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Justice and the Possibility of Good Moralism in Bioethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2019

MATTI HÄYRY
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Abstract:

Moralism in bioethics and elsewhere means going beyond accepted moral principles, either by exaggerating good ethical concerns, by applying them to areas where they do not belong, or simply by assuming anything else than concrete physical or mental harm as normative guides. This paper explores the conceptual background of moralism especially in the consequentialist tradition, presents cases of allegedly bad moralism in the light of this exploration, introduces six approaches to justice, and argues that these approaches question our prevailing views on the goodness and badness of moralism in its various forms.

Keywords

justicemoralismmoralitymoral principlesethicsconsequentialist traditionharm principle
Type
Special Section: Health, Morality, and Moralism
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 236 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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Footnotes

Acknowledgements: The author thanks the Academy of Finland (project SA 307467) and the Finnish Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry (project MMM 248774) for their financial support.

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