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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 July 2019
As new ways of reproducing emerge, advancing technologies are forcing us to rethink our old ideas of what it means to be a genetic parent. Why should some processes qualify as “reproduction” and others should not? To illustrate the practical impact of providing a defensible account of reproduction, the author examines the case of mitochondrial donation (mtDNA) and calls for a philosophical argument to bring clarity to exactly what we mean by ‘reproduction.’
Acknowledgments: Special thanks to Sean Allen-Hermanson, Tim Lewens, Matt Mosdell, Robert Sparrow, Jim Tabery, and anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and constructive criticism.
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