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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
My purpose in this paper is to indicate the extent to which the United States seems to have learned something from history as regards the economic problems incident to the preparation for war by comparing the preparations made during the period of neutrality in 1914-17 with those of the corresponding period of 1939-41, though I shall at points go beyond the neutrality period. The topic is a wide-ranging one and in the time available I can only hope to touch rather sketchily upon the more important aspects of the problem. I shall not attempt any analysis of the factors which explain the greater results secured during the last two years than in the earlier period of neutrality, involving such things as the attitude of the administration, of Congress, and of the public, as well as the fact that so many of the generation that faced the problems of the last war are still alive, in marked contrast to the situation in 1861 or 1914, for to do this would carry me too far afield. I shall treat the subject topically under the headings of the chief economic problems of war.
These chief problems are: first, getting the goods and services required for fighting; second, providing for the essential needs of the civilian population; third, devising means to enable the government to pay for these goods and services, the problem of war finance. Sometimes a fourth problem is added to this list, that of preparing to meet and to minimize the inevitable post-war readjustments. While I think this last should be classed as a peace-time problem still it is one which should properly be held in mind in shaping war-time policy, but it must be kept strictly subordinated to the problems involved in the effort to win the war.
This article is a revision of a paper originally presented at a joint meeting of the American Historical Association and the Economic History Association in Chicago, December 29, 1941. For a more detailed account of the United States' economic mobilization effort during the First World War see C. W. Wright, An Economic History of the United States (New York, 1941), chaps, XLII and XLIII and further references in the bibliography. For general surveys of the current economic mobilization effort see E. Stein and J. Backman (eds.), War Economics (New York, 1942), and S. E. Harris, The Economics of American Defense (New York, 1941), and the references therein. The former, carrying the narrative to the close of 1941, is more up to date; the latter, coming down to the autumn of 1941, is more analytically critical. The most useful official publications are the annual reports of the various government departments and bureaus, the publications of the Federal Reserve banks and the Monthly Labor Review. The weekly bulletin of the Office of Production Management, Defense, the name of which was changed to Victory in December, 1941, will be found particularly useful. Among the numerous Congressional hearings that of the House Committee on Judiciary on Delays in National Defense Preparations and that of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program on Investigation of the National Defense Program, may be noted. A valuable survey stressing legal aspects is the article “American Economic Mobilization: A Study in the Mechanism of War” (Harvard Law Review, vol. LV, Jan., 1942, pp. 427-536).
* This article is a revision of a paper originally presented at a joint meeting of the American Historical Association and the Economic History Association in Chicago, December 29, 1941. For a more detailed account of the United States' economic mobilization effort during the First World War see C. W. Wright, An Economic History of the United States (New York, 1941), chaps, XLII and XLIII and further references in the bibliography. For general surveys of the current economic mobilization effort see E. Stein and J. Backman (eds.), War Economics (New York, 1942), and S. E. Harris, The Economics of American Defense (New York, 1941), and the references therein. The former, carrying the narrative to the close of 1941, is more up to date; the latter, coming down to the autumn of 1941, is more analytically critical. The most useful official publications are the annual reports of the various government departments and bureaus, the publications of the Federal Reserve banks and the Monthly Labor Review. The weekly bulletin of the Office of Production Management, Defense, the name of which was changed to Victory in December, 1941, will be found particularly useful. Among the numerous Congressional hearings that of the House Committee on Judiciary on Delays in National Defense Preparations and that of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program on Investigation of the National Defense Program, may be noted. A valuable survey stressing legal aspects is the article “American Economic Mobilization: A Study in the Mechanism of War” (Harvard Law Review, vol. LV, Jan., 1942, pp. 427-536).