” among Japanese managers and policymakers that a “diffusion of Japanese investment throughout Europe, especially into the poorer southern states of the Continent,” might well produce “political as well as economic rewards.” Emphasis added.

91 See, for example, Mitsuo, Fujii et al. , eds., Nihon takokuseki kigyō no shiteki tenkai, 2: 2Google Scholar.

92 Sayers, R. S., Bank of England Operations, 1890–1914 (London, 1936), 40–42Google Scholar; Ishii, Kanji, “Japan,” in International Banking 1870–1914, ed. Cameron, Rondo and Bovykin, V. I. (New York, 1991), 220–21Google Scholar. I am grateful to Geoffrey Jones for alerting me to the significant impacts of the YSB's London activities on the financial markets of the pre-1914 City of London.

On the importance of the silk trade for Japan see, for example, Yokohama Shōkin Ginkō Chōsabu (Research Section, Yokohama Specie Bank), Kiito kinyu to gaikoku kawase (Trade in Raw Silk Thread and Foreign Exchange), May 1926, 1–9. On some of the early effects of the silk trade on France as well as Japan, see, for example, Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, “The Silk Trade in the Bakumatsu Era and the Pattern of Japanese Economic Development” in Bakumatsu and Meiji: Studies in Japan's Economic and Social History, ed. Nish, Ian (London, 1982), 39–55Google Scholar. According to Lehmann, Japan became a key source of raw silk and silkworm eggs for the Lyon-based silk industry as early as the mid-1860s. The silk industry, Lehmann reports, constituted a “vital sector of the French economy” for many years thereafter—silken fabrics produced in Lyon alone, for example, accounted for no less than 7 percent of France's total exports in 1880—and Japan acted as a critical supplier to that industry.

93 Consider, for example, the highly complex political ramifications of Japan's negotiations with the European Community over the issue of Japanese automobile exports to—but also transplant production in—the EC. See, for example, Mason, Mark, “Elements of Consensus: Europe's Response to the Japanese Automotive Challenge,” in Does Ownership Matter? Japanese Multinationals in Europe, ed. Mason, Mark and Encarnation, Dennis (New YorkGoogle Scholar, forthcoming).

94 On past European attitudes see, for example, Davenport-Hines, R. P. T. and Jones, Geoffrey, “British Business in Japan since 1868,” in British Business in Asia since 1860, ed. Davenport-Hines, R. P. T. and Jones, Geoffrey (New York, 1989), 232Google Scholar; Ian Nish, “Europe and Japan: A British Historian Looks at Misperceptions in the Inter-war Years,” a paper presented at the conference “Europe and Japan: Cooperation and Conflict,” European Policy Unit, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, June 1992; and Wilkinson, Endymion, Japan versus the West: Image and Reality (New York, 1990Google Scholar), part 3.

95 On recent French reactions, see, for example, “Japon: la bataille d'Europe” (Japan: The Battle of Europe), in Le Point, no. 975, 27 May 1991, 87–92; “L'invasion japonais” (The Japanese Invasion), in Le Monde, 10 July 1991, 1; and “Edith peut-elle sauver nos industries: L'obsession japonaise du Premier ministre” (Can Edith [Cresson] Save Our Industries: The Japanese Obsession of the Prime Minister), in Le Nouvel Observateur, 23–29 May 1991, 93. For an informative overview of current (but also historical) French perceptions of Japan and its economic position, see François Crouzet, “Some French Views of Japan Today,” a paper presented at the conference “Europe and Japan: Cooperation and Conflict,” European Policy Unit, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, June 1992.