John Mackintosh, incorporated in 1899, emerged as one of Britain's major confectionery firms, gaining national prominence through the manufacture and marketing of distinct products. A number of interrelated factors marked its growth. Dominated by a single family, the motivations and contributions of its leading members were formative, and its history inevitably engages with debates on Britain's “personal capitalism” and its failings. Considering the importance of marketing to a consumer products manufacturer, capabilities in this critical function are entangled with issues of ownership and management. During the 1930s, the firm ended its reliance on toffee lines, replacing them with innovative, highly advertised brands that mixed toffee with chocolate. These product breakthroughs were fully exploited in the postwar consumer boom. The timing and nature of Mackintosh's achievements can be compared to those of its rival, Rowntree, but there were important differences in their implementation. The story of this firm is an important addition to the history of the British confectionery industry and its development, offering insights into the evolution of marketing techniques. The case of Mackintosh is additionally useful because it clearly reveals an unexplored theme. A long-term perspective on its growth highlights the distinction between “early” and “mature” markets and shows how changes in demand influenced, and then tested, the efficacy of marketing approaches.

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., observed that under managerial capitalism, salaried managers tended to pursue policies that promoted the long-term stability and growth of their enterprises. The U.S. cable television industry provides a case study of how managers responded when stability and growth were mutually consistent objectives, and when they were mutually exclusive. From the late 1950s through the early 1980s, agent-led newspaper publishers and television broadcasters invested aggressively in the cable business. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, investing in cable implied a tradeoff between stability and growth objectives. As a wave of mergers swept the cable industry, agent-led companies avoided acquisitions that might dilute earnings and depress stock prices. Confronting an increasingly turbulent competitive environment during the first half of the 1990s, agent-led companies were much more likely to divest cable assets than owner-managed firms. In agent-led companies, managers believed that their cable units would require massive capital investments, and they were reluctant to “bet the company” on a business facing so much competitive, technological, and regulatory uncertainty. Owner-managers, emotionally attached to the cable industry and to the firms they had built, and often harboring dynastic ambitions, were more reluctant to sell: they were willing to gamble on growth.

The 1884 receivership of the Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway is widely regarded as a turning point in the development of corporate insolvency law. It is said to have created a “new-fashioned receivership,” which enabled debtors to initiate and, to a great extent, control receiverships. It is said that these new-fashioned receiverships facilitated reorganization of the insolvent firm at the expense of creditors' rights. An examination of the history of railroad receiverships reveals that for decades before 1884 judges allowed managers to initiate receiverships, appointed managers as receivers, and forced creditors to accept changes in their contractual rights. Judges also refused to extend reorganization procedures to corporations outside the railroad industry, justifying their special treatment of railroads on the grounds that the foremost obligation of railroads was to serve the public. Analysis of railroad bond prices supports the conclusion that creditors' rights were not transformed by the courts in the mid-1880s.

Events in the late 1960s reshaped the securities industry. Trading volume increased sharply, with the number of shares changing hands on the New York Exchange growing from five million a day in 1965 to twelve million a day in 1968. This expansion overwhelmed the mechanisms brokers used to transfer securities and keep records, which relied heavily on paper and pen. They responded by purchasing computers, but these machines were expensive and demanded more sophisticated management than most firms could provide. Accordingly, many companies botched the process. Moreover, trading volume declined sharply in 1969 and 1970, cutting deeply into brokerage revenue. These factors combined to create a crisis that had, by the end of 1970, forced nearly a sixth of the nation's brokerage firms out of business. Yet this crisis also opened the way for large, integrated companies, which, by the 1990s, dominated the securities industry and conducted business on a scale unimagined thirty years earlier.

The Larkin Company of Buffalo, New York, was established in the 1870s as a small soap producer and grew to become a large mail-order house. Larkin's success could be attributed to a unique sales strategy created by Elbert Hubbard, called “The Larkin Idea,” which had as its motto, “From Factory-to-Family: Save All Cost Which Adds No Value.” The company sold its products exclusively through the mail to women in cooperative buying clubs. Employing a variety of marketing, advertising, and employee welfare practices, the Larkin Company built a unified corporate family of “Larkinites“—employees, customers, and executives. Larkin executives also hired architect Frank Lloyd Wright to construct a modern office complex, which became the physical representation of Larkin's culture. But changes in marketing, the departure and deaths of key executives, a seemingly anachronistic corporate culture, and poor business decisions combined to undermine the company in the mid-1920s, and by 1940 the company was virtually dead.

The Cuba Company was the largest single foreign investment in Cuba during the first two decades of the twentieth century and remained one of the largest corporations. This article presents a detailed history of the commercial networks forged between political officials and North American and Cuban businessmen through the development of the company. These networks proved crucial to the success of the Cuba Company and subsequently shaped the development of the new Cuban Republic.

For all its notoriety and controversial character, the history of Swiss banking secrecy remains largely unexplored. This article traces the crucial phases of its development. It reveals that the maintenance and reinforcement of banking secrecy represented a major objective of Swiss authorities throughout the twentieth century, and exerted a substantial influence on Swiss domestic and foreign policy. It demonstrates that, contrary to popular opinion, the institution of Swiss banking secrecy did not arise from a desire to protect the funds deposited in Switzerland by Jewish victims of Nazi persecution but rather had substantially different origins. Moreover, this article shows that Swiss banking secrecy gave rise to tensions between Switzerland and the Great Powers, especially during and after World War II, when it poisoned relations between Switzerland and the United States.

The development of the pulp and paper sector has been a highly controversial subject in Canadian business history. During the 1920s, there was a rapid growth of capacity (which reached twice the level of market demand) and a series of mergers as different firms sought to attain giant size. By 1928 several leading companies were experiencing difficulties, and by 1932 half of the producers were bankrupt while the remainder hovered on the brink of insolvency. These developments had their own logic and were driven by strategic issues and the formation of an institutional market for industrial securities. As corporate executives propelled their firms into dubious strategies characterized by excess production and unrealistic dividend policies, the status of the newsprint producers was obscured from investors by financial and accounting practices, thereby contributing to a flood of investment, which was followed by corporate collapse. The attempts to reorganize the companies began a complex process that lasted anywhere from several years to more than a decade.

Spanish shipping firms relied on various strategies to direct the growth of their industry from 1860 to 1930. The diffusion of specialist shipowners during the second half of the nineteenth century was the result of both an increasing demand for maritime transport and a heavy rise in capital requirements owing to improvements in technology. During the first third of the twentieth century, some of these specialized firms became large companies through internal growth and/or horizontal combination. They achieved their gains without resorting to formal vertical integration, choosing instead to build social networks with other shipowners based on trust and loyalty. This approach allowed them to create intermediate arrangements, thereby diminishing transaction costs. When strategies of formal vertical integration were adopted, they primarily involved activities similar to shipping, such as ship brokering, consignment, stevedoring, and other maritime services. To document these trends, this article analyzes the organizational structure of Spain's twenty largest shipping concerns.

An examination of the fortunes of three hotel groups in the 1920s and 1930s suggests that the collapse of international demand and the growth of a middle-class motorized trade were the major influences on differential performance. While trading difficulties led to an effort to exit from unprofitable outlets or to rationalize supplies and services, opportunities for economy were restricted by customers' rising expectations of facilities and the need to protect a preeminent position in the market. Company organization appears to have contributed little, with the best performance achieved by the group with the smallest individual units and the least opportunity for structural specialization or economies.

Between the end of the Civil War and the enactment of national Prohibition in 1920, America's brewing industry grew to become one of the nation's leading manufacturing industries. During the first thirty years of this period, the industry's growth was propelled by the emergence of a small group of nationally oriented breweries. These firms pioneered a series of important technological, scientific, and organizational innovations, which allowed them to increase annual sales. Yet, after several decades of spectacular growth, they began to see their relative position in the industry decline. From the mid-1890s until Prohibition, hundreds of regional and local breweries reasserted themselves in the market for beer. These firms often were able to provide less expensive beer and to sell it in saloons that they owned or controlled. Together, these two factors enabled regional and local breweries to present a competitive challenge to national firms in the years leading up to Prohibition.

This article examines the relationship between J.P. Morgan & Co. and France during the First World War. It argues that the dealings between the French government and the partners of J.P. Morgan & Co. from 1914 to 1918 were characterized by personal difficulties between successive French representatives and the partners of J.P. Morgan & Co. Contributing to a strained relationship was the place of Morgan, Harjes, the French affiliate of J.P. Morgan & Co., within the House of Morgan. Herman Harjes, the senior partner in Morgan, Harjes, though a proponent of Franco-American amity, became disenchanted with his New York partners as the war continued. The feeling was shared by those in New York, who reevaluated the role of Morgan, Harjes within the House of Morgan—until the French affiliate's eventual disappearance in 1926. While sympathetic to France, and instrumental in sustaining French credit during the war, the partners of J.P. Morgan & Co. conceived of the Allied cause as the British cause, a perspective that led them to rebuff calls for greater Franco-American financial cooperation.

“[O]ur ladies know nothing of the sober certainties which relate to money and they cannot be taught,” wrote Frederic Tudor in 1820, in a sweeping indictment of women's financial abilities that was common for the period. Despite such stereotypes, many women in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries participated in commerce, both as merchants and as manufacturers. Because they mainly oversaw small and shortlived concerns, however, their enterprises did not fit into traditional understandings of successful business, either in their own time or later, when the field of business history developed in the twentieth century. As a consequence, when Harvard Business School's Baker Library began amassing business manuscripts, curators generally concentrated on collecting the records of large firms and well-known industrialists. Their big-business bias not only affected what was collected, but also how manuscripts were processed. Search aids and cataloging records did not distinguish materials made by or about women because gender was not a compelling issue for early twentieth-century historians.

Industrialization, urbanization, and commercial expansion following the Civil War altered the social and economic landscape in America and contributed to the rapid development of new consumer markets. Manufacturers began to vie aggressively for consumer spending. It was the advertising trade card that met the need for an effective national advertising medium, heralding the arrival of an extraordinary variety of manufactured goods newly available to the American public.