Appeals to social justice that argue medicine and healthcare should have certain priorities and not others are common. It is an obvious question to ask: What does social justice demand of the new genetic technologies? However, it is important to note that there are many theories and sub-theories of justice. There are utilitarian theories, libertarian theories, and egalitarian theories. There are so-called luck egalitarians, equality-as-fairness thinkers, and capability theorists, with each having his or her own distinctive approach to the distribution of medical goods and technologies, and to healthcare priorities. This article argues that the discussion surrounding this question is potentially hampered by an implicit assumption that if one theory of justice is applicable in one context, then it must also be applicable in others. Instead, it is proposed that one adopt the stance, influenced by Michael Waltzer, that different theories with their opposing principles may be applicable to different questions regarding justice and genetics. The specific view advanced is that to answer questions about what justice requires regarding the therapeutic and enhancement use of genetic techniques, a method of reflective equilibrium can show how intuitions, in context, may support different theories of justice. When particular pre-theoretic ethical judgments are balanced against the theories that might explain or justify them, and are in accord with what seems emotionally acceptable, then it can be seen how different general theories may be applicable in the different contexts in which questions of justice and genetics arise.

Common understandings of neuroethics, that is, of its distinctive nature, are premised on two distinct sets of claims: (1) neuroscience can change views about the nature of ethics itself and neuroethics is dedicated to reaping such an understanding of ethics, and (2) neuroscience poses challenges distinct from other areas of medicine and science and neuroethics tackles those issues. Critiques have rightfully challenged both claims, stressing how the first may lead to problematic forms of reductionism whereas the second relies on debatable assumptions about the nature of bioethics specialization and development. Informed by philosophical pragmatism and our experience in neuroethics, we argue that these claims are ill founded and should give way to pragmatist reconstructions; namely, that neuroscience, much like other areas of empirical research on morality, can provide useful information about the nature of morally problematic situations, but does not need to promise radical and sweeping changes to ethics based on neuroscientism. Furthermore, the rationale for the development of neuroethics as a specialized field need not to be premised on the distinctive nature of the issues it tackles or of neurotechnologies. Rather, it can espouse an understanding of neuroethics as both a scholarly and a practical endeavor dedicated to resolving a series of problematic situations raised by neurological and psychiatric conditions.

The number of patients with organ failure who could potentially benefit from transplantation continues to exceed the available supply of organs. Despite numerous efforts to increase the number of donors, there remains an enormous mismatch between demand and supply. Large numbers of people still die with potentially transplantable organs remaining in situ, most frequently as a result of family objections. I argue that there are no persuasive moral arguments against mandated organ retrieval from all dead individuals who meet clinical criteria. However, because of continuing endemic prejudice in United States society and its healthcare system and the distrust this engenders, I conclude that proceeding with a policy of compulsory organ retrieval, even if morally unobjectionable, would not be warranted.

Complying with the requirements of informed consent for medical procedures can sometimes be problematic, even when the hospitals are located in countries that are uniform in their language and cultural values. However, when hospitals are located in countries with diverse linguistic and ethnic communities, it becomes particularly challenging. This article examines how Macao, with four predominant languages—Mandarin, Portuguese, Cantonese and English—and two very strong cultures, Western and Chinese, strives to meet the challenges of informed consent. The situation is made even more complicated by a healthcare delivery in Macao that is mostly guided by Chinese ethical and cultural perspectives, whereas its law is inspired by the Western model.

Why is it that humanitarianism and theories of global justice seem to have relatively little engagement with each other? This article discusses some of the reasons for this being the case, and argues that instead of seeing these two fields as separate or adversarial they should be viewed as complementary. The article begins with a brief overview of humanitarianism, in order to argue for the relevance of justice in humanitarianism. The second section focuses on analyzing selected theories of justice— those of Peter Singer, John Kekes, and Thomas Pogge—through a particular lens, that of the question of responsibility for global well-being. The article concludes by arguing that theories of global justice can be beneficial for humanitarian causes, not in a comprehensive and consistent “all-or-nothing” manner, but rather on a case-by-case basis and through selective application of particular arguments.

In this article, we present a pragmatic approach to neuroethics, referring back to John Dewey and his articulation of the “common good” and its discovery through systematic methods. Pragmatic neuroethics bridges philosophy and social sciences and, at a very basic level, considers that ethics is not dissociable from lived experiences and everyday moral choices. We reflect on the integration between empirical methods and normative questions, using as our platform recent bioethical and neuropsychological research into moral cognition, action, and experience. Finally, we present the protocol of a study concerning teenagers’ morality in everyday life, discussing our epistemological choices as an example of a pragmatic approach in empirical ethics. We hope that this article conveys that even though the scope of neuroethics is broad, it is important not to move too far from the real life encounters that give rise to moral questions in the first place.

Because the demand for intensive care unit (ICU) beds exceeds the supply in general, and because of the formidable costs of that level of care, clinicians face ethical issues when rationing this kind of care not only at the point of admission to the ICU, but also after the fact. Under what conditions—if any—may patients be denied admission to the ICU or removed after admission? One professional medical group has defended a rule of “first come, first served” in ICU admissions, and this approach has numerous moral considerations in its favor. We show, however, that admission to the ICU is not in and of itself guaranteed; we also show that as a matter of principle, it can be morally permissible to remove certain patients from the ICU, contrary to the idea that because they were admitted first, they are entitled to stay indefinitely through the point of recovery, death, or voluntary withdrawal. What remains necessary to help guide these kinds of decisions is the articulation of clear standards for discontinuing intensive care, and the articulation of these standards in a way consistent with not only fiduciary and legal duties that attach to clinical care but also with democratic decision making processes.

Against the background of a recommended hysterectomy, this article examines the current requirement in Saudi Arabia for the husband’s consent for any medical procedure that affects the reproductive ability of his wife. The history and background of this decree is explained, along with the major arguments for its support. Additionally, the legitimacy of the requirement is discussed from the Islamic and legal perspectives. Special attention is given to relevant cultural considerations, such as the family unit, the medical community, and the larger Saudi society. Arguments advocating for discontinuing the requirement are offered along with measures to implement in order to overcome this social artifact.

Meeting healthcare needs is a matter of social justice. Healthcare needs are virtually limitless; however, resources, such as money, for meeting those needs, are limited. How then should we (just and caring citizens and policymakers in such a society) decide which needs must be met as a matter of justice with those limited resources? One reasonable response would be that we should use cost effectiveness as our primary criterion for making those choices. This article argues instead that cost-effectiveness considerations must be constrained by considerations of healthcare justice. The goal of this article will be to provide a preliminary account of how we might distinguish just from unjust or insufficiently just applications of cost-effectiveness analysis to some healthcare rationing problems; specifically, problems related to extraordinarily expensive targeted cancer therapies. Unconstrained compassionate appeals for resources for the medically least well-off cancer patients will be neither just nor cost effective.

This short article proposes a conceptual structure for “neurolaw,” modeled loosely on the bipartite division of the sister field of neuroethics by Adina Roskies into the “ethics of neuroscience” and the “neuroscience of ethics.” As normative fields addressing the implications of scientific discoveries and expanding technological capacities affecting the brain, “neurolaw” and neuroethics have followed parallel paths. Similar foundational questions arise for both about the validity and utility of recognizing them as distinct subfields of law and ethics, respectively. In both, a useful distinction can be drawn between a self-reflexive inquiry (the neuroscience of ethics and law) and an inquiry into the development and use of brain science and technologies (the ethics and law of neuroscience). In both fields, these two forms of inquiry interact in interesting ways. In addition to a proposed conceptual structure for neurolaw, the article also addresses the neurolegal versions of the critiques made against neuroethics, including charges of reductionism, fact/value confusion, and biological essentialism.

Under the current conditions of scarcity of transplantable livers, difficult decisions need to be made about access. There is a growing consensus that it is morally justified to give people with ARESLD lower priority than those whose need is not self-caused. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the conditions under which such prioritization is morally justified, by challenging arguments put forth by Walter Glannon and Daniel Brudney. There are serious theoretical and practical problems with these views, which have to do with the nature and scope of the (putative) moral duty not to contribute to the competition for scarce transplantable livers, and the difficulty in determining whether people are responsible for their weakness or even wickedness of character. These problems need to be resolved if we are to be morally justified in determining access based on causal and moral responsibility for being in need.

Influenced by the people-centered integrated care (PCIC) model, Healthy China 2030 was drafted recently with a special concern given to patient engagement. Although there are three levels of engagement (i.e., individual, household, community), patients are more likely to be empowered and activated through an individualistic approach. Thus, engaging patients at the household level appear to have been overlooked so far. Supported by ethical values and practical evidence, this article attempts to address the importance of engaging patients at the household level in shaping the Chinese healthcare system with the PCIC model orientation, and thus recommends four strategies for empowering and activating patients at the household level in the Chinese context.

Patient’s needs and rights are the key to delivering state-of-the-art modern nursing care. It is especially challenging to provide proper nursing care for patients who are reaching the end of life (EOL). In Chinese culture nursing practice, the perception and expectations of these EOL patients are not well known. This article explores the feelings and wishes of 16 terminally ill Chinese cancer patients who are going through the dying process. An open-ended questionnaire with eight items was used to interview 16 terminally ill Chinese cancer patients, and was then analyzed by a combined approach employing grounded theory and interpretive phenomenological analysis. Four dimensions were explored: first, patient’s attitudes towards death, such as accepting the fact calmly, striving to survive, and the desire for control; second, the care desired during the dying process, including avoiding excessive treatment and dying with dignity; third, the degree of the patient’s acceptance of death; and fourth, the consequences of death. This cognitive study offers a fundamental understanding of perceptions of death of terminally ill cancer patients from the Chinese culture. Their attitude toward death was complex. They did not prefer aggressive treatment and most of them had given a great deal of thought to their death.

Given that a properly formed utilitarian response to healthcare distribution issues should evaluate cost effectiveness against the total utility increase, it follows that any utilitarian cost-effectiveness metric should be sensitive to increases in both individual and social utility afforded by a given intervention. Quality adjusted life year (QALY) based decisionmaking in healthcare cannot track increases in social utility, and as a result, the QALY cannot be considered a strict utilitarian response to issues of healthcare distribution. This article considers arguments against, and a possible defence of, the QALY as a utilitarian concept; in response, the article offers a similar — but properly formed — utilitarian metric called the (IALY). This article also advances a tool called the ‘glee factor’ (GF) on which the IALY may lean in a similar way to which the QALY leans on the Rosser Index.

This article investigates both the claims made for, and the dangers or opportunities posed by, the development of (allegedly), aspiring or “would-be” autonomous vehicles and other artificially superintelligent machines. It also examines the dilemmas posed by the fact that these individuals might develop ideas above their station. These ideas may also limit or challenge the legitimacy of the proposed management and safety strategies that might be devised to limit the ways in which they might function or malfunction.

This article addresses the prioritization questions that arise when people attempt to institutionalize reasonable ethical principles and create guidelines for microlevel decisions. I propose that this instantiates an incommensurability problem, and suggest two different kinds of practical solutions for dealing with this issue.

Highly immersive virtual reality (VR) systems have been introduced into the consumer market in recent years. The improved technological capabilities of these systems as well as the combination with biometric sensors, for example electroencephalography (EEG), in a closed-loop hybrid VR-EEG, opens up a range of new potential medical applications. This article first provides an overview of the past and current clinical applications of VR systems in neurology and psychiatry and introduces core concepts in neurophilosophy and VR research (such as agency, trust, presence, and others). Then, important adverse effects of highly immersive VR simulations and the ethical implications of standalone and hybrid VR systems for therapy in neurology and psychiatry are highlighted. These new forms of VR-based therapy may strengthen patients in exercising their autonomy. At the same time, however, these emerging systems present ethical challenges, for example in terms of moral and legal accountability in interactions involving “intelligent” hybrid VR systems. A user-centered approach that is informed by the target patients’ needs and capabilities could help to build beneficial systems for VR therapy.

This article explores the current situation regarding the importance of access to healthcare in relation to the genesis and context of bioethics developed in Brazil, a country in which healthcare is understood through the national constitution to be a universal right of its population. Since the onset of the development of Brazilian bioethics at the beginning of the 1990s, topics relating directly and indirectly to the field of public health have been a priority in the bioethics agenda. The article considers the socioeconomic context within which conflicts occur, an issue that has been addressed in other scientific articles on bioethics in Latin America. It presents the main conceptual bases of intervention bioethics, a critical approach that has been developed as a reference point in this region, with the aim of analyzing (bio)ethical issues and indicating solutions that relate specifically to the different forms of social exclusion that influence the health conditions and lives of people in Brazil, as well as in other peripheral countries in the Southern Hemisphere and of the world in general. The article calls attention to some of the problems and challenges that the Brazilian public health system has been facing. An international agenda of “universal health coverage” is one of the main global threats to implementing the universal right to healthcare as it has been understood in Brazil.

In their daily clinical work, healthcare professionals generally apply what seems to be a double standard for the responsibility of patients. On the one hand, patients are encouraged to take responsibility for lifestyle changes that can improve their chances of good health. On the other hand, when patients fail to follow such recommendations, they are not held responsible for the failure. This seeming inconsistency is explained in terms of the distinction between task responsibility and blame responsibility. The double standard for responsibility is shown to be epistemologically rational, ethically commendable, and therapeutically advantageous. However, this non-blaming approach to patient responsibility is threatened by proposals to assign lower priority in healthcare to patients who are themselves responsible for their disease. Such responsibility-based priority setting requires that physicians assign blame responsibility to their patients, a practice that would run into conflict with the ethical foundations of the patient–physician relationship. Therefore, such proposals should be rejected.

The lack of sleep is a significant problem in the modern world. The structure of the economy means that 24 hour working is required from some of us, sometimes because we are expected to be able to respond to share-price fluctuations on the other side of the planet, sometimes because we are expected to serve kebabs to people leaving nightclubs, and sometimes because lives depend on it. The immediate effect is that we feel groggy; but there may be much more sinister long-term effects of persistent sleep deprivation and disruption, the evidence for which is significant, and worth taking seriously. If sleeplessness has a serious impact on health, it represents a notable public health problem. In this article, I sketch that problem, and look at how exploiting the pharmacopoeia (or a possible future pharmacopoeia) might allow us to tackle it. I also suggest that using drugs to mitigate or militate against sleeplessness is potentially morally and politically fraught, with implications for social justice. Hence, whatever reasons we have to use drugs to deal with the problems of sleeplessness, we ought to be careful.