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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
In a previous article in this Journal, I discussed the prospects for the stabilization of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. I considered the factors which I thought to be favourable, and then noted certain problematic features inherent in both the constitutional structure of the Federal Republic and in the political praxis—the “unwritten constitution”—as it has developed under the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer. Some of these danger points will be the subject of the present paper. Our concern will be with certain structural weaknesses which are, so to speak, built into the system of government, structural features which are independent of issues and ideologies.
A brief commentary on certain recent events will serve as background for our discussion. In the election campaign of 1961 one observed a rather desperate attempt by the Social Democrats (SPD) to broaden their support among the intellectuals and the petite bourgeoisie, and also the farmers, by modifying their economic programme to such an extent that very little was left of specifically socialistic propositions. Marx was relegated to history; the party made it very clear that it is no longer a Marxist party. No longer does the party demand socialization of the “means of production” except in cases where private enterprise cannot meet the needs of the community. On the contrary, as a major “plank” in its election platform, it advocates a wider distribution of property by a new scheme of profit-sharing. In its foreign policy the party has abandoned its former proposals for gradually intensified contacts with the East German regime, and in striving for a “joint foreign policy” has come very close to the course of the Adenauer government.
The present paper is partly based on my essay, Democracy Restored–Political Tendencies and Parties in Germany (mimeo. Baton Rouge, 1957). An earlier version was read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, 1960. I am indebted to the Louisiana State University Council on Research for financial assistance in the continuation of research initiated in Germany 1956 during a sabbatical leave.
1 XXV, no. 4, Nov., 1959, 484–96.
2 See “The Hanover Manifesto” in News from Germany, 12, 1960 Google Scholar; H. Deist, “Pro-perry for all,” ibid., March, 1961, and “A New-Style Economic Policy,” ibid., Jan., 1961. Also the “Godesberg” Programme (Grundsatz Program) of the SPD of 1959 ( Basic Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Bonn, 1959), 10, 11, 12 Google Scholar; and A Design for a New Socialist Platform (Bonn, 1958)Google Scholar passim.
3 See, for example, editorial by Dönhoff, Marion Gräfin in Die Zeit, 09 29, 1961.Google Scholar
4 See the discussion between Professor Bahrdt, H. P. and Wehner, Herbert in Die Zeit, 02 2, 1962 Google Scholar, and the letters to the editor in Die Zeit, Feb. 16, 1962.
5 Schmidtchen, Gerhard, Die befragte Nation (Freiburg i. Br., 1959) 51 ff.Google Scholar This book, which is based on the opinion polls of the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach, is a rich source of information.
6 Ibid., 118.
7 Alleman, T. R., Bonn ist nicht Weimar (Köln, 1956), 338 Google Scholar; Loewenberg, Gerhard, “Parliamentarism in Western Germany: The Functioning of the Bundestag,” American Folitical Science Review, LV, no. 1, 03, 1961, 87–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 This provision led to the establishment of a Federal Commission for the drafting of a party law (Parteienrechts Kommission). The report of this commission, Rechtliche Ordnung des Parteiwesens (Frankfurt, a. M., Berlin, 1957), quoted here as ROdP contains a wealth of information on the actual working of political institutions and processes in the Bundesrepublik as well as on theoretical thinking among the best minds in constitutional law and political science. The report is therefore one of the best sources for future studies of the German party system. It confirms the main findings of this paper which is based on research undertaken before the publication of the report.
9 Consequently, the relation of the two norms and the exact meaning of the two articles has become subject of discussion among the experts. ( ROdP, 69 and passim. )
10 Ibid., 59
11 Ibid., 156.
12 The SPD is the only party with a continuous history reaching back into the nineteenth century. Its membership was in 1913 about 983,000, reached a maximum in 1931 of 1,037,384; since 1945 is developed as follows: 1946, 701,448; 1948, 896,275; 1950, 683,896; 1955, 585,158; 1960, 652,000; membership of CDU/CSU was about 293,000 in 1956 (ibid., 40–42).
13 Membership dues were made obligatory by SPD party statutes of 1900 (ibid., 20).
14 Ibid., 43.
15 Ibid., 45. A comparison with USA would be meaningless, even if comparable data were available because the American parties do not intend to be membership parties in the European sense.
16 Ibid., 156.
17 Ibid., 58.
18 Ibid., 45ff.
20 Ibid., 67; also Loewenberg, “Parliamentarism.”
21 Wildenmann, Rudolf, Partei und Fraktion (Meisenheim am Glahn, 1954).Google Scholar
22 ROdP, 35 ff.
23 Ibid., 67.
24 Eschenburg, Th., Herrschaft der Verbände? (Stuttgart, 1956)Google Scholar; Kaiser, J., Die Repräsentation der Interessen (Berlin, 1955)Google Scholar; Breitling, R., Die Verbände in der Bundesrepublik (Meisenheim am Glahn, 1954)Google Scholar; Sternberger, D. et al. “Rundtafelgespräche,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie, V, 1953.Google Scholar
25 ROdP, 81–6.
26 For an analysis of the form and function of the election system see Loewenberg, “Parliamentarism.”
27 See Kirchheimer, Otto “The Composition of the German Bundestag 1950” in Western Political Quarterly, III, no. 4, 1950, 589 ff.Google Scholar Kirchheimer states that 44 per cent of the members of the Bundestag were public office holders, party functionaries and journalists, 30 per cent were representatives of agriculture, industry and other business, while trade union functionaries and public health insurance officials, representatives of consumer cooperatives and work council members totalled about 9 per cent. However, the latter figure understates the actual representation of labour, because many of its representatives are classified as party functionaries. For details by party see Kirchheimer, Table IV.
28 ROdP, 86.
29 Ibid., 83
30 Potthoff, E., “Die wirtschaftliche Machtstruktur der Bundesrepublik” in Grundfragen moderner Wirtschaftspolitik (Frankfurt a. M., 1957).Google Scholar
31 ROdP, 174 ff. especially 185 ff.