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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
Since the War imprecision has been the common characteristic of most statements on foreign policy by Canadian prime ministers. In this the prime ministers of Canada have not been unique. As Mr. Harold Nicolson has pointed out, though “the essence of a good foreign policy is certitude” and though “an uncertain policy is always bad” yet “on the other hand, parliamentary and press opposition is less likely to concentrate against an elastic foreign policy than against one which is precise. It is thus a grave temptation for a Foreign Minister under the democratic system to prefer an idealistic formula, which raises only intellectual criticism, to a concrete formula which is open to popular attack.”
Canadian political leaders have been vague about the principles of their foreign policy, not only because of a shrewd calculation of political interest (the fact that a forthright statement on foreign policy would lose more votes than it would gain) but also out of regard for the national interest. There are deep divisions in the Canadian nation—divisions arising out of race, religion, section. These divisions are likely to be deepened—over the short-run at least—by facing the Canadian people with the necessity of choosing between a number of clearly defined policies on external affairs. For Canadian foreign policy, as Mr. Mackenzie King has recently pointed out, is concerned with the problems which arise out of “the unparalleled complexity of our position as a member of the league, a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and one of the nations of the American continent”.
1 Nicolson, Harold, Curzon: The Last Phase (London, 1934), pp. 394–5.Google Scholar
2 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 18, 1936, p. 3862.Google Scholar
3 Nicolson, , Curzon, p. 395.Google Scholar
4 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 03 23, 1936, p. 1333.Google Scholar
5 Statement given to the press by the secretary of state for external affairs, Oct. 29, 1935; printed in Documents relating to the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict (Ottawa, 1936), p. 166.Google Scholar
6 Perhaps Mr. King, in expressing his adherence to this principle, had in mind the lucid exposition of it which the Hon. C. H. Cahan had given in the House of Commons on June 21, 1926. At that time Mr. Cahan had said: “May we not reasonably hope that those who succeed us in filling the highest offices in the gifts of the people of Canada shall only undertake such inter-imperial and international responsibilities as may be undertaken with the general approval of all sections of the country, and so insure that the action of parliament, and of the government which this parliament maintains and sustains, shall have the approval not only of a majority of the electoral constituencies throughout Canada, but also have the substantial support and co-operation of the constituencies in every important section, district or province of the Dominion? I am confident, Mr. Speaker—and my sole excuse for speaking is that I feel so strongly about this matter—that it is only by restricting all our external commitments and obligations within such limits as to merit and obtain the general approval, as I said, of each and every section of Canada, that we can ever hope to have such cordial co-operation between the peoples who compose the Canadian electorate as will enable us to solve our domestic problems in such a manner and so successfully as to maintain the continued solidarity and unity of the great Canadian nation, and thereby promote for all time the peace, progress and prosperity of this country, in which we were born, in which we will die and which will be the home of our children and our children's children for all future time,” ( Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 21, 1926, p. 4770 Google Scholar; italics added).
7 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 18, 1936, p. 3869.Google Scholar
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 3864.
10 Ibid., p. 3872.
11 Ibid., p. 3871.
12 Ibid., Feb. 11, 1936, p. 97: part of Mr. King's defence of the government's action in the Riddell incident.
13 Ibid., March 23, 1936, p. 1333.
14 League of Nations Assembly, 09 29, 1936, Verbatim Record, p. 4.Google Scholar
15 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 18, 1936, p. 3871.Google Scholar
16 “I am not at all sure that, when the whole story comes to be told, it may not be discovered that, but for the action of the government of Canada in this particular matter, at that particular time, the whole of Europe might have been aflame to-day” ( Mr.King, , Canada, House of Commons Debates, 02 11, 1936, p. 98 Google Scholar).
17 Ibid., p. 96.
18 Ibid., June 18, 1936, p. 3868.
19 Ibid., May 13, 1936, p. 2771: “Mr. Woodsworth: May I ask, since there has been consultation between the British empire and the dominions, what is the attitude of Canada in regard to the question of continuing sanctions against Italy?”
“Mr. Mackenzie King: So far as I am aware, there has been no consultation in respect to the matter to which my hon. friend refers.”
20 On March 9, 1936, in the House of Commons at Westminster, Mr. J. H. Thomas, at that time secretary of state for the Dominions, in replying to questions asked him on Dominion co-operation and policy arising out of the White paper on defence, said that at the jubilee celebration in 1935 the United Kingdom government had explained to the Dominion prime ministers “the defence position, since which full contents of white paper had been communicated to them, and without a solitary exception every dominion not only acquiesced but felt that this was a policy that ought to be supported”.
Mr. Mackenzie King, after quoting the explicit statement (made in the Canadian House of Commons) on May 20, 1935, by the then prime minister, Mr. Bennett, that Canada had neither sought nor given any commitments in respect of imperial defence, added: “A summary of the white paper which was recently laid on the table of the House of Commons at Westminster, describing the proposal of the government of the United Kingdom for the strengthening of its defence forces and the reorganization of the committee of imperial defence was communicated to us. The summary reached us at the same time that a full statement appeared in the press of the contents of the white paper. But we were not asked our opinion of the white paper, nor were we asked to give any approval of it or any commitment with regard to it” ( Canada, House of Commons Debates, 03 10, 1936, pp. 921–2Google Scholar).
21 Since the United Kingdom has a permanent seat on the Council of the League, and since the aggressor can be determined only by a unanimous vote of the Council (excluding the parties to the dispute), the United Kingdom can prevent any war (except a war arising out of a dispute in which she herself is involved) from becoming a “League” war. All “League” wars are, therefore, “British” wars unless they are “League” wars against the United Kingdom. But all “British” wars are not necessarily “League” wars. Great Britain may become involved in a war and the League Council be unable to determine which state is the aggressor.
22 League of Nations Assembly, 09 29, 1936, Verbatim Record, p. 3.Google Scholar
23 Statement given to the press, on Oct. 29, 1935.
24 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 18, 1936, p. 3871.Google Scholar
25 League of Nations Assembly, 09 29, 1936, Verbatim Record, p. 2.Google Scholar
26 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 02 12, 1936, p. 128.Google Scholar
27 Ibid., June 18, 1936, p. 3871.
28 Ibid., 1936, p. 3869.
29 Editorial in Winnipeg Free Press, Oct. 1, 1936.
30 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 18, 1936, p. 3871.Google Scholar
31 League of Nations Assembly, 09 29, 1936, Verbatim Record, p. 3.Google Scholar Two eminent authorities on the interpretation of the League's Covenant appear to have arrived recently at much the same position as Mr. King. Sir John Fischer Williams, in commenting on a draft of a revised covenant of the League, has written: “I share Mr. Gathorne-Hardy's doubts as to whether any direct scheme of amendment can be carried by the use of the existing machinery for amendment contained in the Covenant. I believe that if anything is to be effected, it must be by declaration by the Powers chiefly interested of the sense in which they understand their obligations rebus et nunc stantibus, and by creating precedents of action in the sense that is acceptable to the majority of members” ( The Future of the League of Nations, R.I.I.A., 1936, p. 176 Google Scholar).
M. Avenol, secretary-general of the League, wrote recently: “While the members of the League are unconditionally obliged by the covenant to strive to settle their differences peacefully, their obligations to act collectively are relative and depend on how far other principles are being applied …. The principles of the covenant are interdependent” ( New York Times, 01 1, 1937, p. 26, cols. 1 and 2Google Scholar).
32 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 22, 1936, p. 4106.Google Scholar
33 League of Nations Assembly, 09 29, 1936, Verbatim Record, p. 3: Speech by Mr. Mackenzie King.Google Scholar
34 Cited above, p. 93.
35 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 06 18, 1936, p. 3872.Google Scholar
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 In this article I have tried merely to analyse Mr. King's foreign policy without expressing any views on the merits of that policy. I discuss the merits in my “Canada and the Threat of War” ( University of Toronto Quarterly, VI, 01, 1937, pp. 242–53Google Scholar).