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Protecting Humanity

Habermas and His Critics on the Ethics of Emerging Biotechnologies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 February 2012

MATTI HÄYRY
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Extract

In this article, I present what I believe to be the core of Jürgen Habermas’s views on the morality, ethics, and regulation of emerging genetic and reproductive technologies in his book The Future of Human Nature.

Type
Special Section: Kant, Habermas, and Bioethics
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , April 2012 , pp. 211 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

Notes

1. Habermas, J.The Future of Human Nature. Rehg, W, Pensky, M, Beister, H, trans. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2003.Google Scholar

2. His earlier work does, of course, inform his presentation in The Future of Human Nature. I have said more about this connection in Häyry, M.Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. For an informative overview on the situation in the United States, see Baruch, S, Kaufman, D, Hudson, KL.Genetic testing of embryos: Practices and perspectives of US in vitro fertilization clinics. Fertility and Sterility 2008;89:1053–8.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

4. See note 2, Häyry 2010, at 174–6.

5. See note 2, Häyry 2010, at 17n34.

6. As pointed out by Green, RM.Babies by Design: The Ethics of Genetic Choice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2007Google Scholar, at 57.

7. Wilmut, I, Schnieke, AE, McWhir, J, Kind, AJ, Campbell, KHS.Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells. Nature 1997;385:810–3.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

8. Thomson, JA, Itskovitz-Eldor, J, Shapiro, SS, Waknitz, MA, Swiergiel, JJ, Marshall, VS, et al. . Embryonic stem cell lines derived from human blastocysts. Science 1998;282:1145–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

9. See note 2, Häyry 2010, at 124–73.

10. It should be noted that I have only read the book in its English translation. This means that my interpretations can occasionally catch the translators’ rather than the author’s lines of thought. It would be interesting to compare my results with the results of someone who has only used the German text.

11. See note 2, Häyry 2010. Other interpretations of Habermasian lines of argument from The Future of Human Nature (and beyond) can be found in Green, RM.Confronting rationality. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:216–27CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Árnason, V.Nonconfrontational rationality or critical reasoning. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:228–37CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Gunson, D.Are all rational moralities equivalent? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:238–47CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Herissone-Kelly, P. Habermas, human agency, and human genetic enhancement: The grown, the made, and responsibility for actions. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2012;21:200–210CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Gurnham, D.Bioethics as science fiction: Making sense of Habermas’s The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2012;21:235–246CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Gunson, D.What is the Habermasian perspective in bioethics? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2012;21:188–199.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

12. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 40.

13. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 73, 92.

14. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 55. See also note 2, Häyry 2010, at 36–7.

15. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 40.

16. Jaspers, K.The Origin and Goal of History (orig. 1949), Bullock, M, trans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 1953.Google Scholar

17. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 53–60.

18. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 58.

19. I have explained my views on the Kantian position in Häyry, M.The tension between self-governance and absolute inner worth in Kant’s moral philosophy. Journal of Medical Ethics 2005;31:645–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

20. On cloning, see note 1, Habermas 2003, at 62–3; see note 2, Häyry 2010, at 140–2. On genetic manipulation, see note 1, Habermas 2003, at 51–2, 86; see note 2, Häyry 2010, at 179, 181–2.

21. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 49–51.

22. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 64.

23. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 60.

24. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 54.

25. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 65–66.

26. See note 2, Häyry 2010, at 37.

27. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 65.

28. Sandel, M.The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 2007Google Scholar, at 45–6, 85–7, 89–92. See also note 2, Häyry 2010, at 33–5.

29. See note 28, Sandel 2007, at 85ff.

30. See note 28, Sandel 2007, at 100.

31. See note 28, Sandel 2007, at 79–82.

32. See note 28, Sandel 2007, at 95–7.

33. Kass, L.Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. San Francisco: Encounter Books; 2002Google Scholar, at 19–22, 53, 155–61, 269–72. See also note 2, Häyry 2010, at 32–3.

34. See note 33, Kass 2002, at 33, 134–6, 172.

35. See note 33, Kass 2002, at 121–3, 130ff.

36. Sandel, M.The ethical implications of human cloning. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 2005;48:241–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

37. See note 2, Häyry 2010, at 180–1.

38. Glover, J.Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. See note 38, Glover 2006, at 72.

40. Harris, J.Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2007Google Scholar, at 142.

41. See note 40, Harris 2007, at 139.

42. See note 40, Harris 2007, at 137.

43. See note 40, Harris 2007, at 141–2.

44. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 79. Italics in “future” removed.

45. See note 40, Harris 2007, at 141. Italics in “future” removed,

46. See note 40, Harris 2007, at 141.

47. Parfit, D.Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1984.Google Scholar This book exposed the fallacies of thinking about future people’s well-being by using traditional moral intuitions.

48. On this latter point, see note 1, Habermas 2003, at vii.

49. For the record, “yes” would sound like a very reasonable answer to me. See, e.g., Häyry, M.A rational cure for pre-reproductive stress syndrome. Journal of Medical Ethics 2004;30:377–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 43, 51–2.

51. See note 1, Habermas 2003, at 86.

52. See note 2, Häyry 2010, at 190–3.

53. Jonas, H.The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age (orig. 1979). Jonas, H, Herr, D, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1984.Google Scholar