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RECOGNISING A PRIVACY-INVASION TORT: THE CONCEPTUAL UNITY OF INFORMATIONAL AND INTRUSION CLAIMS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2019

Paul Wragg
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Abstract

This article presents the novel view that “inclusion into seclusion” and “public disclosure of embarrassing facts” (“misuse of private information” (“MOPI”) in the UK), which both the academic commentary and US case law treat as two separate legal actions, occupy the same conceptual space. This claim has important practical ramifications. No further development of the law is required to realise an actionable intrusion tort as part of the UK's MOPI tort. The argument is defended in doctrinal and theoretical terms and by reference to both UK and US law. It is presented in three forms: first, in negative terms, that the orthodox distinction between the two claims (informational privacy and intrusion) is unsustainable; second, in positive terms, that both guard against the same wrong (unwarranted privacy invasion) and the same harm (mental distress), in a way that is distinctive from other privacy actions and legal claims based upon the autonomy value; finally, in pragmatic terms, that MOPI's mature jurisprudence is sufficiently flexible and dynamic to recognise intrusion-only claims using its existing legal framework.

Keywords

privacyintrusioninformational privacyautonomyjurisprudence
Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 78 , Issue 2 , July 2019 , pp. 409 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2019 

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Footnotes

*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Leeds. This paper was read to participants at a privacy conference at the Inner Temple, London, May 2018.

I thank participants for their useful feedback. I am especially indebted to Rebecca Moosavian, whose meticulous observations on an earlier draft helped enormously in clarifying my thoughts, and Tom Bennett, whose thoughtful and critical views were also beneficial. Thanks also to Duncan Sheehan, Nick Taylor, Konstantinos Stylianou, Colin Mackie, Michael Thomson, Jen Hendry and Alastair Mullis. Mistakes are my own.

References

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2 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, ALRC Final Report 123, 2014.

3 This is set out primarily in N. Moreham, “Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law” [2014] C.L.J. 350 and developed in “Liability for Listening: Why Phone Hacking Is an Actionable Breach of Privacy” (2015) 7 J.M.L. 155 and Moreham, N.A. and Sir Warby, Mark (eds.), Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, 3rd edn. (Oxford 2016) 10.82–10.92Google Scholar. See also Moreham, N., “A Conceptual Framework for the New Zealand Tort of Intrusion” (2016) 47 V.U.W.L.R. 283Google Scholar.

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7 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2016] UKSC 26.

8 Ibid., at para. [58]. This is Mr. Justice Tugendhat's finding in Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EMLR 502, at [85].

9 Ibid.

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27 See e.g. Richards and Solove, “Prosser's Privacy Law”.

28 Campbell [2004] UKHL 22, at [96], [135]–[136]. Moreham calls it “a capricious concept which cannot be readily understood in advance”, “Beyond Information”, p. 293.

29 Prosser, “Privacy”, pp. 389–92.

30 De May v Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).

31 Ibid., at p. 166.

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38 Swerdlick v Koch, 721 A. 2d 849 (R.I., 1998).

39 This surveillance formed part of a complaint that business use of the property violated planning regulations.

40 Allstate Insurance Co. v Ginsburg 863 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2003).

41 Prosser, “Privacy”, p. 391.

42 E.g. Lewis v Dayton Hudson Corp, 128 Mich. App. 165 (1983); Elmore v Atlantic Zayre Inc., 178 Ga. App. 25 (1986).

43 Hougum v Valley Memorial Homes 574 N W 2d 812 (1998).

44 E.g. Harkey v Abate 346 N.W. 2d 74 (Mich Ct App, 1984); Kjerstad v Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W. 2d 419 (S.D. 1994).

45 Summers v Bailey 55 F.3d 1564, (1995).

46 It cited Pinkerton v Stevens, 132 S.E.2d at 120 (1963) in support.

47 See criticism in e.g. Flanagan, J.A., “Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private Workplace” (1994) 43 Duke L.J. 1256CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace” (1991) 104 Harv.L.Rev. 1898CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Smyth v Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

49 See e.g. Valencia v Duval Corporation, 132 Ariz. 348, 645 P. 2d 1262 (Ariz. 1982); Johnson v Corporate Special Services Inc., 602 So.2d 385 (Ala. 1992).

50 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 101.

51 Conlon, K.J., “Privacy in the Workplace” (1996) 72 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 285, at 290Google Scholar.

52 Thomson, “The Right to Privacy”, p. 298.

53 She argued that the “wrong” would be a violation of property rights (the right to control one's property); that privacy invasion is subsidiary.

54 Fried, C., “Privacy: Economy and Ethics – a Comment on Posner” (1978) 12 Ga.L.Rev. 423, at 424Google Scholar.

55 See e.g. Gaus, A., “Trolling Attacks and the Need for New Approaches to Privacy Torts” (2012) 47 U.S.F.L.Rev. 353Google Scholar.

56 Solove, Understanding Privacy, p. 163.

57 See Greenwald, G., No Place to Hide (Harmondsworth 2015)Google Scholar.

58 Richards and Solove, “Prosser's Privacy Law”, p. 1890.

59 Kalven Jr., “Privacy in Tort Law”, p. 333.

60 See e.g. Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”; Fried, “Privacy”; Parker, “A Definition of Privacy”; Parent, W.A., “Privacy, Morality, and the Law” (1983) 12 Philosophy & Public Affairs 269Google Scholar; and, more recently, Strahilevitz, L.J., “Reunifying Privacy Law” (2010) 98 C.L.R. 2007Google Scholar; Schwartz, P.M. and Peifer, K.-N., “Prosser's Privacy and the German Right of Personality” (2010) 98 C.L.R. 1925Google Scholar.

61 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”.

62 Prosser, “Privacy”, p. 389.

63 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, p. 982.

64 E.g. Solove, Understanding Privacy, p. 162.

65 Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy”, p. 974.

66 Ibid., at p. 979.

67 E.g. Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of the Law”, pp. 429–40. See also Van Den Haag, E., “On Privacy” in Pennock, J.R. and Chapman, J.W. (eds.), NOMOS XIII: Privacy (New York 1971), 149, 151Google Scholar: that privacy, as a moral claim, is about unauthorised watching, publications and invasion of the senses.

68 Ibid., at p. 433.

69 Thomson, “The Right to Privacy”, p. 310.

70 Moreham, “Beyond Information”, pp. 354–55.

71 Campbell [2004] UKHL 22, at [5], [144]–[147].

72 Green Corns Ltd. v Claverley Group Ltd. [2011] EWHC 3269.

73 H.R.H. Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1776.

74 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB).

75 Murray v Express Newspapers plc. [2009] Ch. 481.

76 Contostavlos v Mendahun [2012] EWHC 850.

77 SKA v CRH [2012] EWHC 766.

78 Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355.

79 Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2014] EWHC 1580.

80 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc. [2014] EWHC 13.

81 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2015] EWCA Civ 1176.

82 Gulati v MGN Ltd. [2015] EWCA Civ 1291, [45].

83 Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd. [2017] UKSC 49.

84 ERY v Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2016] EWHC 2760.

85 H. Gross, “Privacy and Autonomy” in Pennock and Chapman, NOMOS XIII: Privacy, p. 177.

86 Mosley [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB).

87 Ibid., at para. [236].

88 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, p. 412.

89 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, p. 973.

90 Mill, J.S., “On Liberty” in Robson, J.M. (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. XVIII (Toronto 1977), 226Google Scholar.

91 Gross, “Privacy and Autonomy”, p. 181.

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96 Gross, “Privacy and Autonomy”, p. 173.

97 Van Den Haag, “On Privacy”, p. 151.

98 Ibid, at p. 152.

99 Fried, “Privacy: Economy and Ethics”, p. 427.

100 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, p. 974.

101 See e.g. Parker, “A Definition of Privacy”, p. 280.

102 Gray, Mill On Liberty, p. 77.

103 Ten, Mill On Liberty, p. 72.

104 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 267, emphasis in original.

105 Ibid.

106 T.M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (1863), discussed in Solove, Understanding Privacy, p. 162.

107 Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, p. 974.

108 Fried, “Privacy: Economy and Ethics”, p. 427.

109 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.

110 Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 E.R. 807.

111 Campbell [2004] UKHL 22, at [14].

112 Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311.

113 PJS [2016] UKSC 26.

114 Ibid., at para. [29], per Eady J. in CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWHC 1326, at [23].

115 See e.g. Re JR38's Judicial Review [2015] UKSC 42; Weller [2015] EWCA Civ 1176; Axon v Ministry of Defence [2016] EWHC 787; DMK v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2016] 1646 EWHC; ERY [2016] EWHC 2760; Jackson v BBC [2017] NIQB 51.

116 Richard v BBC [2018] EWHC 1837.

117 PJS [2016] UKSC 26, at [35], [45], [64].

118 Ibid., at paras. [44], [65], [68], [74].

119 Richard [2018] EWHC 1837, at [300].

120 Ibid., at para. [265].

121 Ibid., at para. [329].

122 Ibid., at paras. [371], [375].

123 PJS [2016] UKSC 26, at [5].

124 Ibid., at paras. [144]–[147].

125 In Richard [2018] EWHC 1837, the court uses the term “privacy invasion” or “invasion” 16 times: at [264], [285], [287], [301], [316], [317], [318], [320], [345], [350a], [350d], [350e], [363], [365], [369], [417].

126 Murray [2009] Ch. 481, at [36].

127 Jackson [2017] NIQB 51, at [67].

128 E.g. AMP v Persons Unknown [2011] EWHC 3454.

129 E.g. R. v Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472, at [17].

130 E.g. RocknRoll v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2013] EWHC 24.

131 Peck v UK [2003] EMLR 15.

132 Ibid., at para. [60].

133 Green Corns Ltd. [2011] EWHC 3269.

134 Remsburg, 816 A. 2d 1001 (N.H., 2003).

135 Othman v English Defence League [2013] EWHC 1421.

136 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd. [2010] EWHC 1414, at [90].

137 These facts do not appear in the case report, but are noted in McLean, A. and Mackey, C., “Is There a Law of Privacy in the UK? A Consideration of Recent Legal Developments” (2007) 29 E.I.P.R. 389, at 390–91Google Scholar.

138 Pinkerton, 132 S.E.2d at 120 (1963), at [20].

139 Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd. [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB), at [9]–[10].

140 Ibid., at para. [11].

141 Ibid., at para. [27].

142 Axon [2016] EWHC 787 (QB).

143 Ibid., at para. [57].

144 YXB v TNO [2015] EWHC 826.

145 Ibid., at para. [61 iii) c)].

146 Leeds City Council v Channel 4 Television Corporation [2005] EWHC 3522.

147 BKM Ltd. v BBC [2009] EWHC 3151.

148 Ali v Channel 5 [2018] EWHC 298.

149 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53.

150 Ibid., at para. [30].

151 Ibid., at para. [31].

152 Ibid., at paras. [18], [34].

153 Prosser, “Privacy”.

154 As Mummery L.J. put it in the Court of Appeal decision, Wainwright v Home Of fi ce [2001] EWCA Civ 2081, at [60].

155 Wainwright v UK (2007) 44 EHRR 40.

156 Fearn [2019] EWHC 246.

157 Ibid., at para. [88].

158 Ibid., at para. [205].

159 Ibid., at para. [214].

160 Victoria Park Racing v Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479, at 494Google Scholar. Mann J. discusses this case in Fearn [2019] EWHC 246, at [141]–[144].

161 Ibid., at paras. [174], [178].

162 Ibid., at para. [190].

163 Ibid., at para. [196].