Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T22:31:07.651Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Cabinet Minister and Administration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

R. Macgregor Dawson
R. Macgregor Dawson*
Affiliation:
The University of Toronto
Get access

Extract

The generalization of Walter Bagehot that successful administration “depends on a due mixture of special and non-special minds” has lost none of its importance with the passage of time, for the problem of combining competent administration with democratic control is more urgent today than ever before. Bagehot contended that the Cabinet Minister, the “non-special mind,” served a double purpose: he not only enabled a democracy to control the civil service, but he also made a genuine contribution to its administrative efficiency. The specialized civil servant, if left to his own devices, tended to become narrow in outlook, careless of the public convenience, and restricted by departmental routine; and the important secondary function of the Minister was to correct these failings by supplying a fresh mind and a different point of view.

The government of Great Britain still furnishes, as in Bagehot's time, the best practical application of this principle, and the high standards maintained by many of the departments bear testimony as to its essential truth. The need for this interplay of “special and non-special minds” is perhaps best seen in the history of the War Office, a department which by its very uniqueness in several respects presents in exaggerated form both the difficulty of the problem and the virtue of the remedy. The War Office is thus considered not merely as a sample department, but one which places, as it were, a magnifying glass over the general problem of departmental administration elsewhere.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , November 1939 , pp. 451 - 478
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1939

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Presented to the Royal Society of Canada, May, 1939.

2 A mild dissent from this view is expressed in two excellent articles by Aikin, Charles on “The British Bureaucracy and the Origins of Parliamentary Policy” (American Political Science Review, Feb., and 04, 1939, pp. 26–46, 218–33).Google Scholar

3 The following explanations of this fact, the one by a philosophic historian, the other by the most practical of statesmen, are not unlike, although sixty years separates the two opinions. “It would be easy … to prove how, by an increasing love of intellectual pursuits, the military service necessarily declines, not only in reputation, but likewise in ability. In a backward state of society men of distinguished talents crowd to the army, and are proud to enrol themselves in its ranks. But, as society advances, new sources of activity are opened, and new professions arise, which, being essentially mental, offer to genius opportunities for success more rapid than any formerly known. The consequence is, that in England, where these opportunities are more numerous than elsewhere, it nearly always happens that if a father has a son whose faculties are remarkable, he brings him up to one of the lay professions, where intellect, when accompanied by industry, is sure to be rewarded. If, however, the inferiority of the boy is obvious, a suitable remedy is at hand: he is made either a soldier or a clergyman; he is sent into the army, or hidden in the church” ( Buckle, H. T., History of Civilization in England, London, 1871, vol. I, p. 198 Google Scholar). “It is no use referring to what is done in Continental armies. Those armies numbered millions, and the best brains of the nation were attracted by the great prizes which were to be won by service in them. Ours was a small thing. The rewards were necessarily limited in number and scope” (Memorandum of Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. Asquith, June 17, 1916, in George, D. Lloyd, War Memoirs, London, 1933, vol. II, p. 764 Google Scholar).

4 The very unusual relationship between a General in active service and the Cabinet presents an entirely different problem and has been left untouched here and in the following discussion.

5 An excellent account of the complicated organization—and its history—is given in Gordon, H., The War Office (Whitehall Series, London, 1935).Google Scholar Cf. Vagts, A., A History of Militarism (London, 1938), pp. 350–5.Google Scholar

6 Arnold-Forster, Mary, Memoir of H. O. Arnold-Forster (London, 1910), pp. 224–5.Google Scholar

7 Spender, J. A., Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923), vol. II, pp. 149–50Google Scholar; Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (London, 1934), vol. II, pp. 26–38 Google Scholar; SirCallwell, C. E., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London, 1927), vol. I, pp. 57–63 Google Scholar; Arnold-Forster, Mary, Memoir of H. O. Arnold-Forster, pp. 224–9.Google Scholar This same difficulty arose later when Lord Kitchener occupied the position. Cf. Grey, Viscount, Twenty-five Years (New York, 1925), vol. II, p. 74 Google Scholar; infra, pp. 465-6.

8 Arnold-Forster, Mary, Memoir of H. O. Arnold-Forster, p. 229.Google Scholar

9 Ibid., p. 226.

10 Callwell, , Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, vol. I, p. 54.Google Scholar

11 SirChamberlain, Austen, Politics from Inside (London, 1936), p. 157.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., pp. 60-1.

13 SirLee, Sidney, King Edward VII (London, 1927), vol. II, pp. 206–15.Google Scholar

14 Arnold-Forster, Mary, Memoir of H. O. Arnold-Forster, pp. 251–2.Google Scholar

15 Spender, , Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, vol. II, pp. 325–6Google Scholar; Gordon, , The War Office, pp. 78–91 Google Scholar; Haldane, R. B., An Autobiography (London, 1929), pp. 182–200 Google Scholar; SirMaurice, F., Haldane (London, 1937), vol. I, pp. 177–234.Google Scholar

16 Haldane, , An Autobiography, p. 288.Google Scholar There were, however, many critics at the time the reforms were being made. Sir Austen Chamberlain who had been most critical in 1907, wrote the following generous footnote in 1936: “I never understood till the Great War came what a magnificent achievement Haldane's army reorganisation was. Confession of my error is the only amends I can offer to his memory” (Politics from Inside, p. 55).

17 Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), p. 17.Google Scholar

18 Haldane, , An Autobiography, pp. 164–5, 183 Google Scholar; Maurice, , Haldane, vol. I, pp. 111–12, 135–40.Google Scholar

19 Haldane, , An Autobiography, pp. 173, 183.Google Scholar

20 Maurice, , Haldane, vol. I, p. 162.Google Scholar

21 SirHarris, C., “Lord Haldane at the War Office” (Public Administration, Oct., 1928, p. 341).Google Scholar

22 Maurice, , Haldane, vol. I, p. 171 Google Scholar; cf. also p. 177. Lord Esher wrote to Lord Kitchener in December, 1905, that “the new Secretary of State cannot fail to do well. Above all, he has determined to walk slowly, and has no preconceived ideas. He is adroit, shrewd, and exceedingly clever” ( Journals and Letters of Reginald. Viscount Esher, vol. II, p. 132 Google Scholar).

23 Maurice, , Haldane, vol. I, p. 172.Google Scholar

24 Ibid.; cf. also vol. II, p. 235.

25 Haldane, , An Autobiography, pp. 184–7.Google Scholar

26 Ibid., pp. 187-9; Maurice, Haldane, vol. I, pp. 177-90. In his speech to the House of Commons, Haldane enunciated eight basic principles underlying army policy ( British House of Commons Debates, 07 12, 1906, pp. 1080–5Google Scholar).

27 Haldane, , An Autobiography, pp. 198–200 Google Scholar; Harris, , “Lord Haldane at the War Office”, p. 342 Google Scholar; Grey, Viscount, “Lord Haldane” (Public Administration, Oct., 1928, pp. 332–3)Google Scholar; Cooper, A. Duff, Haig (Toronto, 1935), vol. I, pp. 105–17Google Scholar; Maurice, , Haldane, vol. II (London, 1939), p. 232.Google Scholar

28 British House of Commons Debates, 07 12, 1906, pp. 1078–9, 1086 Google Scholar; Maurice, , Haldane, vol. II, p. 18.Google Scholar

29 British House of Commons Debates, 07 12, 1906, p. 1079.Google Scholar

30 Harris, , “Lord Haldane at the War Office,” p. 342.Google Scholar

31 British House of Commons Debates, 03 8, 1906, p. 685.Google Scholar

32 Oxford, Lord and Asquith, , Memories and Reflections (Toronto, 1928), vol. II, p. 30.Google Scholar Sir Douglas Haig wished Lord Haldane to return to the War Office ( Cooper, Duff, Haig, vol. I, pp. 128–9Google Scholar).

33 SirRobertson, W., Soldiers and Statesmen (London, 1926), vol. I, p. 189.Google Scholar

34 Ballard, C. R., Kitchener (London, 1930), pp. 235–7, 367 Google Scholar; Grey, , Twenty-five Years, vol. II, pp. 70–1Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I (London, 1933), pp. 391–2Google Scholar; Spender, J. A. and Asquith, C., Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith (London, 1932), vol. II, pp. 131–3Google Scholar; SirArthur, George, Life of Lord Kitchener (New York, 1920), vol. III, pp. 307–10.Google Scholar

35 Maurice, , Haldane, vol. I, pp. 360–1Google Scholar; cf. also vol. II, pp. 11-12.

36 Haldane, , An Autobiography, p. 279.Google Scholar

37 Sir John Cowans, the Quartermaster-General, was the outstanding exception.

38 Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, p. 132.Google Scholar Cf. Cooper, Duff, Haig, vol. I, p. 277 Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, p. 231.Google Scholar

39 Grey, , Twenty-five Years, vol. II, pp. 77, 246.Google Scholar The dispute in India between Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, and Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, as to the position of the latter in the Government of India anticipated to a singular degree Kitchener's curious position in the British Government ten years later. The document reviewing the dispute and signed by all the advisers of the Viceroy, save Kitchener, contained the following: “We cannot too strongly or emphatically express our conviction that the Military Member is an essential element in the Government of India …. His Majesty's Government may be invited to consider the position that would be produced in England if a Commander-in-Chief of the British Army possessed a seat in the Cabinet, if he were the sole representative of the Army there, if he enjoyed the power and rank of the Secretary of State for War in addition, and if His Majesty's Ministers were called upon to accept or reject his proposals with no independent or qualified opinion to assist them. And yet this is precisely the situation which we are asked to accept by Lord Kitchener in India” ( Fraser, Lovat, India under Curzon and After, London, 1912, p. 431 Google Scholar).

40 Grey, , Twenty-five Years, vol. II, p. 74.Google Scholar Cf. also Robertson, , Soldiers and Statesmen, vol. I, pp. 189–90Google Scholar; Ballard, Kitchener, pp. 230-2.

41 For Sir William Robertson's views on the functions of the Minister, the General Staff, and the Cabinet, see Soldiers and Statesmen, vol. II, pp. 300–3Google Scholar; also SirRobertson, W., From Private to Field-Marshal (London, 1921), pp. 236–52Google Scholar; Churchill, W. S., The World Crisis (London, 1927), vol. III, pp. 34–5Google Scholar; George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 759–60.Google Scholar

42 Oxford, and Asquith, , Memories and Reflections, vol. II, pp. 97–8Google Scholar; Birkenhead, Lord, Points of View (London, 1922), vol. I, p. 14 Google Scholar; Ballard, , Kitchener, pp. 223–9, 366–9Google Scholar; Arthur, , Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. III, pp. 299–300.Google Scholar

43 Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. II (Toronto, 1923), pp. 172–3.Google Scholar Cf. Riddell, Lord, War Diary (London, 1933), p. 134.Google Scholar The Field-Marshal at the War Office proved at times embarrassing also for the Commander-in-Chief in France, and a visit paid by Lord Kitchener (in full uniform) to Sir John French was misunderstood by the latter, who felt that the Secretary of State was trying to use his superior military rank to intimidate the General in command of the army in the field ( Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, pp. 108–9Google Scholar; Churchill, , The World Crisis, Toronto, 1923, vol. I, pp. 299–301 Google Scholar).

44 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 124–213, 235–71Google Scholar; vol. II, pp. 548-654; Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. II, pp. 61–83, 319–22Google Scholar; Addison, C., Politics from Within (London, 1924), vol. I, pp. 83–6Google Scholar; Official History of the War, 1915 (London, 1927), vol. I, pp. 37–58.Google Scholar

45 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, p. 134.Google Scholar

46 Birkenhead, Lord, Contemporary Personalities (London, 1924), p. 36.Google Scholar

47 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 124–236 Google Scholar; Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, pp. 134–43Google Scholar; Arthur, , Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. III, pp. 263–81.Google Scholar

48 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 548–56.Google Scholar

49 Ibid., pp. 556-65.

50 Ibid., pp. 573-98.

51 Ibid., pp. 599-610; Official History of the War, 1915, vol. I, pp. 55–8.Google Scholar

52 On November 22, 1915, Asquith records he had an interview “with von Donop, to whom I had to make the revelation that two or three of the remaining leaves of his attenuated artichoke are to be snapped off by Lloyd George. I handled him as well as I could, and I hope broke his fall” ( Memories and Reflections, vol. II, p. 132 Google Scholar). “One last fight remained. Whatever else the War Office failed to do, they at least lived up to the old tradition of the British Army of never knowing when they were beaten” ( George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, p. 634 Google Scholar).

53 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 614-39.

54 Twenty-five Years, vol. II, pp. 248–9.Google Scholar

55 War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 124–5.Google Scholar

56 Arthur, , Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. III, pp. 279–80.Google Scholar Lord Haldane also placed extraordinary confidence in the Master-General of Ordnance. Cf. Maurice, , Haldane, vol. II, pp. 4, 9.Google Scholar

57 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 146, 166–7, 181–5Google Scholar; Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. II, p. 175 Google Scholar; Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, pp. 138–40.Google Scholar

58 Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. II, p. 175 Google Scholar; cf. vol. II, pp. 172-5, 321; Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, p. 136 Google Scholar; Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War (London, 1928), vol. I, pp. 182–3Google Scholar; Ballard, , Kitchener, pp. 366–8.Google Scholar

59 Esher, Lord, The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener (London, 1921), pp. 130–1.Google Scholar

60 Arthur, , Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. III, pp. 322–5.Google Scholar

61 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 752–6.Google Scholar

62 Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, p. 124.Google Scholar

63 My colleagues,” said Kitchener, “tell military secrets to their wives, all except —, who tells them to other people's wives” ( Beaverbrook, , Politicians and the War, vol. I, p. 69 Google Scholar).

64 Ballard, , Kitchener, p. 369.Google Scholar Cf. also Oxford, and Asquith, , Memories and Reflections, vol. II, pp. 88–9.Google Scholar Kitchener gave Lord Esher the following account of his own qualities in 1905: “I think I know what I can do as well as my limitations. I can, I believe, impress to a certain extent my personality on men working under me, I am vain enough to think that I can lead them, but I have no silver tongue to persuade” ( Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher, vol. II, p. 98 Google Scholar).

65 Spender, and Asquith, , Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. II, pp. 127–8.Google Scholar

66 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 139–45, 188–99, 201 Google Scholar; vol. II, p. 550; SirFrench, John, 1914 (New York, 1919), pp. 355–69.Google Scholar

67 Churchill, , The World Crisis, vol. II, p. 172 Google Scholar; Beaverbrook, , Politicians and the War, vol. I, pp. 180–1.Google Scholar

68 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 82–3.Google Scholar Cf. Maurice, , Haldane, vol. II, p. 21.Google Scholar

69 Oxford, and Asquith, , Memories and Reflections, vol. II, p. 88.Google Scholar

70 Esher, , The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener, pp. 148–51.Google Scholar

71 Ronaldshay, Lord, Life of Lord Curzon (London, 1928), vol. II, p. 251.Google Scholar

72 “I told Kitchener,” wrote Lord Esher, “that I had been with Arthur Balfour for a long time yesterday, and that Arthur had spoken very frankly to me about his difficulty in getting on to intimate terms with him, Lord K. This was due to a suspicion that Lord K. was not quite frank, and tried now and then ‘oriental methods’ with him. Lord K. took this very well, and admitted that it might be so” ( Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher, vol. III, London, 1938, p. 252 Google Scholar).

73 Mr. Duff Cooper describes how General Robertson was similarly embarrassed when discussing problems with the Cabinet. “Soldiers and politicians had the same objective. All wanted equally to win the war. But their training had been so different, their minds worked along such different grooves that the language they spoke was hardly the same, and the difficulty that they found in understanding one another was comparable only to the difficulty experienced by men of different races. It is illustrated by the incident just recounted [when Mr. Balfour suggested the transfer of all possible troops to the Eastern Front]. To Balfour's fine intellect and broad intelligence there could appear no harm in throwing airily on to the table a suggestion which seemed to merit a moment's consideration. If it had been torn in pieces he would not have raised an eyebrow in objection, and would have smilingly agreed that there was nothing in it. But Robertson took no intellectual pleasure in the discussion of abstract propositions. His mind was direct, his views were settled and his time was fully occupied. To him the discussion in Cabinet of a futile proposition seemed as wicked as it would to a clergyman to raise a debate on the possibility of immortality in Convocation, or to a magnate if a director at a board meeting were to question the desirability of accumulating wealth” ( Cooper, Duff, Haig, vol. I, pp. 289–90Google Scholar).

74 “We had a long cabinet,” wrote Mr. Asquith, August 11, 1914, “in which a large part of the talking was done by Winston and Kitchener, the former posing as an expert on strategy and the latter as an expert on Irish politics” ( Memories and Reflections, vol. II, p. 32 Google Scholar).

75 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, vol. II, p. 751.Google Scholar