Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
The evidence presented to the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency in Canada, 1933, is preserved in some three thousand five hundred multigraphed foolscap pages. There are fifty or sixty copies in existence. A number of these are in the possession of those who were attached to the Commission and of the Canadian banks: others are to be found in certain Canadian libraries: and that is about all. There is only one other avenue of access to the material. During the course of the proceedings the Financial Post of Toronto published a weekly summary of the more important submissions; and the daily papers throughout the country printed extracts irregularly. It is, therefore, clear that few people have had, or will ever have, the opportunity to become familiar with the evidence. And even those who have access to the copies available in libraries will be confronted by a vast, undigested, poorly indexed mass of material.
Hence this article. It has two objects. It attempts, in the first place, simply to describe the evidence to those readers who either have not the inclination or the ability to consult it. In the second place, it attempts to guide those who may in the future wish to consult it away from the more arid patches and towards the oases. In what follows, I find myself between two fires. Since I was fortunate enough to be attached to the Commission in a minor capacity, and the only economist so attached, I am tempted to give a critical review from the standpoint of an economist. On the other hand, my connection with it imposes some restraint upon my remarks both regarding the Commission itself and those appearing before it. Indeed, as I write, I feel acutely conscious that I am compassed about by a great cloud of witnesses. To those who, reading this article, feel that I have done them any injustice, I apologize, asking them to bear with me, remembering the magnitude of the task of condensation which I am undertaking.
1 These are as follows: The Parliamentary Library, Ottawa; the libraries of the following universities and colleges—Acadia University, University of Alberta, Assumption College, University of British Columbia, Dalhousie University, Laval University, University of Manitoba, McGill University, McMaster University, University of Montreal, University of New Brunswick, Queen's University, St. Dunstan's University, University of Saskatchewan, University of Toronto, Victoria University, University of Western Ontario; and the Willistead Library, Walkerville, Ontario. There are, I understand, still a few copies available for distribution at the Department of Finance, Ottawa.
2 The figures in brackets refer to pages in the multigraphed evidence.
3 The representative of the U.F.O. refused to commit himself regarding the ownership of the bank.
4 The only academic economist, who was not attached to a Canadian university, and who gave evidence, was Dr. T. E. Gregory of the University of London. He was in the country attending the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and met the Commission in Toronto. He favoured a central bank (2976-3049).
5 See, for example, “The Proposal for a Central Bank” (Queen's Quarterly, 08, 1933).Google Scholar Also Curtis, C. A., “The Canadian Monetary Situation” (Journal of Political Economy, 06, 1932)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Curtis, C. A., “Credit Control in Canada” (Papers and Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, vol. II, 1930).Google Scholar
6 In the mimeographed evidence this word reads “Bank” which is probably a mistake because Mr. Swanson did not recommend a central bank.