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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2012
This article deals with a few aspects of the management of the Southern Pacific Company under E. H. Harriman from his assumption of control of the road in 1901 until his death in 1909. This was a short period in the railroad's history and yet it was long enough to supply ample illustration of the methods which Harriman, a former Wall Street broker, employed to attain great success in the administration of this huge railroad system. It exemplifies the truth that a big job must be done by the coöperative work of many men, albeit with a strong man at the top. It shows the successful operation of a big business unit under a strong top-level organization which allowed for individual freedom and initiative at lower levels. It was the Harriman system, even more than Harriman, alone, that did so much for the Southern Pacific. And, then, we must not forget that some of the ideas which Harriman put into effect were nurtured by the former president, C. P. Huntington, who never found the opportunity to carry them out. But if Harriman did not largely conceive the policies and techniques and train the men, he merged them into a great concept of policy, organization, and management which he supported with his financial strength and his capacity as an administrator. The story of his administration of the Southern Pacific illustrates an important stage in the history of American railroad administration and, indeed, of this country's large-scale business administration in general.
1 Gras, N. S. B. & Larson, Henrietta M., Casebook in American Business History (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1939), p. 730.Google Scholar
2 Ibid, p. 738.
3 Kennan, George, E. H. Harriman: A Biography (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1922), vol. i, p. 235.Google Scholar Quotations from this book are reproduced here by courtesy of the publisher.
4 Daggett, Stuart, Chapters on the History of the Southern Pacific (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1922), p. 428.Google Scholar
5 Kennan, op. cit., vol. i, p. 234.
6 Daggett, Stuart, Railroad Reorganization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908), p. 258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 Ibid., p. 236.
8 These additional purchases were to a large extent to protect the management from a minority group that disagreed with the company's dividend policy.
9 Kennan, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 240–241.
10 Ibid., pp. 241–242.
11 Daggett, Railroad Reorganization, p. 258.
12 Railway Gazette, Feb. 8, 1901, vol. xxxiii, p. 96.
13 From the Union Pacific's annual report for June 30, 1901, as quoted in the Railroad Gazette for Jan. 3, 1902, vol. xxxiv, p. 9.
14 Material gathered from Busbey, Addison T., The Biographical Directory of the Railway Officials of America (Chicago, 1906)Google Scholar; and Railroad Gazette, Oct. 25, 1901, vol. xxxiii, p. 745.
15 Railroad Gazette, loc. cit.
16 Loc. cit.
17 Busbey, op. cit.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Except in Texas, where the law required a local vice-president to report directly to the president.
22 Material for this section was obtained from the Railroad Age Gazette, vols. xlvi and xlvii.
23 Railroad Age Gazette, vol. xlvi, was the main source for this paragraph.
24 Railroad Age Gazette, Sept. 17, 1909, vol. xlvii, p. 484.
25 Railroad Gazette, Mar. 17, 1905, vol. xxxviii, p. 248.
26 Railway Age, Aug. 24, 1906, vol. xlii, p. 224.
27 Railroad Gazette, May 1, 1908, vol. xliv, pp. 610–616.
28 Railroad Age Gazette, Sept. 17, 1909, vol. xlvii, p. 484.
29 Kennan, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 244–245.
30 Railroad Gazette, May 16, 1902, vol. xxxiv, p. 359.
31 Ibid., Jan. 3, 1902, vol. xxxiv, p. 9.
32 Heath, Erie, Seventy-Five Years of Progress (San Francisco: Southern Pacific Bureau of News, 1945), p. 21.Google Scholar
33 Loc. cit.
34 Not all equipment was the same on both lines. On this subject, Kennan (op. cit., vol. i, p. 277) said: “Sometimes Mr. Harriman was disposed to carry this policy of standardization too far, as in one case where he proposed that classes of locomotives on the two systems be made uniform. When, however, his director of operation showed him that this was impracticable, and that it would result in a decrease of efficiency on certain parts of the lines where engines of an exceptional type were needed, he yielded to Mr. Kruttschnitt's better judgment.”
35 Ibid., p. 273.
36 Loc. cit.
37 Ibid., p. 274.
38 Source of figures: ibid., pp. 257–258.
39 Ibid., pp. 258–259.
40 Franklin K. Lane, “Consolidation and Combination of Carriers” (Washington, Apr. 5, 1907), p. 281.
41 Railroad Age Gazette, June 18, 1909, vol. xlvi, p. 1301.
42 Railroad Gazette, Apr. 1, 1904, vol. xxxvi, p. 251.
43 Loc. cit.
44 Ibid., Aug. 16, 1901, vol. xxxiii, p. 570.