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Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is Judicial Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal Landscape?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Ming-Sung Kuo
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Extract

Legal scholars have been inspired by the dialogic approach and rallied around it as the solution to constitutional conflict in domestic constitutional orders and the transnational legal landscape. This paper aims to show that the gravitation towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional theory misses the point, given the ambiguities surrounding it. My investigation reveals that the dialogic approach does not succeed in guiding the inter-departmental or inter-regime interactions in a way that no single power would exert unilateral domination. The emergence of judicial supremacy in both national and transnational constitutional orders further suggests that underlying those ostensible examples of judicial dialogue is a transfigured conception of sovereignty. As it is the rise of judicial sovereignty that drives the move towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional developments, I suggest that legal scholars shift focus of attention from the idea of dialogue to the enhanced judicial role in the new constitutional era.

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Research Article
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Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , July 2013 , pp. 341 - 376
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Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2013

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References

A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 2011 WG Hart Legal Workshop on “Sovereignty in Question” at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London. The author has benefited from the workshop participants. He heartily acknowledges the helpful suggestions of the two anonymous reviewers and the Editor, Richard Bronaugh, and the fine editing work of a student editor, Dr. Lawrence Burns, with The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence. Special thanks go to Joanne Scott for her meticulous comments and suggestions on an early draft. Any errors are the author's responsibility.

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10. In contrast to its siblings in other Commonwealth countries, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11 [Charter], stands apart from ordinary legislation, constituting part of the Canadian constitution.

11. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) 1990/109 [NZBoRA].

12. Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), c42 [HRA]. In this context, the relevant courts include the Law Lords of the House of Lords as well as the Privy Council, the holders of the jurisdiction of last resort before the establishment of the UK Supreme Court in 2009.

13. See, e.g., Tushnet, Mark, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 66–71 Google Scholar. Judicial supremacy refers to the position of treating the interpretations of the constitution made by judicial review as an integrated part of constitutional law and thus de facto or de jure superior to those made by other departments of constitutional power. Judicial supremacy hereby also includes the situation in which the power of judicial review resides in special constitutional courts and extra-judicial institutions. Judicial supremacy is characteristic of what Mark Tushnet calls strong-form judicial review. Ibid at 21-22.

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23. These terms are used interchangeably given that the judiciary (or its functional equivalent) occupies centre stage in these theories. It should be noted that judicial dialogue has been deployed by some scholars in a non-institutional setting, referring to personal contacts between judges of different jurisdictions. See Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 65–66, 96-99Google Scholar. In this paper, I discuss the idea of judicial dialogue in relation to its institutional implications.

24. For the emergence of dialogue in domestic constitutional law, see Waldron, Jeremy, “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators” (2004) 23 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 7 Google Scholar; Tremblay, Luc B, “The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (2005) 3 Int’l J Const L 617 Google Scholar; Petter, Andrew, “Look Who’s Talking Now: Dialogue Theory and the Return to Democracy” in Bauman, Richard W & Kahana, Tsvi, eds, The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 519.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For the deployment of the idea of judicial dialogue in the transnational context, see, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism” in Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 7, 356.

25. Notably, the areas where societal constitutionalism is seen to emerge fall outside the scope of judicial dialogue since there is no (quasi-)judicial body to be identified in these new frontiers of constitutionalism in its reconceptualized constitutional space. See Teubner, supra note 2.

26. See, e.g., Maduro, supra note 24 at 371-79.

27. See, e.g., Gardbaum, Stephen, “Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2010) 8 Int’l J Const L 167 at 181-82Google Scholar.

28. Recent scholarship includes Gráinne de Búrca, “The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-Evaluation” in de Búrca & Weiler, supra note 7 at 105; Alon Harel & Shinar, Adam, “Between Judicial and Legislative Supremacy: A Cautious Defense of Constrained Judicial Review” (2012) 10 Int’l J Const L 950 Google Scholar; Benvenisti, Eyal & Downs, George W., “The Democratizing Effect of Transjudicial Coordination” (2012) 8 Utrecht L Rev 158 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind, “Weak-Form Judicial Review and American Exceptionalism” (2012) 32 Oxford J Legal Stud 487 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29. See Finn, John E, “The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries” in Barber, Sotirios A & George, Robert P, eds, Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 41.Google Scholar

30. Whittington, Keith E, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses” (2002) 80 NCL Rev 773 at 782-83Google Scholar. See also Kramer, Larry D, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 106–11 Google Scholar. Under the system of parliamentarianism, theories of constitutional dialogue espoused in Westminster democracies focus on the institutional relationship between judges and legislators. See Young, supra note 17 at 117.

31. Gardbaum, Stephen, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)Google Scholar. Gardbaum identifies the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism to argue that the protection of rights has taken a distinctive path in these jurisdictions, of which the design of judicial review is just one of the characteristics. Ibid at 14-15. My present focus is on the role of juridical review in these Commonwealth jurisdictions rather than its broader implications to constitutionalism. Notably, this new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism also expands into Australia, albeit only at the territorial and state levels. Ibid at 204-21; Gardbaum, supra note 27 at 168-69. My discussion on the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism will not include the two Australian state/territorial bills of rights.

32. Cf Kahn, Paul W, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)Google Scholar; Loughlin, Martin, “In Defence of Staatslehre “ (2009) 48 Der Staat 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. Traditionally statutes lay beyond the scope of judicial review. See Allan, TRS, “Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review” (2003) 23 Oxford J Legal Stud 563 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34. “Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.” NZBoRA, supra note 11, s 6.

35. “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” HRA, supra note 12, s 3 (1). Notably, section 4 of the HRA authorizes courts in the UK to issue a declaration of incompatibility. As the disputed statute is still binding despite being declared Convention rights-incompatible under section 4, Tushnet argues that section 4 functions as another interpretive mandate, while sections 3 and 4 of the HRA jointly constitute what he calls “an augmented interpretive mandate.” Tushnet, supra note 13 at 27-31. Cf Young, supra note 17 at 116; Hickman, supra note 19 at 82.

36. Charter, supra note 10.

37. Ibid, s 52.

38. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 18-19, 25-27.

39. See Kavanagh, Aileen, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 322–24 Google Scholar

40. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 21-22.

41. See ibid at 24. See also Young, supra note 17 at 116.

42. Young, supra note 17 at 116-18, 128-32; Hickman, supra note 19 at 82.

43. Despite the lack of an express authorization of the courts to declare a statute inconsistent with the NZBoRA, the New Zealand Court of Appeals in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 Google Scholar (CA) [Moonen] suggested the possibility of making a declaration of inconsistency. See Allan, James, “The Effect of a Statutory Bill of Rights Where Parliament Is Sovereign: The Lesson from New Zealand” in Campbell, Tom, Ewing, KD & Tomkins, Adam, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 375 at 384CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 27-33.

45. See Hogg, Peter W & Bushell, Allison A, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such as Bad Thing at All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 75 Google Scholar; Roach, Kent, “Dialogue or Defance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the United States” (2006) 4 Int’l J Const L 347 Google Scholar; Dixon, Rosalind, “Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 Int’l J Const. L 391 at 393Google Scholar [Dixon, “Creating Dialogue”]; Dixon, Rosalind, “The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 235 at 252-53Google Scholar [Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada”]. See also Tushnet, supra note 13 at 31. Cf Young, supra note 17 at 115; Hickman, supra note 19 at 71-81. But see Huscroft, Grant, “Rationalizing Judicial Power: The Mischief of Dialogue Theory” in Kelly, James B & Manfredi, Christopher P, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009) 50.Google Scholar

46. Under section 33, legislatures can either preempt judicial review of the consistency of statues with Charter rights by including a notwithstanding clause in the legislation, or override judicial decisions to resurrect the invalidated statute for at least five years by using the “notwithstanding clause”. Charter, supra note 10, s 33.

47. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 44. The term “legislative sequels” refer to the legislation that reinstates invalidated statutes in previous judicial decisions. Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada”, supra note 45 at 252-53.

48. See Gardbaum, supra note 31. See also Roach, Kent, “Dialogic Judicial Review and Its Critics” (2004) 23 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 49 Google Scholar; Hickman, supra note 19 at 81-96.

49. Gardbaum, supra note 27 at 182. Cf Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada”, supra note 45 at 252-53, 257.

50. Billingsley, Barbara, “Section 33: The Charter‘s Sleeping Giant” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 331 at 339-40Google Scholar.

51. Ibid at 339-40; Gardbaum, supra note 31 at 109. Notably, there is disagreement among scholars on how many times section 33 has actually been used. See Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, “Review, Judicial, Legislative Override and Democracy” in Campbell, Tom, Goldsworthy, Jeffrey & Stone, Adrienne, eds, Protecting Human Rights—Instruments and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 263 at 275CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52. Billingsley, supra note 50 at 340. However, the insertion of the notwithstanding clause in the 2000 amendment to the Alberta Marriage Act, RSA 2000, c-M5 is dubious since the definition of marriage is within the federal jurisdiction. Jeffrey Goldsworthy notes that the notwithstanding clause has never been used at all since 1988. Goldsworthy, supra note 51 at 275.

53. Goldsworthy, supra note 51 at 274-78. See also Gardbaum, supra note 31 at 110. Cf Billingsley, supra note 50 at 341-43. For the limitation inherent in the notwithstanding clause and its impact on the invocation of section 33, see Huscroft, supra note 45 at 55-57.

54. Billingsley, supra note 50 at 339-43.

55. Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada”, supra note 45 at 242.

56. See ibid at 252-56. See also Gardbaum, supra note 27 at 178-83; Dixon supra note 28 at 495-501; Billingsley, supra note 50 at 341-43.

57. For the normative implications of the long-term disuse of constitutional power for constitutional practice, see Vermeule, Adrian, “The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers” (2012) 32 Oxford J Legal Stud 421 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It remains to be seen whether the notwithstanding clause will be actually revived in the near future. See Gardbaum, supra 31 at 9-10.

58. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 52-66. See also Huscroft, supra note 45 at 57-58; Huscroft, Grant, “Constitutionalism from the Top Down” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 91 Google Scholar.

59. UK Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgments: Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Government’s Response to Human Rights Judgments 2011-12 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2012) at 39–57 Google Scholar.

60. Kavanagh, supra note 39 at 282-83. The recent controversy concerning the prisoners’ voting rights in the UK appears to break new ground in this regard. However, taking account of the complex interaction between Parliament, the UK courts, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the parliamentary defance may be understood as resistance to the adjudication of a foreign court instead of rebellion against de facto judicial supremacy in the domestic context. Cf Amos, Merris, “The Dialogue between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights” (2012) 61 Int’l & Comp LQ 557 at 577-79Google Scholar.

61. Gardbaum, Stephen, “How Successful and Distinctive is the Human Rights Act? An Expatriate Comparatist’s Assessment” (2011) 74 Mod L Rev 195 at 203CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62. Ibid at 200-02.

63. Gardbaum, supra note 27 at 178-98.

64. Moonen, supra note 43.

65. Section 5 of NZBoRA stipulates, “Subject to Section 4 of the Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” NZBoRA, supra note 11, s 5. Relying implicitly on an expansive reading of section 5, the Court of Appeals in Moonen notes that ‘the Court ha[s] the power…to indicate that although a statutory provision must be enforced according to its proper meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.” Moonen, supra note 43 at 20. See Allan, supra note 43 at 384; Huscroft, Grant & Rishworth, Paul, “‘You Say You Want a Revolution’: Bills of Rights in the Age of Human Rights” in Dyzenhaus, David, Hunt, Murray & Huscroft, Grant, eds, A Simple Common Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 123 at 147Google Scholar.

66. Huscroft & Rishworth, supra note 65 at 147.

67. [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC) [Hansen]. The New Zealand Supreme Court was established as the highest court and the court of last resort in New Zealand in 2003. It started to exercise this power in 2004. Prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeals was the highest domestic court with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London functioning as the appellate body of last resort.

68. Gardbaum notes that Hansen rejected the robust Moonen methodology in interpreting NZBoRA. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that Hansen at least left unchallenged the judicial power to make “[an] ‘informal’ indication of inconsistency.” Gardbaum, supra note 31 at 139-40.

69. Allan, supra note 43 at 384. Gardbaum also notes that the political branches’ response to judicial decisions has suggested “an overall mixed record of accepting and not accepting these decisions.” Gardbaum, supra note 31 at 141.

70. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 43-75. See also Kavanagh, supra note 39 at 338-65, 409-20. But see Young, supra note 17 at 128-32. This does not mean that the new Commonwealth model adds no new element to constitutionalism. Rather, it suggests that judicial power under this model is not dissimilar to that under traditional constitutionalism associated with strong-form judicial review. Cf Gardbaum, supra note 31 at 223-37; Gardbaum, supra note 61 at 202-09.

71. See Kramer, supra note 30 at 73-92.

72. See generally Cooke, Jacob E, ed, The Federalist (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).Google Scholar

73. See Kramer, supra note 30 at 105-27. See also Fried, Charles, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) at 74–75 Google Scholar.

74. See Flemming, James E, “Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts” (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1377 Google Scholar. For the meaning of constitutional departmentalism, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.

75. Tushnet, Mark, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) at 6–7 Google Scholar[emphasis added by my underlining; italics in original].This is Tushnet’s paraphrase of Chief Justice John Marshall’s statement in Marbury v Madison, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury, supra note 14 at 141.

76. Tushnet, supra note 75 at 6-7. See also Fried, supra note 73 at 74. For a discussion of the relationship between constitutional supremacy and judicial supremacy in the context of continental Europe, see Sweet, Alec Stone, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

77. Jefferson, Thomas, “Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819)” in Ford, PL, ed, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Volume X, 1816-1826 (New York: GP Putnam’s Sons 1899) 140 at 142Google Scholar.

78. Kramer, supra note 30 at 105-14.

79. See ibid at 219.

80. US Const amends I-X.

81. US Const amends XIII, XIV, & XV.

82. See Ely, John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 75–77 Google Scholar.

83. 358 US 1 (1958) [Cooper]. See Burt, supra note 18 at 286; Kramer, supra note 30 at 220-21.

84. 347 US 483 (1954) [Brown]. See Burt, supra note 18 at 271-86.

85. Cooper, supra note 83 at 18.

86. Ibid.

87. Kramer, supra note 30 at 221; Tushnet, supra note 75 at 6-7.

88. See Kramer, supra note 30 at 221.

89. 410 US 113 (1973) [Roe].

90. Peretti, supra note 15 at 32-34.

91. Robert Bork exemplifes this line of critique of Roe v Wade. See Nagel, Robert F, “Meeting the Enemy—The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law by Robert Bork” (1990) 57 U Chicago L Rev 633 at 642 n 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92. See generally Burt, supra note 18.

93. See Meese, Edwin III, “The Law of the Constitution“ (1987) 61 Tul L Rev 979 Google Scholar.

94. Larry Kramer notes that Edwin Meese quickly backed down after his departmentalist criticism of the Supreme Court in 1986 was soon accused of “inviting anarchy.” Kramer, supra note 30 at 221.

95. See, e.g., Braveman, Daan, “On Law and Democratic Development: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Supremacy” (2005) 33 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com 41 Google Scholar.

96. See Johnsen, Dawn E, “Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?” (2004) 67 Law & Contemp Probs 105 Google Scholar.

97. Whittington, supra note 30 at 782-83, 800.

98. See, e.g., Paulsen, Michael Stokes, “The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is” (1994) 83 Geo LJ 217 Google Scholar. Notably, sometimes “the people” is also considered a coequal “department” of constitutional power alongside the political branches and the judicial department. Johnsen, supra note 96 at 105, n 1.

99. Kramer, supra note 30 at 230.

100. See, e.g., Waldron, Jeremy, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 224-31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Michelman, Frank I, “Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts” (2003) 66 Mod L Rev 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101. Tushnet, supra note 13 at 51.

102. See Devins, Neal & Fisher, Louis, The Democratic Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar. See also Young, supra note 17 at 128-32.

103. See Perry, supra note 20 at 99-101; Friedman, Barry, “Dialogue and Judicial Review” (1993) 91 Mich L Rev 577 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104. See Post, Robert C & Siegel, Reva B, “Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy” (2004) 92 Cal L Rev 1027 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105. See also Young, supra note 17 at 122-28.

106. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 13 at 18-76; Gardbaum, supra note 27; Dixon, “Creating Dialogue”, supra note 45; Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada”, supra note 45.

107. Kramer, supra note 30 at 232. A good example of this is the general acceptance of the highly controversial decision in Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000). See Chemerinsky, Erwin, “How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore” (2002) 34 Loy U Chicago LJ 1 at 3-5Google Scholar.

108. Kramer, supra note 30 at 234.

109. Ibid. Cf Huscroft, Grant A, “‘Thank God We’re Here’: Judicial Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation and Its Consequences” (2004) 25 Sup Ct L Rev 241 Google Scholar.

110. See Alexander, Larry & Schauer, Frederick, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation” (1997) 110 Harv L Rev 1359 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alexander, Larry & Schauer, Frederick, “Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply” (2000) 17 Const Comment 455 Google Scholar.

111. Larry Kramer contests the association between judicial supremacy and the rule of law and questions the idea of legal finality and constitutional settlement. Kramer, supra note 30 at 234-42.

112. Ibid at 234-35, 243-46.

113. Ibid at 231-32.

114. 521 US 507 (1997) [City of Boerne].

115. Ibid at 536.

116. See Kramer, supra note 30 at 224-25. In addition to the reconstruction amendments (XIII-XV), the enforcement clause also exists in amendments XIX, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVI. The enforcement clause has been written in the same style in these amendments as follows: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

117. Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” US Const art I, § 8, cl 3.

118. See, e.g., United States v Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566 (2012) [Sebelius]. See also Chemerinsky, Erwin, The Federalism Revolution, 31 NML Rev 7 at 9-12 (2001)Google Scholar.

119. 529 US 598 (2000) [Morrison]. It should be noted that the Supreme Court also addressed the issue of the enforcement clause in Morrison, ibid at 619-27. What sets Morrison apart from City of Boerne, however, is that it also raised the issue of the commerce clause, which is of particular relevance to my present discussion.

120. Ibid at 617 n 7 [emphasis added].

121. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001) at 365Google ScholarPubMed [emphasis added]. See also Rubenfeld, Jed, Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) at 159.Google Scholar

122. Johnsen, supra note 96 at 107.

123. See Michelman, Frank I, “Living with Judicial Supremacy” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev 579 Google Scholar.

124. The continental model of judicial review first appeared in Austria and Czechoslovakia after World War I but only took roots when it was installed as one of the pillars in rebuilding constitutional democracy in post-war Germany and Italy. It should be noted that while this type of judicial review is prevalent in continental Europe, there also exist other institutional arrangements of judicial review. Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 3-4. Along the way, it has been adopted in many new constitutional democracies in the third wave of democratization. See, e.g., Schwartz, Herman, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Ginsburg, Tom, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

125. Stone Sweet, supra note 76 at 45. See also Alec Sweet, Stone, “Constitutional Dialogues: Protecting Rights in France, Germany, Italy and Spain” in Kenney, Sally J, Reisinger, William M & Reitz, John C, eds, Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) 8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

126. Notably, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland constitute the exception to judicial supremacy in continental Europe. See Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 82.

127. Ibid at 5-19, 79-85; Stone Sweet, supra note 76 at 32-38.

128. See Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 39-50; Stone Sweet, supra note 76 at 34-35, 48. See also Shapiro, Martin & Sweet, Alec Stone, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

129. Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 75.

130. Bickel, Alexander M, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

131. Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 75-79.

132. Ibid at 71-72, 77-79.

133. See Brünneck, Wiltraut Rupp-von, “Admonitory Functions of Constitutional Courts: Germany” (1972) 20 Am J Comp L 387 at 391-99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

134. Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 66-70.

135. Ibid at 71-85.

136. See Robertson, David, The Judge as Political Theorist: Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

137. See Stone Sweet, supra note 76 at 61-63.

138. See Sweet, Alec Stone & Matthews, Jud, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 74 at 85-87, 104-112Google Scholar.

139. In a recent article, Oliver Gerstenberg characterizes this European practice of judicial review as “experimentalist” forms of judicial review going hand in hand with “strong” judicial judgments. Gerstenberg, Oliver, “Negative/Positive|Constitutionalism, ‘Fair Balance,’ and the Problem of Justiciability” (2012) 10 Int’l J Const L 904 at 905-06Google Scholar.

140. Ibid at 913-15; Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 46-47. Notably, Charles Fried’s concern about judicial supremacy is centred on the tendency towards this kind of judicial managerial-ism. Fried, supra note 73 at 76-77.

141. Stone Sweet, supra note 76 at 73-75.

142. Ibid at 75-79.

143. Ibid at 194-203. See also Shapiro & Stone Sweet, supra note 128 at 187-92.

144. These types of judicial decisions correspond to what is termed Appellentscheidung in German law. Rupp-von Brünneck, supra note 133 at 387, 395-99. See also Ferreres Comella, supra note 9; Stone Sweet, supra note 76 at 71-73; Zeidler, Wolfgang, “The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany: Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms” (1987) 62 Notre Dame L Rev 504 at 508-19Google Scholar; Vigoriti, Vincenzo, “Admonitory Functions of Constitutional Courts: Italy” (1972) 20 Am J Comp L 404 at 406-08CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf Rolla, Giancarlo & Groppi, Tania, “Between Politics and the Law: The Development of Constitutional Review in Italy” in Sadurski, Wojciech, ed, Constitutional Justice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) 143 at 152Google Scholar.

145. See Zeidler, supra note 144 at 508.

146. See Ferreres Comella, supra note 9 at 60-63.

147. See generally, Kenney, Reisinger & Reitz, supra note 125.

148. See Rupp-von Brünneck, supra note 133 at 395-99; Zeidler, supra note 144 at 511-20, 522.

149. See Rupp-von Brünneck, supra note 133 at 391-95; Zeidler, supra note 144 at 519. See also Fried, supra note 73 at 76-77.

150. Cf Johnsen, supra note 96 at 111.

151. See Walker, Neil, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65 Mod L Rev 317 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosenfeld, Michel, “Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism” (2008) 6 Int’l J Const L 415 Google Scholar. See also MacCormick, supra note 18 at 113. It should be noted that scholarship on constitutional pluralism tends to focus more on its normative and prescriptive implications than on its descriptive accuracy concerning the transnational legal landscape. Compare Weiler, supra note 7 at 8-15, with Cohen, Jean L, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 66–76 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

152. See Kumm, supra note 18; Halberstam, supra note 18; Klabbers, supra note 18; Rosenfeld, supra note 151. Cf Teubner, supra note 2 at 150-73; Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 6.

153. Teubner, supra note 2 at 150-51.

154. See Walker, supra note 151.

155. There are two contrasting views of practical reasoning applied in lawyering and judging. The first holds that the objective of judicial interpretation is to seek a systematic understanding of legal orders through a (meta-)teleological reading of the law. Maduro, supra note 24 at 361-71. In contrast, Nico Krisch pivots the functioning of practical reasoning on concrete issues to reach what Cass Sunstein calls “incompletely theorized agreements.” Krisch, supra note 6 at 290-91. Cf Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State” in Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 7, 258 at 266-72.

156. Kumm, supra note 155 at 289.

157. See Maduro, supra note 24 at 368-75; Samantha Besson, “Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy” in Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 7, 381 at 405-06.

158. See, e.g., Maduro, supra note 24 at 371-73; de Búrca, supra note 28 at 141-48; Besson, supra note 157 at 405-06; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Sweet, Alec Stone & Weiler, JHH, eds, The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart, 1997)Google Scholar; Claes, Monica, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2006)Google Scholar; Daniel Halberstam, “Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World” in de Búrca & Weiler, supra note 7, 150 at 192-99; Halberstam, Daniel & Stein, Eric, “The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order” (2009) 46 CML Rev 13 at 66-72Google Scholar. See also Krisch, supra note 6 at ch 4; Kumm, supra note 155 at 289; Bronckers, Marco, “From ‘Direct Effect’ to ‘Muted Dialogue’: Recent Developments in the European Courts’ Case Law on the WTO and Beyond” (2008) 11 J Int’l Econ L 885 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf Julio Baquero Cruz, “An Area of Darkness: Three Conceptions of the Relationship between European Union Law and State Constitutional Law” in Walker, Shaw & Tierney, supra note 18, 49 at 62-70.

159. Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05P, [2008] ECR I-6351 [Kadi]. A lot of scholarly writings have been devoted to this decision and the subsequent development, including the so-called Kadi II case (T-85/09, Kadi v Commission, 2009 OJ (C 90/37)), which resulted from challenges against the Commission’s response to the ECJ’s Kadi decision. For an updated discussion, see de Búrca, supra note 28. It should be noted that the ECJ has been re-designated as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by the Lisbon Treaty. ECJ is used here to refer to the same judicial body for the sake of convenience.

160. See Wessel, Ramses A, “The Kadi Case: Towards a More Substantive Hierarchy in International Law?” (2008) 5 Int’l Org L Rev 323 at 326Google Scholar. See also Griller, Stefan, “International Law, Human Rights and the Community’s Autonomous Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi “ (2008) 4 Eur Const L Rev 528 at 535-39Google Scholar.

161. See Klabbers, supra note 18 at 294; de Búrca, supra note 28 at 118-23, 138-48; Halberstam, supra note 158 at 175-99; Halberstam & Stein, supra note 158 at 61-63; Búrca, Gráinne de, “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi” (2010) 51 Harv Int’l LJ 1 Google Scholar.

162. See Eeckhout, Piet, “Kadi and Albarakaat: Luxembourg is not Texas—or Washington DC” (25 February 2009) online: EJIL: Talk! http://www.ejiltalk.org/kadi-and-al-barakaat-lux-embourg-is-not-texas-or-washington-dc/ Google Scholar; Nollkaemper, André, “The European Courts and the Security Council: Between Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values: Three Replies to Pasquale De Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci” (2009) 20 EJIL 862 at 863CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Krisch, supra note 6 at 171.

163. Solange I, 37 BVerfGE 271 (1974); Solange II, 73 BVerfGE 339 (1986). For an exposition of the GFCC’s Solange decisions, see Juliane Kokott, “Report on Germany” in Walker, Shaw & Tierney, supra note 158 at 118-27. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann identifies five judicial decisions of the GFCC under the rubric of the Solange jurisprudence as of 2008. Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, “Human Rights, International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice’” (2008) 19 EJIL 769 at 782-83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

164. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 170-71, 286-91; Halberstam, supra note 158 at 193; Halberstam & Stein, supra note 158 at 64-68; de Búrca, supra note 161 at 42-44.

165. I use the EU law or EU legislation to refer to both the pre-Lisbon Community law/legislation and the post-Maastricht Union law.

166. de Búrca, supra note 28 at 142.

167. See, e.g., Nold v Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] ECR 491.

168. See Claes, supra note 158 at 690-91.

169. Petersmann, supra note 163 at 783.

170. See Maduro, Miguel Poiares, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action” in Walker, Neil, ed, Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 501 at 513-14Google Scholar. This Solange-style judicial dialogue is also praised as guiding the inter-regime relations between the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) system. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 289; de Búrca, supra note 161 at 17-24. Paralleling the GFCC’s Solange series is the ECtHR’s Bosphorus decision. Bosphorus Airways v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1.

171. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 173; Eckes, Christina, “Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?” (2012) 18 Eur LJ 230 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Weiler, JHH, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 320–23 Google Scholar; JHH Weiler & Ulrich R Haltern, “Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz” in Slaughter, Stone Sweet & Weiler, supra note 158, 331 at 362-63.

172. 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993) [Maastricht].

173. This line of jurisprudence includes the 2005 European Arrest Warrant decision (113 BVerfGE 273) and the 2009 Lisbon decision (Case 2 BvE 2/08, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08, 182/09) [Lisbon]. Krisch, supra note 6 at 173.

174. See Eckes, supra note 171 at 234-37. See also Voßkuhle, Andreas, “Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund “ (2010) 6 Eur Const L Rev 175 Google Scholar. Cf Slaughter, supra note 23 at 84-85; Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community” in Slaughter, Stone Sweet & Weiler, supra note 158, 305 at 305-08, 319-22.

175. See, e.g., Weiler, JHH, “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision” (1995) 1 Eur LJ 219 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cruz, Julio Baquero, “The Legacy of the MaastrichtUrteil and the Pluralist Movement” (2008) 14 Eur LJ 389 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

176. In his extrajudicial capacity, Andreas Voßkuhle, who was the president of the GFCC when the Lisbon decision was made, notes that underlying the GFCC’s concern over the ultra vires acts of the EU in its Maastricht decision was the issue of constitutional identity, which came to the surface in the Lisbon decision. Voßkuhle, supra note 174 at 193-94. To be sure, if the future for the EU is seen as lying in a United States of Europe, the concern over the growing imbalance between the EU and national constitutional orders would be unjustifable. See Grimm, Dieter, “Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the European Union into a State” (2009) 5 Eur Const L Rev 353 at 372Google Scholar.

177. Grimm, supra note 176 at 370-72.

178. See Baquero Cruz, supra note 175.

179. Slaughter, supra note 23 at 84. See also Kokott, supra note 163 at 109.

180. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 172-73; Eckes, supra note 171 at 235.

181. Take the issue of ultra vires review for example. The issue of ultra vires review of the EU law, including the case law of the ECJ, by national courts loomed large in the Maastricht decision and later became one of the main concerns raised in the Lisbon decision. The attitude of the ECJ and the GFCC towards this issue is evident in Mangold v Helm, C-144/04, [2006] ECR 1-9981. Continuing with its line of jurisprudence tracing back to Solange II, the GFCC’s recent Honeywell decision seems to provide a solution to the potential jurisdictional conflict. See Möllers, Christoph, “German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only Under Exceptional Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell “ (2011) 7 Eur Const L Rev 161 Google Scholar.

182. See Slaughter, supra note 23 at 84-85; Eckes, supra note 171 at 234-37; Stone Sweet, supra note 174 at 312-30. See also Voßkuhle, supra note 174. Cf Claes, Monica & Visser, Maartje de, “Are You Networked Yet? On Dialogues in European Judicial Networks” (2012) 8 Utrecht L Rev 100 at 104-06CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weiler, supra note 171 at 322; Weiler & Haltern, supra note 171 at 363-64.

183. See Cohen, supra note 151 at 299-300. See also Krisch, supra note 6 at 188-89; Weiler & Haltern, supra note 171 at 362-64. Cf Weiler, supra note 171 at 232.

184. Weiler, JHH, “Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg “ in Nicolaidis, Kalypso & Howse, Robert, eds, The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 54 at 68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Cohen, supra note 151 at 58-76, 299-302.

185. See also Weiler, supra note 171 at 232-33; Baquero Cruz, supra note 158.

186. Baquero Cruz, supra note 158 at 65-70.

187. Interestingly, Julio Baquero Cruz criticizes the Lisbon decision, the culmination of the Maastricht line of GFCC jurisprudence, as evocative of a Schmittean exceptional decision, bordering on systemic rebellion, but at the same time locates his proposed institutional disobedience in the category of exception “beyond the law.” Ibid at 54-55, 70.

188. Krisch, supra note 6 at 287-89.

189. Ibid at 286-96.

190. Wessel, supra note 160 at 326.

191. See, e.g., de Búrca, supra note 28 at 140; Halberstam, supra note 158 at 184-90. Notably, the Advocate General’s Opinion in Kadi (which was written by Miguel Poiares Maduro) has been regarded as suggesting an approach based on judicial dialogue. Krisch, supra note 6 at 164-65; Cohen, supra note 151 at 296-99; Halberstam, supra note 158 at 192-93; Halberstam & Stein, supra note 158 at 58-61; de Búrca, supra note 161 at 25.

192. Halberstam & Stein, supra note 158 at 67.

193. Klabbers, supra note 18 at 297-98. Doctrinally, the ECJ drew a line on this and expressed that the UNSC was not an object of scrutiny. Kadi, supra note 159 at paras 286-88.

194. Krisch, supra note 6 at 290-91; Cohen, supra note 151 at 294-301; Halberstam & Stein, supra note 158 at 63-68; de Búrca, supra note 161 at 41-44.

195. See Halberstam & Stein, supra note 158 at 31-32.

196. As it stands, the ICJ functions as an advisory institution to the UNSC. See Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, ch XIV.

197. See also Kahn, Paul W, “War Powers and the Millennium” (2000) 34 Loy LA L Rev 11 at 33-35Google Scholar.

198. Even though an ombudsperson has been appointed to address the concern raised in Kadi, it appears unlikely to satisfy European judicial minds given its non-judicial character. Krisch, supra note 6 at 159-60.

199. Ibid at 140-42.

200. Arnull, Anthony, “The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?” (2011) 36 Eur L Rev 51 Google Scholar.

201. Isiksel, N Türküler, “Fundamental Rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat “ (2010) 16 Eur LJ 551 at 565CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

202. Ibid.

203. Cf Kingsbury, Benedict, “International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in Global Order” in Crawford, James & Koskenniemi, Martti, eds, The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

204. Cf Curtin, Deirdre, “Private Interest Representation or Civil Society Deliberation? A Contemporary Dilemma for European Union Governance” (2003) 12 Soc & Leg Stud 55 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

205. See, e.g., Clinton, W David, The Two Faces of National Interest (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994) at 26–27 Google Scholar.

206. The undermining of the dialogic approach in the controversy concerning prisoners’ voting rights in the UK has much do with the fact that the interpretation of the ECHR was given by the ECtHR, which is an international court. Amos, supra note 60 at 577-79.

207. See Cohen, supra note 151 at 299; Walker, supra note 151 at 349. See also Petersmann, supra note 163 at 776-81.

208. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 119-26. See also JHH Weiler, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Alec Stone Sweet, “Prologue—The European Courts of Justice” in Slaughter, Stone Sweet & Weiler, supra note 158, v.

209. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 282-85, 300-04.

210. See Maduro, supra note 24 at 361-62; Kumm, supra note 155 at 269-72. Cf. Krisch, supra note 6 at 293-94. For judicial comity, see Petersmann, supra note 163 at 790.

211. Maduro, supra note 170 at 530; Voßkuhle, supra note 174 at 183-84.

212. Krisch, supra note 6 at 109-52.

213. Ibid at 126-51; Maduro, supra note 170 at 520-34. See also Anne Peters, “The Constitutionalisation of International Organisations” in Walker, Shaw & Tierney, supra note 18, 253 at 269-71.

214. See, e.g., Martin Loughlin, “Ten Tenets of Sovereignty” in Walker, supra note 170, 55.

215. Supra note 22.

216. This distinction is a product of German jurisprudence but it was given national attention when the Maastricht decision stirred up theoretical debate about the constitutional limits to the transfer of sovereignty among constitutional scholars across Europe. Bruno de Witte, “Sovereignty and European Integration: The Weight of Legal Tradition” in Slaughter, Stone Sweet & Weiler, supra note 158, 277 at 303. This distinction has recently been sharpened in the Lisbon decision. See Murkens, Jo Eric Khushal, “‘We Want Our Identity Back’—The Revival of National Sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Lisbon Treaty” (2010) Pub L 530 at 539-40Google Scholar. I shall come back to this issue later.

217. Balibar, Étienne, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, translated by Swenson, James (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 141.Google Scholar

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219. Murkens, supra note 216 at 540.

220. See also Kahn, Paul W, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 86.Google Scholar

221. Balibar, supra note 217 at 143.

222. Ibid at 147-48. See also Loughlin, supra note 218 at 50-88.

223. Loughlin, supra note 218 at 186-90.

224. Ibid at 228-31. See also Kahn, supra note 32 at 31-90, 125-32; Negri, Antonio, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, translated by Boscagli, Maurizia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).Google Scholar

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226. Schmitt, supra note 225 at 1.

227. See Kahn, supra note 32.

228. See Carl Friedrich, Joachim, Constitutional Reason of State: The Survival of the Constitutional Order (Providence: Brown University Press, 1957).Google Scholar

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230. Kahn, supra note 32 at 1-8. See also Kahn, supra note 220 at 264-79; Meier, Heinrich, Leo Strauss and the Theological-Political Problem, translated by Brainard, Marcus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf Baquero Cruz, supra note 158 at 54-55. Jo Murkens characterizes this line of though as the school of Staatsrecht in German constitutional theory. Murkens, Jo Eric Khushal, “The Future of Staatsrecht: Dominance, Demise or Demystifcation” (2007) 70 Mod L Rev 731 at 743-50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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233. Cf Kahn, supra note 32 at 1-27.

234. Ibid at 1-8. Kahn further argues that communitarianism and liberalism in contemporary political theory are just two sides of a single antinomy of meaning in political liberalism. Kahn, supra note 220 at 49-61.

235. This corresponds to what Murkens calls the Verfassungsrecht view of constitutional theory in German legal scholarship. Murkens, supra note 230 at 750-55. Cf Henkin, Louis, “The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny” (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 853 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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240. See also Kuo, Ming-Sung, “Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering” (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 390 at 392-94CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf Sebelius, supra note 118.

241. Kahn, supra note 32 at 31-64.

242. Ibid at 65-86.

243. Kuo, supra note 240 at 399. Cf Loughlin, supra note 218 at 268-311. Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional moment theory may be regarded as an attempt to constitutionalize the constituent power, the ultimate source of legitimacy of the constitutional state. See Arato, Andrew, “Carl Schmitt and the Revival of the Doctrine of Constituent Power in the United States” (2000) 21 Cardozo L Rev 1739 Google Scholar.

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247. See Marbury, supra note 14 at 177-78. See also Loughlin, supra note 218 at 289-93.

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250. Bickel, supra note 130 at 125. See also Tushnet, supra note 249 at 1204-05.

251. See Tushnet, supra note 249 at 1208, 1230-31.

252. Ibid at 1213.

253. Ibid at 1234.

254. Compare Krisch, supra note 6 at 290-96, with Kahn, supra note 32 at 74-75.

255. Cf Kahn, supra note 231 at 131-69.

256. Ackerman, Bruce, “The Political Case for Constitutional Courts” in Yack, Bernard, ed, Liberalism without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith N. Shklar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 205.Google Scholar

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258. See Loughlin, supra note 218 at 293.

259. See Krisch, supra note 6 at 285-96, 305-07. See also Peters, supra note 213 at 269-71, 275-77.

260. See Kahn, supra note 32 at 43-45.

261. In the Lisbon decision, the GFCC draws a line under the scope and types of sovereign power that can be constitutionally transferred to the EU and re-emphasizes its jurisdiction over ultra vires EU acts and claims its role in protecting the identity of German constitutional order. See Lisbon, supra note 173.

262. See Murkens, supra note 216 at 533-42. See also Thym, Daniel, “In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court” (2009) 46 CML Rev 1795 Google Scholar.

263. Ungern-Sternberg, Antje von, “German Federal Constitutional Court Parliaments—Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy? Judgment of 7 September 2011– Euro Rescue Package” (2012) 8 Eur Const L Rev 304 Google Scholar.

264. See Eijsbouts, WT, “Wir Sind Das Volk: Notes About the Notion of “The People” as Occasioned by the Lisbon-Urteil” (2010) 6 Eur Const L Rev 199 Google Scholar.

265. Martin Loughlin notes the link between the installation of modern judicial review in the constitution and the development of “positivized, de-politicized, individualized, and legalized” constitutional ordering. Loughlin, supra note 218 at 293. Cf Krisch, supra note 6, ch 9.

266. See Kahn, supra note 32 at 150. See also Murkens, supra note 230 at 754-55.

267. Kahn, supra note 32 at 84-86.

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