Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2015
In his 1972 paper commissioned by the Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Quebec, Professor Francois Chevrette questioned the legal significance of the notion of “collective rights”:
The expression “collective rights” is not a term of art and it is significant both that it is found in the vocabulary of political philosophy and not found in the vocabulary of the jurist-technician. The reason is probably that the qualification “collective” attached to the word “rights” refers to the philosophical foundations of such rights much more than to their legal attributes or to their judicial implementation.
1. Chevrette, F. “Notions as to ‘Acquired Rights’, ‘Group Rights’, and ‘Collective Rights’ in Quebec Law”,Google ScholarReport of the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language Rights in Quebec (Gendron Commission) Book II, Language Rights, 404 at 422 (as cited in Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. Attorney General of Quebec (No. 2) (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 33 at 62 [translation]). In this article, the terms “collective rights” and “group rights” are used interchangeably. Cf. Denise Réaume, “Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods” (1988), 38 University of Toronto Law Journal, 1 at 13 and 17
2. SeeHirsch, H.N. “The Threnody of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of Community”, (1986) 14 Political Theory Google Scholar 423 for a succinct discussion of the work of five prominent scholars in the communitarian tradition: Maclntyre, Sandel, Walzer, Tribe, and Auerbach.
3. Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University of Press, 1982).Google Scholar
4. Ibid. art 177.
5. Ibid. art 147.
6. Ibid. art 179.
7. Christian Bay, “From Contract to Community: Thoughts on Liberalism and Postindustrial Society” in Dallmayr, F.R ed., From Contract to Community (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1978) at 30.Google Scholar
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9. Sandelsupra, note 3 at 150.
10. Ibid. at 143.
11. Ibid.
12. Guttman, Amy “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism” 1985), 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs 308 at 322.Google Scholar
13. Hirschsupra, note 2.
14. Ibid. at 435.
15. Ibid.
16. Guttmansupra, note 12 at 321.
17. Sandel, Michael J. “Morality and the Liberal Ideal” The New Republic, May 7,1984, at 15–17.Google Scholar
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19. Ibidat 183.
20. Vemon Van, Dyke “Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought” (1982), 44Journal of Politics 21 at 32.Google Scholar
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22. Grey, Julius H. “Equality Rights: An Analysis” (1976), 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 10732.Google Scholar
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24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. McDonald, Michael “Collective Rights and Tyranny” (1986), 56 University of Ottawa Quarterly 115 at 120.Google Scholar
27. McDonald, Michael “Indian Status: Colonialism or Sexism?” (1986), 9 Canadian Community Law Journal 23 at 37.Google Scholar
28. Ibid. at 41.
29. Svensson, Frances “Liberal Democracy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and Its Impact on American Indian Tribes” (1979), 27 Political Studies 421 at 434.Google Scholar
30. Ibid.
31. McDonald, supra, note 27 at 41.
32. Svensson supra, note 29 at 435.
33. McDonald supra, note 27 at 43–44.
34. Garet, Ronald R. “Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups” (1983), 56 Southern California Law Review 1001 at 1045.Google Scholar
35. Ibid. at 1007.
36. Grey supra, note 21.
37. 406 U.S. 205(1972).
38. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
39. Garet, supra, note 34 at 1038.
40. Ibid. at 1002.
41. Ibid. at 1066.
42. Ibid. at 1002.
43. Ibid. at 1003.
44. Ibid. at 1068.
45. Ibid. at 1033.
46. Ibid. at 1069.
47. Ibid. at 1072.
48. Ibid. at 1070.
49. Ibid. at 1002.
50. Dinstein, Yoram “Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities” (1976), 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 102 at 118.Google Scholar
51. Magnet, J.E. “Collective Rights, Cultural Autonomy and the Canadian State” (1986), 32 McGiU Law Journal 170 at 173;Google Scholar McDonald, Michael “The Personless Paradigm” 37 University of Toronto Law Journal, 1987., 212 at 212–225;Google Scholar Monahan, Patrick Politics and the Constitution (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 95.Google Scholar
52. See Magnet, Ibid, at 176; Monahan, Ibid, at 111-112;McDonald, Michael “The Forest in the Trees: Collective Rights as Basic Rights” (unpublished) at 6.Google Scholar
53. Query whether McDonald, Ibid, at 18, lapses into reductionism when he says that we must decide “whether we value groups for the sake of individuals or the reverse.” See also text at note 65 infra.
54. Garet, supra, note 34 at 1065.
55. Ibid. at 1052-1053.
56. At first glance, sociality does not appear to be relevant to the Santa Clara decision. Garet, however, argues that sociality is very much at stake: “The interpersonal inequality created by the membership rule hardly seems consistent with a norm of equal sharing in society” (at 1036).
57. Grey, supra, note 21 at 13.
58. Garet, supra, note 34 at 1005.
59. Ibid. at 1050
60. Constitutional Act, 1982 (en. by the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, s. 1] Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See ss. 16-23 (minority language and education rights); s. 25 (aboriginal rights); s. 27 (multicultural heritage); s. 29 (confessional schools).
61. See Monahan, supra, note 51 at 95; McDonald, Michael “Collective Rights ‘In a Free and Democratic Society” (1986, unpublished) at 3–7.Google Scholar
62. See Van Dyke, supra, note 20 at 22.
63. Morton, F.L. “Group Rights v. Individual Rights in the Charter: The Special Cases of Natives and Quebecois” in Nevitte, N. and Kornberg, A. ed., Minorities and the Canadian State (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1985) at 73.Google Scholar
64. Grey, supra, note 21 at 15.
65. McDonald, supra, note 27 at 48.
66. Pentney, W.F. The Aboriginal Rights Provisions in the Constitution Act, 1982 (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1987) at 52.Google Scholar
67. Ibid. at 53.
68. Ibid., at 51-52.
69. Ibid. at 53.
70. Ibid. at 57.
71. Ibid. at 56.
72. Evelyn Kallen, “Multiculturalism, Minorities and Motherhood: A Social Scientific Critique of Section 27” in Grey, J.H. ed., Multiculturalism in Canada: A Legal Perspective (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 124; McDonald, supra note 52 at 7-8 Google Scholar
73. Cover, Robert M. “The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreward: Nomos and Narrative” (1983, 97 Harvard Law Review 4 at 4–5.Google Scholar
74. McDonald, supra, note 52 at 15.
75. Ibid. at 17.
76. Indian and Native Programs: A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program Review (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services, 1985) at 1.Google Scholar
77. (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(24) (formerlyBritish North America Act, 1867). The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that Parliament’s constitutional mandate in respect of “Indians” includes “Eskimos”: In re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104.
78. S.C. 1876, c. 18.
79. See, for example, Frideres, James S. Native People in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts, Second Edition (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1983) at 13;Google Scholar Morse, Bradford W. Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian. Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985) 4–5.Google Scholar
80. For a discussion of this aspect of the former Indian Act see: Jamieson, Kathleen Indian Women and the Law: Citizens Minus (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services, 1978).Google Scholar
81. R.S., c. 1-6 as amended c. 10 (2nd Supp.); 1974-75-76, c. 48; 1978-79,c. 11; 1980-81-82-83, cc. 47, 110; 1985, c. 27. See “Definition and Registration of Indians”, ss. 5-17. The enfranchisement provisions are also revoked with similar provisions for reinstatement.
82. Ibid.
83. See McDonald, supra, note 27 at 47 for a discussion of the divisive potential of the “new Indian-wifhout-band” status.
84. In contrast to the divisive Indian Act regime, a gesture towards native reunification may be found in s. 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 which states that “[i]n this Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada.’ Supra, note 60 at Part II, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada.
85. Frideres, supra, note 79 at 7.
86. Evelyn, Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1982) at 65–66.Google Scholar
87. supra, note 81, emphasis added.
88. Ibid.
89. Kallen, supra, note 86 at 66.
90. McDonald, supra, note 26 at 120.
91. Frideres, supra, note 79 at 138.
92. Ibid. at 140.
93. Ibid. at 9.
94. Supra, note 76 at 9.
95. Frideres, Supra, note 79 at 142.
96. As cited in Dinstein, Supra, note 50 at 104.
97. McDonald, Supra, note 27 at 42.
98. Svensson, Supra, note 29 at 431.
99. Supra, note 71 and accompanying text.
100. Berger, Thomas R. “The Persistence of Native Values” in Goldstein, J.E. and Bienvenue, R.M. ed., Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada: A Book of Readings (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 87–89.Google Scholar
101. Ibid. at 87.
102. Ibid. at 88.
103. As cited in Berger, Supra, note 100 at 84.
104. United Nations. Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations. Special Rapporteur Jose R. Martinez Cobo. (E/CN.4/sub.2/l986/7/Add.4, para. 196-197).
105. Kallen, Supra, note 86 at 68.
106. (1981), 3 W.W.R. 60 at 62, emphasis added.
107. Supra, note 81, s. 37.
108. Ibid. s. 39.
109. Ibid, ss. 35(1).
110. Ibid, ss. 35(2).
111. Ibid, ss. 35(3).
112. Ibid, ss. 35(4).
113. The failure of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971, which treats native land as a corporate asset susceptible to taxation and alienation, stands as a stark reminder of the hazards of imposing foreign concepts upon the traditional native lifestyle. For a discussion of the disintegrative effects of ANCSA see Berger, Thomas R. Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985) at 45.Google Scholar