Making sense of an execution: Patriarch Gregory V between the Sublime Porte and the Patriarchate

Abstract

This article examines the events leading to the execution of Gregory V, Patriarch of Constantinople, utilizing accounts and documents in Ottoman Turkish and Greek. Gregory was the occupant of a post which involved striking a balance between different Phanariot factions, pro- and anti-Enlightenment tendencies, and localist and imperial expectations. This article argues that it was the outbreak of the Revolution in the Morea, rather than Ypsilantis’ movement, that upset the status quo, convincing the Ottoman elite that Gregory was no longer useful for the smooth functioning of Ottoman governance.

Introduction

Gregory V was born Georgios Angelopoulos in 1745 in Dimitsana in the Morea.¹ He was executed by imperial order on Easter Sunday, 22 April 1821.² His career intertwined with the changing fortunes of Greek-speaking Orthodox populations, the rise of revolutionary ideologies in Europe and the reform efforts of Ottoman sultans, and ended violently because he was blamed for a revolution carried out by members of his flock. He served as Patriarch on three different occasions, the last of which ended with his execution. His first term (1797–8) coincided with Ottoman fears of a Napoleonic invasion, with the revolutionary career of Rigas Velestinlis, and with Moreot efforts to contact Napoleon himself. He was the Patriarch when the anti-revolutionary pamphlet, Paternal Instruction (Διδασκαλία Πατρική), was written by the Patriarch of Jerusalem and printed in Constantinople.³ Revolutionary ideologies were repeatedly condemned under his first Patriarchate.

His second term (1806–8), coincided with the First Serbian Revolt, the deposition of Sultan Selim III, and turmoil in the Ottoman capital.⁴ By a strange coincidence Gregory V was deposed in 1808 for supporting the Serbian rebels. This was probably a slander against the Patriarch by the new Grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, a Balkan strongman turned Grand Vizier who deposed Mustafa IV and instituted Mahmud II in his place.⁵ In fact, Alemdar had been part of the factional rivalries within the Phanariot complex even before he entered the capital.⁶ An agent of Ali Pasha of Ioannina explains how Alemdar, before entering the capital, sent a horse for one Mourouzis, probably Alexandros. According to the report, they sat for about five hours discussing their plans and left very happy.⁷ The deposition of Gregory in 1808 seems to be a result of Phanariot politics rather than any real involvement in the Serbian revolt. Still, the fact that Gregory got away unharmed after being accused of treason is interesting and must be kept in mind when discussing his execution in 1821. I think the difference in outcomes in 1821 stems from the fact that Gregory had strong connections to the Morea and that the Moreots, unlike the Serbs, rejected any compromise with the Ottoman government from the outset. His third term's tragic end is the theme of this article.

The Patriarch's execution has received increasing attention in recent years. Recent studies have moved away from nationalistic readings and situate Gregory V in an Ottoman context. In this vein, Christine Philliou locates the execution in the process of the ‘breakdown of the Phanariot house’ and, using Greek accounts from Constantinople, places it within a series of executions related to the collapse of the Phanariot system after the start of the Greek Revolution.⁸ However, the parallel eruption of rebellions in the Morea is not mentioned in her account, though they are directly referenced in Ottoman documents about the execution. Şükrü Ilıcak places the execution in the context of the Ottoman government's efforts to monopolize violence in the capital following the arming of the Muslim populace.⁹ Ilıcak considers the execution as ‘a message to the Russian court: Do not instigate the Greeks to rebel; otherwise, you will be responsible for the plight of your coreligionists.’¹⁰ Leonidas Moiras, on the other hand, has underlined how the Sultan saw the Patriarch as one of those responsible for the eruption of the rebellion in the Morea.¹¹ He highlights the references to the Patriarch's Moreot origins and argues that the execution was an effort to create an example out of the Patriarch due to Ottoman fears of an uprising in the capital.¹² It is not my intention to contest any of these views. However, they lack a focus on Ottoman documentation of what led to the execution. I also argue for a larger picture that takes into account all of the above-mentioned factors and possibly more.

This paper will explore developments around the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople in the first months of the Greek Revolution. The aim is to place the Patriarch and the Patriarchate in their Ottoman context and to understand the rationale behind the execution of Gregory V. I follow Phokion Kotzageorgis’ call to approach the question of the Patriarchate's position on the Greek Revolution ‘through individual persons.’¹³ Utilizing Ottoman Turkish and Greek documents, I argue that the execution and the general Ottoman attitude to the Patriarchate at this time can be explained by the disruption of the equilibrium formed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries within the Patriarchal structure and between the Ottoman government and the Patriarchate. I shall argue that the Patriarchate had to harmonize the interests of rival Phanariot groups, find a balance between ecumenical and local interests in the Morea and other provinces, and bring together both advocates of the Greek Enlightenment and those opposed to it. As we shall see, these three points were closely connected to Ottoman expectations of the Patriarchate. The outbreak of the Revolution upset the status quo in all these fields and resulted in Gregory V's execution.

The Patriarchate and the Ottomans

The study of the Ottoman context of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople has seen exciting new work in the last decades. The field has moved away from a perspective that sees the relationship between the Patriarch and the Sultan as crystallized in a shape set in place right after the fall of Constantinople.¹⁴ Moreover, the view that a millet system was set in place by Mehmet II, and that the Patriarch was the head of all Orthodox Christian life in the Ottoman Empire, can no longer be maintained.¹⁵ Recent works emphasize that the term millet was rather a concept than a system, especially for the period before the nineteenth century.¹⁶

The work of Paraskevas Konortas has demonstrated that the Ottomans did not consider the Patriarchate to be an institution until the nineteenth century. According to Konortas, the increasing incorporation of the Orthodox Patriarchate into Ottoman governance was achieved through changing tax regimes. The increasing role of the Phanariot elite had pushed for a more centralized structure as early as the mid-eighteenth century.¹⁷ Hasan Çolak has studied this transformation through the history of the incorporation of the eastern patriarchates into the Ecumenical Patriarchate.¹⁸ Elif Bayraktar Tellan's doctoral thesis has demonstrated how the Patriarchate managed to extend its legal jurisdiction in this period. Beyond its financial and spiritual powers, the Patriarchate of Constantinople acquired punitive powers too.¹⁹

With the rise of the Holy Synod as the main governing body of the Patriarchate in the eighteenth century, the Patriarchs could no longer act on their own. The system that came be known as gerontismos (rule by elders), allowed Phanariot magnates to ally with various metropolitans and fight for the interests of their factions in the Patriarchate.²⁰ In this new picture, local communities could not use their ties to the Ottoman government to have their own candidates appointed. Nevertheless, it seems that these communities could still use their ties to the Patriarchate instead of the Sublime Porte to achieve their aims.

The Patriarchate also tended to support the imperial power throughout the Ottoman period. Konortas relates that from the 1580s the Patriarchate started referring to the Ottoman Sultan as the ‘Basileus’ (βασιλεύς) rather than the older ‘sovereign’ (ὁ κρατῶν).²¹ In 1601, the Synod decided to replace the metropolitan of Larissa, Dionysios (the philosopher or Σκυλοσόφος) because of the ‘audacious and unwise rebellion undertaken against the kingdom of the Basileus Sultan Mehmet, long may he live.’²² At around the same time, the Patriarchate supported the Ottoman government against the Prince of Wallachia, Michael the Brave, when the latter rebelled against the Sultan.²³

Patriarchs were well aware that the limits of their influence were coterminous with Ottoman territories. One document from 1755 concerning Montenegro bears witness to this:

The western side of the place called Montenegro borders places under the dominion of the Venetians, and its eastern side borders the province of Bosnia. The people (reaya) there subject themselves at times to the Sublime State and at other times to the Venetians just like Croatians and Maniotes. One hundred and eighty years ago, the place was considered to be a metropolitan see under the Patriarchs of Peć and is recorded as such in old registers. However, it has for some time past renounced subjection to the Sublime State and entered the dominion of others, and the metropolitan see was lost.²⁴

In 1783, when Russia annexed the Crimea, the Patriarchate of Constantinople lost another metropolitan see, that of Gothia and Kafa.²⁵ Ottoman dominion largely coincided with the Patriarch's jurisdiction.

By the late eighteenth century, the Patriarchate was thoroughly incorporated in the Ottoman administrative system. The Patriarchs and metropolitans were aware that the fortunes of the institution coincided with the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman loss of territory meant loss of prestige and financial means for the Patriarchate as well. The fact that territories were lost to an Orthodox power could not have changed much for the institution. Therefore, when an ex-Patriarch, Serafeim II (p. 1757–1761), joined the Russians in 1770 and supported them openly, Patriarch Theodosius and the Synod ordered that refutations of him be read in church.²⁶ The Patriarchate also condemned those Orthodox Cossacks who fought on the Russian side in 1768–1774.²⁷ What the rise of Russia brought to Patriarchal affairs was the possibility for individuals within the Patriarchal sphere to identify with projects outside of Ottoman influence. The Patriarchs had to balance different tendencies within the institution while insisting on its overall policy of siding with Ottoman power. A similar tendency can be seen when it comes to the effects of the Greek Enlightenment.

Greek Enlightenment and the Patriarchate

My aim in this section is not to re-evaluate the Greek Enlightenment but to highlight some aspects of it that are connected to the Patriarchate and its relation to the Ottoman government.²⁸ Education played a key role in such debates. It should not be surprising that one of the first illustrious figures of the Greek Enlightenment was an educator and clergyman, Eugenios Voulgaris (1716–1806). Voulgaris embarked on a teaching career in Mount Athos, already connected to Enlightenment thinking.²⁹ He was invited by Patriarch Serapheim II to teach at the Patriarchal Academy, where his tenure lasted from 1759 to 1762. However, his teaching was not welcomed by the more conservative, and the change of patriarch in 1762 brought his dismissal.³⁰ Voulgaris found a patron in Catherine II after leaving the Ottoman capital; he lived for a while in Leipzig and Berlin and finally moved to Russia in 1771.

The fortunes of the Greek Enlightenment depended on several factors, among them the Patriarchate's relationship with Russia, Catherine II's current feelings about Enlightenment thinkers, and the state of Ottoman-Russian diplomacy.³¹ Until the French Revolution, as long as Catherine II felt comfortable with its ideas, the Enlightenment was seen in a positive light. In this atmosphere works of Voltaire and others were translated into Greek. Even then, Dimaras warns us, the Patriarchate may have tried to prevent such work from being read and taught in academies.³² This did not always meet with success.³³ With the outbreak of the French Revolution, attitudes changed completely. The Patriarchate and Orthodox clergymen started publishing works and pamphlets opposed to the Revolution and condemning Enlightenment ideas.³⁴

The period of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars created new opportunities to strengthen the alliance between the Patriarchate and the Sublime Porte. The prime example of this alliance is the publication of the Paternal Instruction prepared by Anthimos, the patriarch of Jerusalem.³⁵ In Ottoman minds, the publication was a response to the Napoleonic threat and to the activities of Rigas Velestinlis. The reports of the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, İbrahim Afif Efendi, make it clear that the Ottoman government was monitoring Greek revolutionary activities in Habsburg domains. One of these reports discusses the arrest of Rigas Velestinlis.³⁶ From Afif Efendi's report it becomes clear that the Sublime Porte pushed for the extradition of Velestinlis and the people arrested with him.³⁷ In the same report, there is a note by the Grand Vizier that relates how ‘the papers by the Patriarch of Jerusalem that are to be spread to certain places are being published and completed and are about to be sent.’³⁸ It seems that the publication of the Paternal Instruction was the result of a joint effort by the Sublime Porte and the Patriarchate devised against the activities of Rhigas and his allies at a time when the Ottomans were expecting an invasion from Napoleon.

However, the Enlightenment did not invariably exhibit revolutionary tendencies, and the Sublime Porte was not interested in all of its adherents. For the Patriarchate, the main strategy consisted in blocking intellectual currents that were deemed anti-religious and anti-Ottoman. For the Ottomans, what mattered was stopping revolutionary activities, and it is not clear whether they cared about the debate around education. The closure of the Philological School of Smyrna, two years before the Revolution broke out, provides a blurred picture in this respect. The debate that surrounded the school concerned teaching materials. The metropolitan of Ephesus, Dionysius, was connected with the wider network of Greek Enlightenment, entertained relations with Adamantios Korais, and supported the teaching of modern philosophy: this drew the ire of the more conservative.³⁹ The school was eventually closed, and some teachers like Konstantinos Oikonomos found themselves forced out and sought the protection of Phanariot families in the capital. The fact that these men did not come under Ottoman surveillance is telling.

The debate around education was so important that the first measure taken by the Patriarchate after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution was the banning of philosophy lessons.⁴⁰ Konstantinos Oikonomos relates how the aforementioned Dionysius was blamed for being ‘the leader and protector of the carbonari, the very first of which are the educated.’⁴¹ Dionysius was one of the first to be imprisoned by the Ottomans, on 9 March. Lappas relates that Dionysius was a member of the Friendly Society (Φιλική Εταιρεία) his brother was in the circle of Konstantinos Ypsilantis, father of the revolutionary Alexandros.⁴² It is not clear whether the Ottomans imprisoned and executed him for being a metropolitan, a revolutionary, or a member of the Phanariot ‘house.’ The placard displayed on his body (yafta) is not enlightening: ‘his complete involvement in the sedition and opposition was ascertained and became manifest and his treason to both the Sublime State and his own millet came to light.’⁴³ However, since he was executed more than a month later, together with the Patriarch, it might be safe to assume that all of these factors were necessary for the decision to execute.

The Greek Revolution was not simply about the Enlightenment. The successful military activities were carried out by the Christian notables and klefts of the Morea. In fact, without the rebellion in the Morea, the Revolution would never have succeeded. The revolt in the Morea changed the Ottoman perception of the rebellion drastically. It ended up affecting the relationship between the Ottoman government and Gregory V, for it underlined the ineffectiveness of the Patriarch in balancing local and imperial interests, which was one of the expectations on the part of the Ottomans.

Locals and imperials

The fact that the Patriarchate had its exclusive right to appoint and dismiss metropolitan bishops recognized by the Sublime Porte in the late eighteenth century should not blind us to the fact that local notables and communities, Muslim and Christian, still got involved in the appointment of metropolitans to their communities. Almost all clergymen in the Morea in 1821 were locals and had connections to different Moreot notables. One of the leaders of the Revolution in the Morea, the metropolitan of Palaiai Patrai Germanos, for example, was like Gregory from Dimitsana in the Morea and had served under him when Gregory was the metropolitan of Smyrna. After becoming the metropolitan of Palaiai Patrai Germanos stayed in Constantinople between 1815 and 1818 and served in the Holy Synod.⁴⁴ He was initiated into the Friendly Society on return to his see. He became one of the leaders of the local branch, defending local rights against the Society's leadership. If we are to believe his memoirs, Germanos became something of a spokesman for the interests of local notables: he relates how he defended the rights of the Moreots to control the local finances of the Friendly Society, after the organization asked for the transfer of funds to the centre in Constantinople.⁴⁵

Many clergymen in the Morea owed their elevation to local Christian notables. Such notables funded local schools and sought the best education for their sons. Olga Karageorgou-Kourtzis has demonstrated how the Perroukas family considered the schools in Argos to be their own business.⁴⁶ Such schools and the Christian notables’ desire to have their sons educated gave future clergymen opportunities to create contacts with them. The metropolitan of Amyklai and Tripolitsa, Daniel, established a connection with the Deliyannis family because he used to be the teacher of Ioannis Deliyannis’ children.⁴⁷ Daniel too was born in Dimitsana.⁴⁸ He served as a bishop in Akovos in the Morea and we have a letter of him promising loyalty to the Deliyannis family.⁴⁹ The predecessor of Daniel in the metropolitan see of Tripolitsa was the brother of Sotirios Kougeas, another Christian notable from the Morea.⁵⁰ The metropolitan of Monemvasia, Chrisanthos, was from Avia and had close relations with the Mavromichalis family from the Mani. He was initiated into the Friendly Society by Christoforos Perraivos in 1819.⁵¹ Examples of such connections can be multiplied.

The Ottoman government did not interfere with such relationships and did not try to impose itself upon the Morea by insisting that metropolitans be chosen from outside. It is dubious whether the officials in Istanbul had that kind of power to intervene anyway. It seems that the Sublime Porte interfered when it decided that local interests were leaving the orbit of Ottoman power structure or when it needed extra help to protect order in the Morea.

Securing the capital

The Prince of Wallachia, Alexandros Soutsos, died in office on 19 January 1821; the revolutionary leader of the Friendly Society, Alexandros Ypsilantis, crossed the Prut on 22 February 1821. One of the first occasions Alexandros is mentioned in an Ottoman document about the revolt in the Danubian Principalities is an order (hüküm) to el-Hac Mustafa Pasha, appointing him as the guardian of the Black Sea entrance to the Bosporus.⁵² Mustafa Pasha was ordered to ‘show utmost care for guarding the reaya in the said region in order not to allow them to be seduced from outside’.⁵³ By mid-March, before things started in the Peloponnese, the Ottoman officials seem to have expected the rebellion to spread beyond the Danubian Principalities. The care shown to protect the Black Sea entrance to the Bosporus seems to show concern for the capital itself.

This concern is evinced by an order sent to the Patriarch on 23 March 1821. This order underlines concern about the propaganda disseminated by the rebels to convince Christian subjects to join them and warns the Patriarch that anyone siding with the rebels would end up executed. Moreover, the order threatens the Patriarch that ‘this shameful rumour might stir up all of the dominant millet of Islam with excitement and it would not be possible to stop them. If this happens, the blood of so many helpless innocents will be spilled unjustly.’⁵⁴

In order to warn all Orthodox Christians of the city, the Patriarch was ordered to gather ‘the metropolitans residing in the capital, the respected ones among the millet, artisans (esnâf) and traders (tüccâr) in the Patriarchate in the presence of the voyvoda of Wallachia Scarlatos [Kallimachis] and the dragoman of the Imperial divan [Konstantinos Mourouzis].’⁵⁵ At this point, Ottoman policy-makers must either have considered the Phanariots in their employ as still loyal or believed in the state's ability to convince them by threats. Philliou's research argues for this: using an anonymous source and the reports of the British ambassador, she relates how Mourouzis was asked to make a register of the Greeks in the city with their connections.⁵⁶ The insistence on the presence of Kallimachis and Mourouzis in the Patriarchate at this meeting was of course a result of the Phanariot involvement in the Patriarchate, which was considered a natural thing. In fact, the first days of the Revolution in the capital and around the Patriarchate were experienced as Phanariot strife. Konstantinos Oikonomos relates that many among the Soutsos faction were already imprisoned in the first days.⁵⁷ Oikonomos himself was not touched by the Ottoman government or the conservatives in the Patriarchate because he had the protection of the Mourouzis family.⁵⁸

In March, the Ottoman government went after the Phanariots, most of them connected to the Soutsos faction. One short undated missive stamped by the Patriarch shows that the Ottomans used the resources of the Patriarchate to capture and imprison them. ‘As per his imperial order, five zimmi subjects, Bano Panayotaki, Ağa Aleko Ralli, Kuluçyar Zafiraki, Paharnik Yorgaki and the son of the executed voyvoda Kostandin Hançerli who were imprisoned in our poor Patriarchate, have been handed over to the Kuşçubaşı Agha’: so runs a missive bearing the personal seal of Patriarch Gregory V. ‘Agents have been appointed to every neighbourhood for the son of [illegible] and the merchant Papayorgi [illegible]. If there are any news or clues on their situation, we will haste to inform.’⁵⁹ This undated missive was sent to the Sublime Porte by the Patriarch some time between late February 1821 when Alexandros Ypsilantis crossed the Prut and 22 April 1821 when Gregory V was executed. It shows that the Sublime Porte needed the Patriarchate for its pursuit of suspects.⁶⁰

In the aforementioned order of 23 March 1821, the Sublime Porte also asked for specific steps to be taken. The Patriarch was ordered to make it clear to all present that they should inform Ottoman officials should they receive news or letters from the rebels, ‘thinking in advance about the great dangers that they would suffer from and be afflicted with.’⁶¹ They were also expected to turn in anyone who might have entertained participating in revolutionary activities. The Patriarch was to ‘publish and disseminate religious papers (âyinî kağıdlar) and strong excommunications (şedid afarozlar)’ and send them to the metropolitans and leaders of the millet (rüesâ-yı millet) in the provinces. The metropolitans and the bishops were to verify the fidelity of their priests and to send those lacking in submission to the Patriarch in order to be punished. It was warned that ‘everyone could receive harsh punishments; metropolitans for priests, priests and çorbacıs [provincial Christian notables] for the regular subjects (reaya) in case of actions contrary [to this order].’⁶² Anyone failing to inform about seditious movements, and that included the Patriarch himself, was threatened with harsh punishment.

This long order was a result of increasing concern in the Ottoman capital. The Sultan himself had been worried about possible sedition among the Christian populations of the capital as early as mid-March and had ordered increased patrols in Galata and Beyoğlu and surveillance of the movements of non-Muslims in the suburbs.⁶³ We have enough evidence to claim that Ottoman officials worried about a rebellion in the capital and used the Patriarchate in their efforts to control the Orthodox Christians of Constantinople. In fact, Ottoman officials started confiscating weapons in the hands of the capital's Christians and ordered the Patriarchate to send clergymen to accompany Ottoman officials in their searches. Most of these weapons were gathered in the Patriarchate as well.⁶⁴

In short, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople was essential for the Ottoman government in its efforts to secure the capital, to catch and imprison suspected revolutionaries, and to fight against revolutionary propaganda in Istanbul and beyond. Developments in early to mid-March do not suggest mistrust of the Patriarch. This changed dramatically once Phanariot families started escaping the capital, and especially when the rebellion in the Morea started and the Patriarch's efforts against the revolution had proved useless, at least in the eyes of the Sultan.

The rebellion in the Morea

There is evidence from early to mid-March that the Ottoman officials in the capital expected a rebellion in the Morea and connected the possibility to Ypsilantis’ movement in the Danubian Principalities. The information comes from the report of Hurşid Pasha. He informs the Sultan about some letters he had received from Tripolitsa to the effect that ‘a number of individuals have arrived from Ali Pasha to the Morea and incited the subjects (reaya) by baseless talk and as a result some rebellious agitation (harekat-ı reddiye) has been felt from the subjects of the Morea.’⁶⁵ Moreover, Hurşid Pasha reports, the bey of Mani ‘had received one thousand purses from Russians in order to arm and prepare soldiers.’⁶⁶ Hurşid Pasha's report plays on the possibility that this might have been a Russian machination rather than Ali Pasha's and recommends sending a few ships from the Imperial Navy to the Mani and some soldiers into the Morea. The Sultan's note on this document proves that he concurred: ‘Although Ali Pasha's sedition is evident everywhere, it is obvious from the news relayed by the guardian of Brăila that there is sedition from elsewhere as well.’⁶⁷

It seems that the Patriarch too was aware of the news in the early days. Tassos Gritsopoulos has published a letter that was sent by Gregory V to the metropolitan of Tripolitsa and Amyklai. The letter dated 13 March (Gregorian: 25 March) 1821 warns the metropolitan Daniel that ‘false rumours circulate here [in Constantinople] that certain ill-doers deceive the loyal reaya of the mighty kingdom, the state which is eternal and invincible, to make them ungrateful to the state and to follow in the spirit of rebellion of the ungrateful and foolish Prince of Moldavia.’⁶⁸ The Patriarch reminded Daniel of the imperial orders and excommunications against the leaders of the rebellion and anyone who might join them. Daniel was asked to bring together the metropolitans of the Morea and draft a letter to the Sublime Porte denying the ‘false rumours’ that the Morea was about to revolt.

Ottoman officials in the Morea and in the capital were unable to identify who was behind the rebellion, and this caused great confusion in the first days. Apart from Petrobey Mavromichalis of the Mani, no one was identified by name until the gathering of metropolitans and kocabaşıs in Tripolitsa. Only when some of the invited individuals refused to show up did the Ottoman officials start identifying the rebels. Salih Agha reports in a missive dated 1 April 1821 that the kocabaşıs of Kalavryta and Vostitsa, the metropolitan of Palaiai Patrai and the bishop of Kalavryta were behind the sedition. These were some of the most important leaders of the revolution that did not show up for the meeting. The metropolitans and the kocabaşıs gathered in Tripolitsa were not suspected of anything yet, but Salih Agha still ‘took care and paid attention to the guarding of the kocabaşıs and the metropolitans so that they would not escape.’⁶⁹ By then it became clear that the excommunications and the warnings of the Patriarch were of no use in controlling the rebellion.

The Patriarch's admonitions against sedition addressed to the metropolitans of the Morea were fruitless. As I have argued, they were all Moreots, all had close relations with one kocabaşı or another, and many of them were members of the Friendly Society. The active participation of metropolitans and bishops and the leading roles played by some convinced the Ottoman government that Gregory was unable to carry out his duty. In the Ottoman archives there are translations of declarations made by metropolitans and bishops to the Muslim populations of the towns they were besieging, and this sealed the fate of Gregory V.

A good example is a declaration by the bishop of Methoni to the Muslim inhabitants of the same castle dated 3 April (Gregorian: 15 April) 1821. He relates that ‘while residing in a manor in Vlachopoulo, I received the lordly order of a great lord who set about to serve our fatherland (vatanımız).’⁷⁰ The bishop immediately marched on two castles in the vicinity but still wanted to warn his former Ottoman lords because he considered them friends. He argued that ‘God does not approve that a millet should be under tyranny and oppression while the other is free (serbest) and at ease; his approval is for all of us to be steadfast in the religions we have.’⁷¹ The bishop declared that until now the Greeks have been in captivity but now ‘God has permitted our salvation.’⁷² The metropolitans and bishops of the Morea in some cases took an active part in the revolt. The Ottomans considered the situation in the Morea to be not only a failure but a betrayal. This led to the execution of Gregory V.

The execution of Gregory V

It should not be considered coincidence that the eventuality of the execution of the Patriarch is first discussed in the side notes written on a report that arrived from Salih Agha of Morea. The report is dated April 1 and it is a long summary of Salih Agha's perspective on the events that had occurred. It includes one side note by the deputy grand vizier discussing a meeting with the Patriarch and another note by Sultan Mahmud II. I shall go over each section here.

Salih Agha reports that he had previously informed the Sublime Porte about ‘the kocabaşıs of Kalavryta who were recruiting captains and soldiers that they call kapu from among the reaya.’⁷³ He was ordered in return to gather all of the kocabaşıs, metropolitans and bishops in the Morea to Tripolitsa to discuss the situation. He carried out the order and invited the Christian notables and prelates to Tripolitsa to a conference in April. Due to rumours that he was going to kill everyone, the kocabaşıs and the bishop of Kalavryta, the kocabaşı of Vostitsa and the metropolitan of Palaiai Patrai did not show up. The letters sent by him and by Christian prelates and notables gathered in Tripolitsa did not change their mind. The ‘fugitives’ gathered around themselves some five hundred men and started attacking travellers. Then, for Salih Agha, ‘it became manifest that the aforementioned fugitive kocabaşıs, metropolitans and bishops are the origin and the source of the baseless rumours and events that have occurred recently.’⁷⁴ Salih Agha's aim in writing this report was to ask for soldiers, since he had none of his own.

The note by the deputy grand vizier relates that the news from Salih Agha was copied and given to the Chief Scribe, who spoke to the Patriarch. The note explains that the Chief Scribe told the Patriarch the following:

You communicated to us that you have published and sent to all corners strong excommunication warnings to prevent the Rum milleti from obeying the bandits and not to be in any condition or take any action contrary to the state of loyalty. Now an unpleasant activity emerged among the reaya in the Morea peninsula, and the Sublime State tries to punish and quiet them; however, the Sublime State is unable to trust you that these people are doing these kinds of activities contrary to your excommunication threats and contrary to the will of the leaders of their millet. If you cannot extinguish this within the millet and if this kind of treachery and disorder emerges from the reaya of your millet it will only excite the wrath of the Sultan and we fear that it will cause the appearance of an imperial order for the unsheathing of the sword of execution for the entirety of the Rum milleti.⁷⁵

The Sublime Porte had lost all confidence in Gregory V. The Sultan and his officials were at a loss what to do. The Sultan expressed his bewilderment by noting ‘that this behaviour of the Rum milleti is something inconceivable. So many have been killed and so many are being killed but they do not show any alarm or change.’⁷⁶ He ordered a meeting of high-ranking officials at the mansion of the Chief Mufti.

The meeting was attended by the Grand Vizier Benderli Ali Pasha, the Grand Admiral Deli Abdullah Pasha, the kadıasker (chief military judge) Sıdkızade Ahmed Reşid Efendi, the Aghas and two elders of the janissary corps. The minutes of this meeting present the execution of the Patriarch as a measure that emerged from the meeting itself. They deserve to be quoted in detail:

It has become apparent from the current situation that the aforementioned Patriarch must have known about all the sedition that appeared now, since he has been the leader of the millet for a long time. The traitor in question is a Moreot and it is decided and has become clear from the circumstances that he was involved in the sedition in the Morea like the dragoman that was executed; he may have even played an independent role. These Rum patriarchs have been dismissed and chosen by the preferences of the Phanariot households (bey takımı olan hâneler) for a while now. Despite all the imperial favour bestowed on both sides, they have ended up daring to [undertake] such shameful acts as are necessitated by their malicious and seditious nature and their inclination towards the Muscovites. Thus, it would be impossible to correct these infidels with words and it would be far-fetched to expect fidelity and gratitude from them. Considering this, the Patriarch should be punished first of all as a punishment for his evil deeds and in order to cut at the root of the Moreot sedition here.⁷⁷

The discussion blamed the Patriarch for three different things: failure to inform the Ottomans about the sedition that developed among his flock; being a Moreot and so suspected of a leading role in the rebellion in the Morea; being chosen by the Phanariot elite. In many ways, this discussion underlines the Ottoman expectations of a Patriarch. First, he had to strike a balance between various tendencies among his flock and to ensure the overall loyalty of Orthodox Christians to the Sultan. The eruption of the Revolution underlined his failure. Second, he had to find a balance between local and imperial dynamics. The rebellion in the Morea and his complete failure to influence Moreot opinion put him under suspicion. Third, he had to strike a balance between the Phanariot factions; but by April 1821 the Ottomans had decided to do away with the entire Phanariot complex anyway. The collapse of the ‘Phanariot house’ left the Patriarch with very limited room for manoeuvre.

Overall, it seems that the rebellion in the Morea was the decisive factor in Gregory's execution, and that the execution was intended as a way to ‘cut at the root of the Moreot sedition’ in the Ottoman capital. Once the execution was decided, the Sultan ordered the immediate election of a new Patriarch.⁷⁸ Eugenius II was elected and released from prison. The Janissary Agha was ordered to secure the area around the Patriarchate to prevent any disorder during the execution.⁷⁹ Gregory V was executed on Easter Sunday. The yafta placed on the executed body of the Patriarch repeated the accusations discussed in the meeting at the Chief Mufti's mansion, except for that of Phanariot involvement.⁸⁰

Philliou rightly points out that the Sublime Porte appointed a new patriarch before the execution in order to have an argument against the Russian pressure they were expecting after such an execution, pressure which indeed materialized. According to the Ottoman argument, the man executed was not a religious dignitary, but one who had failed in his service to the Sultan.⁸¹ Other ambassadors in Istanbul raised their concerns: Sultan Mahmud II himself noted on the minutes of a meeting between the Chief Scribe and the French ambassador that ‘if this were a war of religion, the Patriarch of Jerusalem would have been the first to be executed and the Rum and the Armenians under the power of our hand would have been massacred.’⁸² It seems that Mahmud II and his officials were ready for the outrage the execution caused among the ambassadors and prepared their excuses for the execution, in order to portray the event as an administrative rather than a religious measure.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to explore the reasoning behind the execution of Gregory V. I have argued that the execution was the result of a total collapse of the modus operandi that the Sublime Porte and the Patriarchate had established by the early nineteenth century. The collapse of the ‘Phanariot house’ owing to Ottoman suspicions; the collapse of the ‘enlightened’ section within the Patriarchate; the inability, according to Ottoman officials, of the Patriarch to control his flock; Ottoman fears of an uprising in Istanbul and of Russian intervention – all played a role in the execution. One of the main arguments, however, was that the rebellion in the Morea convinced Ottoman authorities that the Patriarch was not trustworthy.

Gregory's execution did not end Ottoman expectations of successor Patriarchs. Clergymen continued to be employed in security measures in the Ottoman capital, and they accompanied Ottoman officials during the census of Greek inhabitants of Istanbul in 1821.⁸³ The new Patriarch was also asked to send new letters to the Morea in order to negotiate with the rebels. These letters were sent through the British ambassador to the island of Naxos. The answer the Sublime Porte got from the rebels was not very encouraging: ‘The Ottoman state can put a turban on the said Patriarch's head and use him in whatever way it wishes. We can elect and appoint another Patriarch here.’⁸⁴ At the same time, the Ottomans held many metropolitans responsible for the rebellions in their regions. The court historian Mehmed Esad Efendi who chronicled the years between late 1821 and 1826, talks about priests stirring the population for rebellion. He notes the imprisonment and execution of so many metropolitans from different parts of the Empire, blaming most of them for active roles in the uprising.⁸⁵ These executions seemed to have followed a similar logic. Metropolitans who could not control their flock were blamed for active participation.

A new status quo was found in the decades that followed. As discussed by Dimitrios Stamatopoulos and Christine Philliou, the Patriarchate became the ground for a neo-Phanariot struggle as early as the 1830s. Two influential figures, Stephanos Vogorides and Nikolaos Aristarches and their politics dominated Patriarchal affairs in the years to come.⁸⁶ This can be compared to the pre-revolutionary period when the Patriarchate was a ground for Phanariot factional struggles and the Patriarchs were responsible for finding a balance between these factions. It might also be argued that the Ottoman government, at least by 1860s, had learnt from the situation in 1821 and had sought closer control over Patriarchal affairs by using Orthodox Ottoman officials better integrated into the Ottoman government mechanism. It was the intention of the Ottoman government to place Ottoman officials of Greek origin into the Patriarchate to control it in 1860s through with the Organic Regulations, and to ensure its harmony with state policies.⁸⁷

A similar argument can be made about the local-imperial axis. Kostas Kostis has pointed out that we cannot talk about the primacy of metropolitans in local communities before the Greek Revolution; they were, rather, dominated by local Christian elites until the 1840s.⁸⁸ This changed in the age of reform. The changing taxation and land-holding systems coupled with the Tanzimat insistence on a centralized mechanism resulted in a situation where the Patriarchate exerted better control over its flock.⁸⁹ If we agree that the execution of Gregory V was in part a result of his failure to convince and control Moreot Christians, we can see in the reform period echoes of the Greek Revolution and the lessons drawn from it by Ottoman officials.

All in all, the process that led to the execution of Gregory V is enlightening for a study of changing Ottoman expectations of the Patriarchate and the strain the Revolution put on the relationship between the Ottoman government and the Patriarchate. It can also be seen as the point at which expectations were clearly defined, perhaps for the first time. It may have been too late for Gregory V, but it was the beginning of a new era for the institution.