The prosperity of an industrial enterprise depends upon its ability to adapt continuously to the evolving market for its goods. This paper considers the consequences of one kind of industrial strategy — vertical integration — when the relevant market is strongly influenced by fashion.

The late nineteenth century was a critical epoch in the history of French industry. During this period, many French industrialists adopted, for the first time, entrepreneurial attitudes towards business. At the same time, however, traditional skilled trades continued to play an important role in the national economy. In this article, Professor Weissbach explores the attitudes and practices of nineteenth-century entrepreneurs in the French luxury trade. By focusing specifically on the Patronage industriel des enfants de l'ébénisterie—an organization established to assist, educate, and moralize children apprentices in the French furniture industry—Weissbach reveals that traditional and entrepreneurial attitudes and practices coexisted throughout the nineteenth century.

In the manner of the Creole tradesmen of Louisiana, whose lagniappe to their patrons is legendary, the Editor offers a similar bonus to readers of the Review. Instead of trifling presents added to a purchase, however, our lagniappe will be notes and documents illustrative of the evolution of business enterprise.

The advertising industry generated remarkably prompt responses, at both the institutional and individual level, to the opportunities and problems of growth. Once associationist activities had achieved a measure of industry self-regulation and self-analysis, individual entrepreneurs stepped in to offer specialized services that grew in value as the professional status of the parties concerned became established and differentiated.

“Second generation” historical efforts are shedding new light on the beginnings of the textile industry. Even fragmentary records, minutely examined, yield vignettes that may one day be merged to form important new chapters of industry history. The Darley Abbey story reveals rare operational detail and an interesting variant in the British pattern of development.

Contrary to their traditional image as institutions operated exclusively for “frugal workers,” mutual savings banks in New York were also a haven for the savings of many middle and upper class persons, whose accounts comprised a substantial proportion of the banks' funds. Thus these intermediaries presumably improved the efficiency of the savings and investment process, allowing middle class people to allocate their resources between fixed and liquid assets better than would otherwise have been possible.

Early American life insurers found themselves facing the problem of asymmetric information, as they needed to rely on applicants themselves to provide truthful, complete answers to a standard set of questions. In an attempt to repersonalize the relationship between their boards of directors and the individual applicants, firms selected highly respected local citizens to act as their agents. These agents were expected to evaluate the appearance of candidates, unearth evidence of unhealthy family histories or questionable habits, and attest to the respectability of people writing testimonial letters on an applicant's behalf. In short, the initial purpose of the agency system was not to actively solicit customers, but rather to recreate the glass-bowl mentality associated with small towns or city neighborhoods.

Rarely does a relatively unknown professor of economics publish a book that sells more than 200,000 copies in a few months. When critics accuse the same economist of being normative, political, of manipulating data, of misunderstanding basic economic theory, and of wanting to impoverish everyone, surely it must be because he is on to something. Other commentators, perhaps a bit prematurely, are claiming that his book is the economics book that will define twenty-first-century debate.

This timely account of the hunching of the Suez Canal project reveals both sides of the coin of innovation. It is, on the one hand, a study of the character and methods of one of the most famous innovators of the nineteenth century. Ferdinand DeLesseps was not a politician, a financier, an engineer, a promoter (in the common sense of the word), or a businessman. Yet he succeeded brilliantly in a venture requiring consummate mastery of all these professional fields. On the other hand is revealed the waterway itself — vital to one civilization, useless and neglected in another, and then of transcendent importance as world history marched on. Realization of the grand scheme envisaged by the Pharaohs came at last when economic and political factors momentarily aligned in a pattern of opportunity for a unique set of entrepreneurial qualifications.

To facilitate fruitful conceptualization and research in business history among scholars throughout the world, the Review herewith inaugurates a series of reports by our International Correspondents. These reports will supplement the American activities regularly recorded in our pages. It is our hope that comparative studies of common problems and the exchange of data and ideas will thus be encouraged.

To stimulate further research in the history of business instruments, the Review offers this illustrated record of a search for the earliest evidence of printed corporate securities.

The railroad leader's conception of his role in business and society is the focus of this study of one of the nineteenth century's most articulate businessmen.

Nowhere was the postwar growth of multinational corporations more dramatic than in the petroleum industry. The major oil companies of the western nations were soon banded together in a complex of joint exploration, producing, refining, and marketing organizations. But efforts to advance criminal prosecution of the American companies under the antitrust laws soon ran head-on into overriding considerations of national security. The hardening of the Cold War, complicated by internal political weaknesses in Iran, persuaded both President Truman and President Eisenhower to soft-pedal litigation. In the end, criminal prosecution of joint production enterprises became civil suits against marketing and pricing agreements, which were settled by consent decree. This, according to Professor Kaufman, amounted to attacking “the tail but not the head or body of the energy tiger.”