Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T11:11:58.195Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Administration and Politics: The Case of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

J. E. Hodgetts
J. E. Hodgetts*
Affiliation:
Queen's University
Get access

Extract

The economist J. B. Say once wrote that “our duty with regard to errors is not to revive them, but simply to forget them.” Complete acceptance of this doctrine would expose the political scientist to ruin, for the study of government is largely the study of errors and man's clumsy efforts to correct them. The history of errors, so far as government control of radio broadcasting in Canada is concerned, centres on the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission which struggled for survival between 1932 and 1936. Our concern, however, is not with this history of errors but rather with the attempt, through the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, to correct these errors. In particular, our interest is focussed on the pressing problems of integrating administration and politics in the public interest, through the device of an independent government corporation.

In 1900, Professor Frank Goodnow first differentiated between politics and administration by suggesting that all activities involved in expressing the will of the state should be classified as “politics,” while all operations necessary to the execution of the will of the state should be termed “administration.” The harmonization of these two activities, according to Goodnow, depends on the subordination of one to the other. In a parliamentary system, harmonization in the public interest is presumably obtained by having the agents responsible for the execution of the will of the state dominated by the agents responsible for its expression. This simple bifurcation has been complicated by the fact that the cabinet, the supreme instrument of party government, has become responsible in large measure for both the expression and execution of the will of the state. In certain sectors of governmental activity the party (partisan) character of cabinet supervision has led to the demand for a withdrawal from its hands of the direct responsibility for “politics” and “administration.”

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , November 1946 , pp. 454 - 469
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1946

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Toronto, May 24, 1946

References

1 See Goodnow, F. J., Politics and Administration: A Study in Government (New York, 1900), pp. 9ff.Google Scholar

2 See Dimock, M. E., Modern Politics and Administration: A Study of the Creative State (New York, 1937), chap. XIII.Google Scholar

3 This migration can be logically explained only in terms of personalities. Mr. Howe simply carried the Corporation with him when he moved from Transport to Munitions and Supply. When it was handed over to National War Services, Mr. Howe retained the licensing power and continues to hold it in his new department. Apparently the Deputy Minister of Transport reported to the head of Munitions and Supply on all matters involving the licensing of broadcasting stations. See Order-in-Council, P.C. 3076, July 8, 1940. While the transfer of functions from one department to another under provision of the Public Services Re-Arrangement and Transfer of Duties Act is not uncommon, the practice of having the permanent head of one department responsible for a certain function to the political head of another department seems to form an undesirable precedent. The explanation for the present lodging place of the Corporation is that Mr. McCann, Minister of National Revenue, has invariably acted as chairman of the special committee on radio broadcasting, and he took over when the Department of National War Services was folded up.

4 The Act of 1932 disregarded the recommendations of the royal commission on broadcasting that a general manager be created to supervise the execution of policy. The parallel between the original organization of the Tennessee Valley Authority is exact, for there also policy and administration were combined in the directors, each being responsible for one aspect of the Authority's activities. “It has been amply demonstrated,” a parliamentary committee reported in 1936, “that a commission of three cannot be moulded into a unit that can formulate and execute policies successfully …. There has been a lack of coordination in dealing with some major questions” (See Report in Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1936, p. 3077 Google Scholar).

5 1 Edw. VIII, c. 24, s. 3.

6 See Mr. Graydon's persistent criticisms of the inadequate representation of these two functional groups on the Board, e.g., Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1943, p. 34.Google Scholar The recent appointment of Mr. Chase and Mr. Parker now meets this criticism, but other claimants (such as the press and private broadcasters) remain dissatisfied.

7 Dr. Frigon emphasized this problem a few years ago: “Our responsibility in respect to program control … results in a continuous series of crises which, at times, come in such rapid succession that one's mind has difficulty in adjusting itself to the tempo. Problems arise all over the country, at the most unexpected moments, which require a solution in a matter of minutes. Most frequently these have to be submitted to the highest authority of the Corporation.” See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting (Ottawa, 1944), p. 53.Google Scholar

8 This executive committee was provided for in the Act, 1936. However, the committee was set up in 1941 mainly to supervise the internal management of the C.B.C., rather than general policy. This would suggest that Mr. Coldwell was right in surmising that the Board had lost faith in its Manager. See discussion in Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, pp. 45 ff.

9 A review of these events is conveniently found in Mr. Graydon's, speech before parliament in 1943, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1943, pp. 2479 ff.Google Scholar

10 The General Manager was essentially a public relations man and was, accordingly, made responsible for programmes and publicity; the Assistant General Manager was made responsible for the technical and administrative aspects of the Corporation's activities.

11 See his testimony before the parliamentary committee, 1944, Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, p. 29. The division of work was as follows: the permanent Chairman was to be responsible for directing the policies of the Corporation, supervising programmes, settling differences concerning political and controversial broadcasts, popularizing the services of the C.B.C. and adjusting the regulations of the private stations; the General Manager was to supervise internal management, finance, staff, and technical operations.

12 8-9 Geo. VI, c. 33.

13 An alternative solution, adopted in other corporations, might have been to combine the position of permanent Chairman and General Manager; but this would compel the Board to review not only decisions concerning the broader aspects of policy, but also decisions concerning the details of internal management.

14 This was in contrast to the recruitment of staff under the old C.R.B.C. by the Civil Service Commission. See 22-3 Geo. V, c. SI, s. 4. As early as 1933 an amendment was approved to permit recruitment of technical personnel outside civil service regulations. See 23-4 Geo. V, c. 35.

15 See evidence of Dr.Frigon, before parliamentary committee, 1944, Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, p. 92 Google Scholar; also Appendix D, for salary schedules.

16 There is evidence that political pressure has not been absent, for Members of Parliament apparently do not hesitate to press the claims of their protégés. See, for example, the comments of Mr. Durocher before the parliamentary committee, 1944, ibid., p. 14; the exchange between Mr. Coldwell and the Honourable Mr. LaFlèche (the minister in charge) is also revealing, ibid., pp. 13 ff.

17 See Gordon, L., The Public Corporation in Great Britain (London, 1938)Google Scholar, “The British Broadcasting Corporation,” section on administration.

18 The present General Supervisor of Programmes and the Director of the Commercial Department started out with the original C.R.B.C.

19 See evidence of Dr.Frigon, before parliamentary committee, 1944, Evidence of Special Committee of Radio Broadcasting, pp. 77–8.Google Scholar

20 See Report of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1945.

21 See the memorandum from the Canadian Congress of Labour to the parliamentary committee, 1944, Appendix L of Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting. The memorandum argues that the C.B.C. cannot afford to be less democratic than private enterprise in refusing to recognize collective bargaining, and that denial curtails the workers' rights. The original ground for refusing collective bargaining was the decision of the Justice Department that the Corporation was an emanation of the Crown and hence, like a government department, legally debarred from signing agreements with outside unions. There is a technical argument in favour of altering this decision now, as the memorandum of the C.C.L. points out. Under P.C. 1003, 1944, employers are obliged to bargain collectively with any union chosen by a majority of the employees to represent them; and “employer” has been defined to include government corporations whose employees are not entitled to a cost of living bonus. The employees of the Corporation were excluded from the bonus—although the Board of its own volition acceded to staff requests for its application.

22 See Herring, E. P., Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York, 1936), p. 168.Google Scholar

23 See Hettinger, H. S. and Porter, W. A., “Radio Regulation: A Case Study in Basic Policy Conflicts” (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. ccxxi, 05, 1942, p. 122).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 See Herring, , Public Administration, p. 171.Google Scholar

25 See, for example, the Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Ottawa, 1929), p. 5 Google Scholar, where the purpose of the enquiry is stated as determining “how radio broadcasting in Canada could be most effectively carried on in the interests of Canadian listeners and in the national interests of Canada.”

26 See discussion by Spry, Graham, “A Case for Nationalized Broadcasting” (Queen's Quarterly, vol. xxxviii, 01, 1931, pp. 151–69)Google Scholar; also his article “The Canadian Broadcasting Issue” (Canadian Forum, vol. xi, 04, 1931, pp. 246–9).Google Scholar

27 The C.B.C. owns outright only ten stations, but operates two national networks through the affiliation of a majority of the eighty-odd private stations.

28 The Annual Reports of the Corporation are most illuminating in describing the vast array of programmes presented each year.

29 See, for example, Annual Reports of the Corporation, 1937 and 1940.

30 In 1938 the press launched a campaign against the “americanization” of Canadian opinions and tastes through the national network of the C.B.C. The real burden of their complaint was that radio advertising was beginning to compete effectively with newspaper advertising. The press has never forgiven the C.B.C. for its failure to keep its promise (made in 1938) to limit its commercial revenues to $500,000. It was on this understanding that the press supported the campaign to increase radio licence fees. The argument has been continued before the parliamentary committee, 1944: see Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, pp. 423 ff. for views of the Periodical Press Association; see rebuttal in the statement of Mr. Weir, Director of the Commercial Department of the C.B.C., pp. 538-50. The feud has even been carried to such picayune levels that one paper has erased the C.B.C. nameplate from all photographs where the Corporation's microphones were in evidence.

31 See Annual Report of the Corporation, 1945.

32 Further evidence of the Corporation's leadership in this field is provided in the recent announcement of the awarding of five prizes to the C.B.C.'s educational programmes in competition with the best offered in the United States.

33 See, for example, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1944, pp. 287 ffGoogle Scholar; 873 ff.

34 A Gilbertian note was struck in 1944, following discussion in Parliament of the political bias of the news service staff. This staff, rounded up from among old newspapermen accustomed to the vaunted freedom of the press, was compelled to write humble affidavits to the parliamentary committee swearing to its political innocence and neutrality. Had such an imposition been forced on the press one might well imagine the ponderous pontifications of every liberty-loving editor in the country!

35 It is interesting to note that, in drawing up these regulations, the C.B.C. had to attempt the almost impossible task of defining a political party in concrete terms. Needless to say, Burke would not have recognized his definition in that of the Corporation's. See Political and Controversial Broadcasting: Policies and Rulings (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; issued by authority of the Board of Governors, 02 21, 1944).Google Scholar

38 Section 22 of the Act of 1936 gives, the Corporation authority to make regulations for controlling the establishment and operation of broadcasting chains, for prescribing periods reserved for programmes of the Corporation on private stations, for controlling the character of all programmes, the amount of time devoted to advertising and its character, and the regulations governing political broadcasts on its own or private stations.

37 See Key, V. O., “Politics and Administration,” in White, L. D. (ed.) The Future of Government in the United States: Essays in Honor of Charles E. Merriam (Chicago, 1942), pp. 160–1.Google Scholar

38 It might be said, for example, that the Corporation's reluctance to grant licences to private interests to experiment with television and frequency modulation could be attributed to the professional desire to retain in its own hands the development of a new system of broadcasting that might undermine the “natural monopoly” of the national network now vested in the Corporation. See on this point the comments of Mr.Sedgwick, before the parliamentary committee, 1944, Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, p. 499.Google Scholar

39 See Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1943, p. 2242.Google Scholar

40 His expression was actually applied to the old C.R.B.C.; see ibid., 1933, p. 2574.

41 The courts have held in three cases that the C.B.C. is a distinct and separate corporation, properly suable but not taxable. See ibid., 1941-2, p. 3993.

42 Although on one occasion the Auditor General did not know whether to report financial maladministration to the Board of Governors or to the Minister.

43 Typical instances are to be found in Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1938, p. 410 Google Scholar (refusal to table C.B.C. contracts with American advertisers); ibid., p. 1164 (the Prime Minister's refusal to interfere with the C.B.C.'s policy concerning news commentators); and ibid., 1939, p. 749 (refusal to table information concerning the internal management of the Corporation).

44 The Broadcasting Act, however, places a limit of $100,000 on all working capital advances to the C.B.C. from the government; it also limits government loans to $500,000, and these constitute a first charge on c.B.C. revenues; all expenditures above $10,000 must receive cabinet approval.

45 Fees are collected by the Radio Division of the Department of Transport and are turned over to the Corporation after the commissions of agents and departmental administrative charges have been deducted. The Corporation receives the money by submitting a monthly budget to its Minister who authorizes the necessary withdrawals from licence fee revenues. The possibility of ministerial control is revealed in Mr. Howe's statement to the House in 1938: “I can take my own time in paying over the money we collect, and I exercise that power to make sure the corporation lives within its means” ( Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1938, p. 1047 Google Scholar).

46 Mr. Hanson has recently proposed that the useless standing committee on railways, canals, and telegraphs and the select committee on C.N.R. accounts be dropped and a new standing committee on communications created to consider the reports of the C.B.C. and the C.N.R. (see Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1942, pp. 912–3Google Scholar).

47 See, for example, the Prime Minister's efforts to cut off discussion of the previous report on the resolution to appoint a new committee in 1944. He argued that such a discussion was irrelevant to the resolution. The Speaker on this occasion gave a ruling which permitted liberal reference to the findings of the previous committee. See ibid., 1944, pp. 865 ff. But under similar circumstances in May, 1946, the discussion was rigidly curtailed.

48 See his comments before the parliamentary committee, 1944, Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, pp. 496 ff.

49 See their recommendations in ibid., pp. 237 ff.

50 Complaints have centred on such matters as restrictions on excess use of records (to encourage “live talent”); prohibition of price mention in advertisements; unduly heavy line charges; and reservation of time for C.B.C. sustaining programmes on affiliated stations at the most profitable commercial hours. The complaint against excess line charges would be difficult to prove, and the problem of reserving time so that it will be satisfactory to all stations across five time zones would not be met by setting up another agency.

51 See Hettinger and Porter, “Radio Regulation,” for attitude of F.C.C.

52 All applications for new licences are cleared through the technical staffs of the C.B.C. and the Radio Division of the Department of Transport, their recommendations then flow through the Board of Governors to the Minister in charge of the C.B.C to the department over which Mr. Howe happens to be presiding at the time.

53 The most recent assertion of this principle is found in Third and Final Report of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting (Ottawa, 1944), p. 551 Google Scholar: “Your Committee now desires … to point out that since 1932 there has been unanimity by all political parties on the national control of Canada's place in the radio realm as a public utility …. Your Committee wishes to state that we believe it is of paramount importance to have a single national authority in control of radio in Canada.”

54 The C.A.B. has recommended that the Corporation should give up its second national network (consisting of nineteen private stations and only one C.B.C. station). But, if the C.B.C. retained its other network intact it would also have private stations affiliated with it, so that actually it would not be a case of straight competition between privately and publicly owned stations.

55 Dr.Frigon, stated before the parliamentary committee, 1944, Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, p. 281 Google Scholar: “If the C.B.C. were to operate a network in competition with a privately-owned network, both controlled by an independent board, it seems evident that unless the private network could establish a corner in commercial broadcasting the C.B.C. would be driven to compete commercially with the other network; in which case we might not feel that we should handicap ourselves in the competition for business by our present self-imposed restrictions; all we would have to do would be to live up to the board's regulations.”

56 The benefits accruing to private stations through co-operation with the C.B.C. were described by Dr. Frigon as follows: “The C.B.C. network has enormously increased the audience of the privately-owned stations which are members of it. Its sustaining program service has saved stations large sums of money. It has given them prestige which they would not otherwise have attained and besides bringing them network programs, it has left to them almost exclusively the most profitable part of commercial business, i.e., national spot and spot announcement business …. We have never heard of any privately-owned station going out of business because of C.B.C. competition, nor of any reduction of their profits resulting from C.B.C. affiliation. On the other hand, many of them could not survive without the program service commercial and sustaining carried to them” Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, p. 125.

57 See statement of Mr. Morin, ibid., p. 36.

58 See statement of Dr. Frigon, ibid., pp. 69 ff.

59 But consultation does not prevent the C.B.C. from being embroiled in bitter disputes, as, for example, with Mr. Bracken in 1943, and Mr. Drew in 1945.

60 See Evidence of Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, pp. 34, 45.

61 Ibid., pp. 211, 221.

62 The press argues that the tax-free, licence-sustained Corporation can undersell newspaper advertising rates; but the C.B.C.'s rates appear to be the going market rates set mainly in the competitive markets of the United States.

63 See, for example, the results of the poll in Canadian Forum, vol. xxiii, 04, 1941, pp. 22–4.Google Scholar

64 Dafoe, J. W., “Public Utilities and Administrative Boards” (Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. ii, 08, 1936, p. 329).Google Scholar