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Commentary: Cognitive Enhancement: Are the Claims of Critics “Good Enough”?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2017
Abstract
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- Departments and Columns
- Information
- Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 26 , Special Issue 4: Clinical Neuroethics , October 2017 , pp. 693 - 698
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017
References
Notes
1. Greely, H, Sahakian, B, Harris, J, Kessler, RC, Gazzaniga, M, Campbell, P, Farah, MJ. Towards responsible use of cognitive-enhancing drugs by the healthy. Nature 2008;456(7223):702–5, at 703.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
2. Some supporters of enhancement technologies even argue that it is not only morally permissible to use enhancement technologies to make people more healthy, longer-lived and smarter, but that we are morally obliged to do so (e.g., Harris J. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Oxford University Press; 2010; or Savulescu J. Genetic interventions and the ethics of enhancement of human. In: Steinbock B, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007:516–35.). It is beyond the scope of this commentary to discuss this issue and take a position on it.
3. Mehlman, MJ. Cognition-enhancing drugs. The Milbank Quarterly 2004;82(3):483–506, at 492.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
4. See note 3, Mehlman 2011, at 127.
5. Garasic MD, Lavazza A. Moral and social reasons to acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. BMC Medical Ethics, 2016; available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4812634/# (last accessed 19 Jan 2017).
6. Ms. P. mentions piracetam. If we imagine that the authors of the vignette have the United States context in mind, this is additionally troublesome.
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