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Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 April 2002

Alison L. Young
Alison L. Young*
Affiliation:
Hertford College, Oxford
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Abstract

Section 3(1) Human Rights Act 1998 appears to limit the powers of the court; statutes can only be interpreted in a manner compatible with Convention rights ‘so far as possible’. However, in practice, Parliament has given the judiciary carte blanche to determine when it is impossible to interpret statutes in a manner compatible with Convention rights. The express words of section 3(1) are so vague as to provide no clear outline of the limits of possibility. Nor does the legislative history of the Act provide any clear boundary. Should the judiciary so wish, section 3(1) could have the same effect in practice as if it impliedly repealed the provisions of all statutes contrary to Convention rights. It is the judiciary and not Parliament that determine how far human rights will be protected.

Type
Shorter Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 61 , Issue 1 , 07 March 2002 , pp. 53 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2002

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Footnotes

I am indebted to Sebastian Baer, Mindy Chen-Wishart, Stephen Weatherill and Sienho Yee, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. All responsibility for errors rests with the author alone.

References

1 G. Marshall, “Interpreting interpretation in the Human Rights Bill” [1998] Public Law 167, 167.

2 F.A.R. Bennion, “What interpretation is ‘possible’ under section 3(1) Human Rights Act 1998?” [2000] Public Law 77, 88.

3 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 582, col. 1230 (3 November 1997).

4 Hansard H.C. Deb. vol. 313, cols. 421-422 (3 June 1998).

5 Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All E.R. 720.

6 See p. 54 above.

7 See p. 54 above.

8 Cm. 3782, paragraph 2.7.

9 This paper is available on the internet at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/humanrights/speeches/speechfr.htm.

10 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 584, col. 1291 (19 January 1998).

11 G. Marshall recognises the difficulty of recognising that section 3(1) HRA is not limited to ambiguous statutes, yet at the same time it is difficult to assess what other limit can be drawn when courts are required to “read” legislation in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights. He reconciles this problem, by referring to the ability of the courts to “give effect” to Convention rights. See G. Marshall, “Two kinds of compatibility: more about section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998” [1999] Public Law 377.

12 Edwards, R.A., “Reading down legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2000) 20 Legal Studies 353Google Scholar.

13 Ibid., at pp. 366-368.

14 Article 13 E.C.H.R. provides that all those whose Convention rights are violated “shall have an effective remedy before a national authority”. The Human Rights Act 1998, s 1(1)(a) expressly excludes Article 13 E.C.H.R. from incorporation into English law.

15 See p. 54 above.

16 See p. 54 above.

17 http://www.lcd.gov.uk/humanrights/speeches/speechfr.htm.

18 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 584, col. 1292 (19 January 1998).

19 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 583, cols. 518-519 (18 November 1997) and Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 584, col. 1290 (19 January 1998).

20 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 583, col. 522 (18 November 1997).

21 (1842) 5 Beavan 574; 49 E.R. 700.

22 (1842) 5 Beavan 574, 583; 49 E.R. 700, 704.

23 Vauxhall Estates V. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733; Ellen Street Estates V. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590.

24 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 584, col. 1292 (19 January 1998).

25 Bennion, F.A.R., “What interpretation is ‘possible’ under section 3(1) Human Rights Act 1998?” [2000] Public Law 77, 8082Google Scholar.

26 Minister for Home Affairs V. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319.

27 A-G of the Gambia v. Momodou Jobe [1984] A.C. 689, 702.

28 [1984] A.C. 689, 702.

29 [1984] A.C. 689, 702.

30 C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] E.C.R. 1-4135 and C-456/98 Centrosteel [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 711.

31 Litster v. Forth Dry Dock [1984] A.C. 689.

32 Webb v. Emo Air Cargo (U.K.) Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 49, 59 (Lord Keith).

33 Minister of Transport v. Hoort [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260.

34 Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 All E.R. 720.

35 [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 131.

36 A.A.M. Irvine, “Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretative Process” (1999) 10 King's College Journal 177; the Paul Sighart Memorial Lecture, delivered on 20 April 1999. A copy of this speech can be found at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/humanrights/speeches/speechfr.htm.

37 With the possible exception of article 10 E.C.H.R. See Douglas v. Hello! Ltd [2001] Q.B. 967, 1003 (Sedley LJ) and Venables v. News Group Newspapers [2001] Fam. 430.

38 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 583, col. 520 (18 November 1997).

39 Hansard H.L. Deb. vol. 583, col. 521 (18 November 1997).