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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
Important changes were made in the Combines Investigation Act in 1952, and again in 1960; the intervening period provides a suitable unit for the study of operations under the Act. We shall try to account for the changes that were made in 1952 and for the manner in which the Act was administered thereafter, in terms of some basic propositions about the process of government in Canada, which are well known though perhaps not universally accepted. We conclude with a brief discussion of the 1960 revision of the Act.
Canadian governments of both parties must try to avoid policies that will antagonize large blocks of voters. They must also steer clear of policies that will lose them the support of substantial business interests, not only because they depend on business groups for campaign funds, but also because the environment in which government operates is influenced, in a great variety of ways, by the actions and attitudes of the major business groups. Many policy decisions, particularly in non-economic fields, do not involve a conflict between these two objectives. Where there is a conflict, the policy decisions that emerge represent a compromise.
A paper given at the meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Montreal on June 10, 1961.
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1889, quoted in Reynolds, L. G., The Control of Competition in Canada (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 131–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 H. of C., Debates, 1949, 2nd session, 1516–7.Google Scholar
3 Report of the Committee to Study Combines Legislation (Ottawa, 1952), 29.Google Scholar
4 Ibid., 43–6.
5 Ibid., 41–3.
6 RSC, 1952, c. 314.
7 Report of the Committee to Study Combines Legislation, 55.
8 H. of C., Debates, 1951, 2nd session, 41–2.Google Scholar
9 The figures on the discussion that follows are based on data in the annual Reports of the Director of Investigation and Research, the Public Accounts, and Dominion Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts, Income and Expenditure.
10 The Eddy Match Company had followed a policy of buying out new competitors after undermining their trade through discriminating sales policies and unfair trade practices. It was convicted and fined, but no order prohibiting the continuation of the offence was issued and the merger was not dissolved. In the latest Dominion Bureau of Statistics report available at the time of writing, the production of wooden matches was not reported on the grounds that this commodity is produced by only one or two concerns.
Participants in a price-fixing agreement covering fine papers were convicted and fined, and a restraining order was issued. In July, 1960, however, it was mentioned in the House of Commons that the government was considering the removal of tariff protection, tinder the section of the Combines Investigation Act that permits reduction of duty where the duty “facilitates” the detriment to the public arising from the combine.
11 The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada (Toronto, 1956), 162.Google Scholar
12 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, The Electronics Industry in Canada (Ottawa, 1956), 25.Google Scholar
13 RSC, 1960, c. 45.