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The Break-Up of the Czechoslovak Coalition, 1947–8*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

H. Gordon Skilling
H. Gordon Skilling*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

For one year after liberation in 1945, Czechoslovakia seemed to offer a picture of relative harmony between the political forces of democracy and communism personified by Eduard Beneš, the President, and Klement Gottwald, deputy Prime Minister, and leader of the Communist party. The themes of continuity and revolution, introduced during the wartime struggle for national liberation and developed for one post-war year in apparent concord, were soon to break off in open disharmony. Profound divergences appeared within the National Front of the six political parties concerning the course to be followed in future. On the Communist side there was a wish to complete a revolution that remained, in their view, unfinished. On the non-Communist side, there was a desire to end the course of drastic change and to establish order and legal stability on the Western pattern. These differences were for some time hidden by, or at least subordinated to, the unity symbolized by the National Front. By late 1947 what amounted to a deadlock had resulted, and prospects of continuing co-operation of Communists and non-Communists were slight. The climax in February, 1948, to be correctly appreciated, must be placed in the context of this deep and protracted crisis.

The first year of the liberated republic was one of reconstruction and revolution. The legal order was restored, with substantial new elements incorporated. The main organs of government were reconstituted, sometimes in greatly changed form. The punishment of war criminals, and the purification of Czech and Slovak life of “fascist elements,” were begun, through special “people's tribunals.” The property confiscated from German and Czech “traitors” was placed under “national administration.” Extensive nationalization of industry was begun, and a system of planning was prepared.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , November 1960 , pp. 396 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1960

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Footnotes

*

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance afforded by a Senior Fellowship at the Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, in the preparation of this article.

References

1 For fuller discussion, see the author's “Revolution and Continuity in Czechoslovakia, 1945–1946,” to be published in a forthcoming number of the Journal of Central European Affairs.

2 See the author's “The Prague Overturn in 1948” in Canadian Slavonic Papers, IV (Toronto, 1960), for the events of February, 1948.Google Scholar

3 See: speech by Z. Fierlinger in the Provisional National Assembly, Oct. 30, 1945, in Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Prozatímního Národního Shromáždění republiky Československé / Stenographic Reports of the Meetings of the Provisional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, henceforth cited as Zprávy; Diamond, William, Czechoslovakia between East and West (London, 1947), 70 ff.Google Scholar

4 Speech of Nov. 9, 1945, Zprávy, 70; also in The Opening of the Prague Parliament (Prague, 1946), 77.Google Scholar

8 Nos. 100–3, Sbírka zákonů a nařízení republiky Československé / Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Czechoslovak Republic, henceforth cited as Sb. See Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, 42, 71, 126 ff. English texts in Nationalization in Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1946).Google Scholar

6 Beneš, Eduard, Demokracie dnes a zítra / Democracy Today and Tomorrow (3rd ed., Prague, 1946), 268–71.Google Scholar

7 Ripka, Hubert, Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London, 1950), 41–4Google Scholar; Laušman, B., Kdo byl vinen? / Who Was Guilty? (Vienna, 1953), 76–89.Google Scholar

8 No. 5/1945, Sb. See Beneš, E., “Postwar Czechoslovakia,” Foreign Affairs, XXIV, no. 3, 04, 1946, 407–10.Google Scholar

9 Gottwald, K., Deset let: Sborník statí a projevů, 1936–1946 / Ten Years: Collection of Articles and Speeches, 1936–1946 (Prague, 1947)Google Scholar (henceforth cited as Deset let), 293.

10 Ibid., 308, 314–15.

11 Cf. Beneš, , Demokracie dnes a zítra, 271 Google Scholar; Cesta k svobodě / The Path to Freedom (2 vols., London, 1944), II, 20–5Google Scholar; Za nové Československo / For a New Czechoslovakia (Moscow, 1944; Prague, 1945), 172–6.Google Scholar

12 Deset let, 329.

13 Decrees of June 21, 1945 (no. 12, Sb.) and of July 20, 1945 (no. 28, Sb.). A hectare is roughly 2½ acres.

14 The Czechoslovak Agrarian party, and other smaller parties, were, under the Košice programme, to be prohibited. The National Front included the Communist party of Czechoslovakia (C.P.C.), the separate Communist party of Slovakia, the Czechoslovak National Socialist party, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party, the Czechoslovak People's, or Populist, party, and the Slovak Democratic party. Under the presidency of Eduard Beneš, the six parties were represented on a basis of parity in the first post-war government headed by Fierlinger.

15 Laušman, , Kdo byl vinen? 50–62 Google Scholar, where statements by Beneš and all party leaders in support of the Communists are given.

16 See the speeches by Ducháček (People's party), Zenkl (National Socialist party), and Vilím (Social Democratic party), in parliamentary debate on the government statement by Fierlinger, , Zprávy, Oct. 30, 1945.Google Scholar

17 Deset let, 288–9.

18 Ibid., 319.

19 See the article by Zenkl, Petr in Svobodný zítřek, 05 16, 1946.Google Scholar

20 For brief statements about all the parties, see Diamond, Czechoslovakia between East and West, chap. II; Duff, S. G. et al., Czechoslovakia: Six Studies in Reconstruction (London: Fabian Society, n.d.), chap. IIGoogle Scholar; Young, E. P., Czechoslovakia (London, 1946), 65–71.Google Scholar

21 Deset let, 327–35.

22 Svobodné slovo, May 5, 1946.

23 Fuller details of the elections are given in the author's “Revolution and Continuity.” See also editorial by Kodíček, J. in Central European Observer, 06 7, 1946.Google Scholar A later public opinion poll, conducted by the Czechoslovak Research Institute for Public Opinion under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, showed 62 per cent of the population agreeing with the Košice programme, and 28.8 per cent agreeing to it with reservations. Ibid., Oct. 3, 1947.

24 Klement Gottwald, 1946–1948 (2 vols., Prague, 1949), I, 9–64.Google Scholar This speech was published in English as Statement of Policy of Mr. Gottwald's Government (Prague, 1946).Google Scholar

25 Zprávy, July 8, 1946.

26 Cesta 25 let Komunistické stany Československa / The Twenty-Five Year Path of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1946).Google Scholar

27 Cf. Stransky, Jan, East Wind over Prague (New York, 1951)Google Scholar, where Communist strength is assigned mainly to fear, greed, and confusion.

28 See Diamond, , Czechoslovakia between East and West, 114–24Google Scholar; Duff et al., Czechoslovakia, chap. VI. Cf. Brown, J., Who's Next? The Lesson of Czechoslovakia (London, 1951), 77–80.Google Scholar

29 The Communist “infiltration” in the mass organizations and in the government is described in detail in Korbel, Josef, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938–1948 (Princeton, 1959), chap. IX.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 See Slánsý's, speech, For a Lasting Peace, Dec. 1, 1947.Google Scholar

31 See Gottwald's, speech on Jan. 1947, in Klement Gottwald, I, 114 ff.Google Scholar See also Ibid., 189–90.

32 According to Korbel (The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 198–9) Beneš also expected a Communist defeat. See Friedman, Otto, The Break-up of Czech Democracy (London, 1950), 68 Google Scholar, for reference to a public opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Information, revealing a likely drop in Communist votes from 38 per cent to 29 per cent in the forthcoming elections. The results of this poll were not published. See Black, Robert E., “The Last Free Poll in Czechoslovakia,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XIV, no. 2, summer, 1950, 384–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33 See, e.g., Kubeš, Vladimír, O novou ústavu / On the New Constitution (Prague, 1948)Google Scholar for the National Socialist viewpoint, and Procházka, Vladimír, “Concerning the New Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic,” Tvorba, 03 19, 1947 Google Scholar, and “The Struggle over the New Constitution,” Ibid., March 3, 1948, for the Communist viewpoint.

34 For a detailed description of these controversies, see Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, esp. chaps, XIX-XXII.

35 See Zprávy, Nov. 25, 1947 (Nosek and Drtina), and Jan. 21–2, 1948 (Drtina and Hodinová-Spurná). See also Korbel, , The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 191–4.Google Scholar

36 Diamond, , Czechoslovakia between East and West, 29, 41–5, 90–1, 131, 163.Google Scholar See also Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, esp. chaps. XVIII, XXIV.

37 See Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 131–2.Google Scholar

38 Laušman, , Kdo byl vinen? 187–9.Google Scholar

39 See Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 46, 100–1, 109–10, 186, 193–4.Google Scholar See Majer, V., “Czechoslovakia” in Healey, Denis, ed., The Curtain Falls (London, 1951), 89–90.Google Scholar According to the Communists an agreement was reached between Zenkl and Laušman in early 1948 for common action. See the alleged text, in Rudé právo, Feb. 17, 1948. Laušman confirms an agreement between the two parties, but describes this text as imaginary (Kdo byl vinen? 108–9, 162).

40 See Gottwald's January speech in Klement Gottwald, I, 114.Google Scholar Rejecting the idea that the C.P.C. was struggling for a mere formal majority, he declared: “Our policy is a policy of active struggle against reaction, a policy of acquiring more and more new positions, a policy of strengthening acquired positions and pushing the enemies on to the defensive.”

41 For the congress, see New York Times, Nov. 17, 1947; Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 120–5Google Scholar; Brown, , Who's Next? 115–18Google Scholar; Healey, , ed., The Curtain Falls, 90 Google Scholar; Laušman, , Kdo byl vinen? 96–7.Google Scholar

42 See Gottwald's, speech of 06 5, 1947, in Klement Gottwald, I, 187–8.Google Scholar

43 See Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 107.Google Scholar

44 New York Times, Feb. 17, 19, 1947.

45 See Kodíček, J., “The Slovak Problem,” Central European Observer, 06 27, 1947.Google Scholar

46 For the crisis see Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 105–19Google Scholar; Lettrich, Jozef, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), 247–51Google Scholar; Klement Gottwald, I, 260–5Google Scholar; New York Times during Oct. and Nov., 1947; World Today, III, no. 12, Dec., 1947, 511–21.Google Scholar

47 Klement Gottwald, I, 266–82.Google Scholar See Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 183, 204–5, 208–9, 211–13.Google Scholar According to Laušman (Kdo byl vinen? 98–105), this speech of Gottwald's was the result of a directive from the C.P.S.U. secretariat, transmitted by F. Pexa-Voda, the permanent Czech representative there, urging the party to suppress the slogan of a “special Czech path to socialism,” and thus to remove the danger of a “right deviation.”

48 The same theme was developed by Slánský in his report to the founding conference of the Cominform in Poland in Sept., 1947 (For a Lasting Peace, Dec. 1, 1947).

49 See, e.g.: Kohn, Hans in Current History, XIV, no. 78, 02 1948, 67–70 Google Scholar; Duff, S. G. D. in World Today, III, no. 12, Dec., 1947, 511–21Google Scholar; Mosely, P. E. in Political Science Quarterly, LXIII, 03, 1948, 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50 Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 200 Google Scholar; also 190. Ripka claims to have received this news on February 16 from a Communist source. For similar views, see: Ducháček, Ivo, The Strategy of Communist Infiltrations: The Case of Czechoslovakia (New Haven, 1949)Google Scholar; Krajina, V., “How It Happened,” Svobodný zítřek, 02 20, 1949 Google Scholar; Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, chap. XI.

51 Klement Gottwald, II, 122–43.Google Scholar Cf. also his speech of Nov. 17, 1948, Ibid., 268–9.

52 Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 142–6, 201–2.Google Scholar

53 Bruce Lockhart regards this Communist charge as absurd, but also rejects the non-Communists' claim that they were seeking to forestall a Communist coup. See “The Czechoslovak Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, no. 4, 07, 1948, 632–44.Google Scholar

54 Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 185.Google Scholar He expected the Communists to remain the strongest party, suffering a loss of 10 per cent. See above, n. 32.

55 This is stressed by Sheila Grant Duff, in her contribution to Duff, et al., Czechoslovakia, 14.Google Scholar See also her articles in World Today, III, no. 1, Jan., 1947, 6–18 Google Scholar; and III, no. 12, Dec., 1947, 511–21; and the article by Lockhart, Bruce, Central European Observer, XXIV, no. 12, 06 27, 1947.Google Scholar

56 See Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 54, 58–62 Google Scholar; Majer, “Czechoslovakia,” 89–90; Laušman, , Kdo byl vinen? 46–7.Google Scholar The conversation with Stalin has been variously reported. The Czech delegation, consisting of Gottwald, Masaryk and Drtina (the latter in place of Ripka, who was ill), had gone to Moscow to discuss other matters, including a trade treaty and the proposed French-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance, and was not, as sometimes stated, summoned to Moscow in connection with the decision on the Marshall Plan. The account given by Ripka of the conversation, taken from a transcript (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 66–70, 91–2), does not coincide with another version, claimed to have been prepared immediately after the talk, by Arnost Heidrich, the secretary-general of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and published by Alsop, S., “Stalin's Plans for the U.S.A.,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 224, no. 2, 07 14, 1951, 17 ff.Google Scholar A text of Heidrich's report to the U.S. State Department is given by Schmidt, Dana Adams, Anatomy of a Satellite (Boston, 1952), 101.Google Scholar The versions agree in ascribing to Stalin the statement that the Czech alliance with Soviet Russia was at stake, but differ substantially in describing his explanation of the Soviet view.

57 See Ripka, , Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 130–1Google Scholar; New York Times, July 13, Dec. 5, 1947; Dewar, Margaret, Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945–1949 (London, 1951), 25–9.Google Scholar

58 Contrast the statements on the Marshall Plan given by Gottwald and Ripka to foreign journalists: Klement Gottwald, I, 213–14Google Scholar; 300–1; New York Times, Jan. 4, 1948.

59 The connection of the Czech crisis with the impending Yugoslav question is stressed by Ducháček, , “The February Coup in Czechoslovakia,” World Politics, II, no. 4, 07, 1950, 515 Google Scholar, and by Laušman, , Kdo byl vinen? 98, 208.Google Scholar

60 Jan Papánek, in his address to the Security Council on May 21, 1948 (Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, no. 71) reported an all-night conference between Zorin and Gottwald, Slánský, and other Communist leaders. See also Josten, Josef, Oh My Country (London, 1949), 107–8, 110–11.Google Scholar Laušman describes Gottwald as being subject to Zorin's instructions (Kdo byl vinen? 148, 177, 181–2). Bruce Lockhart minimizes the importance of Zorin's personal presence, and of Soviet intervention generally.

61 In an alleged “last message,” President Beneš referred to a supposed threat by Gottwald that the Red Army would march if his demands were not fulfilled. See Friedman, , The Break-up of Czech Democracy, 124–7.Google Scholar Papánek reports a conference in early February in Štrbské Pleso in the Tatra Mountains, between Gottwald and his staff and a Russian military delegation, to make arrangements for the coup and for eventual military intervention.

62 This theme is developed at length by Ducháček in The Strategy of Communist Infiltrations. Gottwald, in explaining the reasons for victory in 1948 and defeat in 1920, spoke of the absence of “visible support” from the Soviet Union in 1920, and the complete change in “the international balance of power” by 1948. See speech of Nov. 17, 1948, in Klement Gottwald, II, 263–5.Google Scholar

63 Cf. Pravda, Feb. 21, 1948; Izvestia, Feb. 21, 1948.