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Ocean Commons, Law of the Sea and Rights for the Sea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2019

Vito De Lucia
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to re-activate certain layers of normative meaning that have been obscured, forgotten or rendered inoperative by the predominant traditions that engaged, from Grotius onwards, with the concept of res communes omnium. The hope and the purpose is that of offering a novel perspective on matters such as the protection and preservation of ocean commons that are of great urgency and importance today. Re-activating or ‘remembering’ the full scope of the concept of res communes omnium may produce some effects on the broader discourse of ocean environmental protection. It may, perhaps, help carve novel space for re-imagining the terms of the problems, and the array of available solutions that can be entertained and discussed, having particularly in mind the debates currently ongoing in the context of the negotiations towards a new global treaty on marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 45 - 57
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2019 

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Footnotes

I wish to thank Margherita Poto and Thomas Appleby for useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as the anonymous reviewer for insightful suggestions on how to improve the paper.

References

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3. It must be acknowledged how this is a western perspective and “telluric being” is a reference to western culture. By contrast, in other cultures, the sea is a crucial element of the social world, and the normative discourse reflects such different perspective. See, e.g., Philip E Steinberg, “Three Historical Systems of Ocean Governance: A Framework for Analyzing the Law of the Sea” (1996) 12:5-6 World Bull: Bull Int’l Stud Philippines 1. These questions, however, remain outside the scope of this article.

4. I am thankful to Kristine Dalaker Kraabel for bringing to my attention Carson’s passion for, and writings on, the sea.

5. RL Carson, “Undersea”, The Atlantic Monthly (September 1937) 322. The essay had been originally prepared as a report to the US Bureau of Fisheries, where Carson worked, but deemed too lyrical for a technical report. See Maria Popova, “Undersea: Rachel Carson’s Lyrical and Revolutionary 1937 Masterpiece Inviting Humans to Explore Earth from the Perspective of Other Creatures” (28 February 2017) Brain Pickings, online: https://www.brainpickings.org/2017/02/28/undersea-rachel-carson/.

6. Rachel Carson, “Undersea”, reprinted in Enzo Ferrara, “Rachel Carson—Undersea” (2015) 3 Visions for Sustainability 62 at 63.

7. Ibid.

8. Grotius, Hugo, The Freedom of the Seas or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade, translated by Ralph van Deman Magoffin (Oxford University Press, 1916) at 7.Google Scholar

9. Grotius, Hugo, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, edited by Martine Julia van Ittersum (Liberty Fund, 2006) at 334.Google Scholar

10. Ibid.

11. See, generally, Schmitt, Carl, Land and Sea: A World-Historical Meditation (Telos Press, 2015).Google Scholar See also Ruschi, supra note 1. But see Philip E Steinberg, “Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean” (1999) 89:2 The Geographical Rev 254 at 255-57, who underlines how the papal bull Inter Caetera of 1493 (and the subsequent Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494) that allocated to Spain and Portugal respectively, focused on “spheres of influence” (i.e., imperium) rather than on possession (i.e., dominium).

12. See, generally, Grossi, Paolo, L’Ordine Giuridico Medievale (Laterza, 2006).Google Scholar

13. See Alberto Miele, “Res Publica, Res Communis Omnium, Res Nullius: Grozio e le Fonti Romane sul Diritto del Mare” (1998) 26 Index: Quaderni Camerti di Studi Romanistic 383 at 384, with particular respect to the Grotian use of both the category of res communes omnium and of the (ambiguous deployment of the) concept of jus gentium. However, as Miele also recognizes, the intention of Grotius was never that of historical reconstruction, but rather that of articulating a legal argument for a contemporary problem.

14. Indeed, this approach is not uncommon, given that, as Ann Orford reminds us, “[p]ast texts and concepts are constantly retrieved and taken up as a resource in international legal argumentation and scholarship.” Ann Orford, “International Law and the Limits of History” in Wouter Werner, Alexis Galán & Marieke de Hoon, eds, The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 297 at 297.

15. See, e.g., King, Matthew, “Heidegger’s Etymological Method: Discovering Being by Recovering the Richness of the Word” (2007) 51:3 Phil Today 278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16. See, e.g., Fisher, Elizabeth, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford & Cinnamon Carlarne, “Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship” (2009) 21:2 J Envtl L 213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. On the various dimensions that can be attached the notion of global commons, see, e.g., Buck, Susan J, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Island Press, 1998).Google Scholar

18. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].

19. Ibid, art 1.1(1).

20. Ibid, art 86.

21. Insofar as it can be striated, marked, and etched permanently.

22. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, Part XI. See especially arts 136 and 137.

23. See ibid, art 87.

24. The most important of which is the obligation of due regard for the rights and interests of other States.

25. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art 17. The right of innocent passage can be exercised, subject to some limitations, within the territorial sea.

26. See ibid, art 38. The right of transit passage can be exercised in relation to straits used for international navigation.

27. See ibid, art 58, which renders applicable to the exclusive economic zones the freedoms of the high seas laid out in art 87.

28. Marcianus, D. 1. 8. 2 pr-1: “Qaedam naturali iure communia sunt omnium, quaedam universitatis, quaedam nullius, pleraque singulorum quae variis ex causis cuique adquiruntur. Et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt illa: aer, aqua profluens, et mare, et per hoc litora maris.”

29. Ibid.

30. Although some authors also place it under jus gentium. See, e.g., Francesco Sini, “Persone e Cose: Res Communes Omnium Prospettive Sistematiche tra Diritto Romano e Tradizione Romanistica” (2008) 7 Diritto@Storia: Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Giuridiche e Tradizione Romana, online: dirittoestoria.it/7/Tradizione-Romana/Sini-Persone-cose-res-communes-omnium.htm.

31. Alexander Passerin d’Entrèves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Transaction Publishers, 2009) at 32.

32. D. 1.1.1.3 (Ulpianus 1 inst.).

33. D. 1.1.1.4 (Ulpianus 1 inst.).

34. D. 1.1.6pr (Ulpianus 1 inst.).

35. Ibid.

36. Paulus, D. 1.1.11. See also Rosanna Ortu, “Plaut. Rud. 975 «Mare quidem commune certost omnibus»” (2017) 2 Jus 160 at 178, online: https://jusvitaepensiero.mediabiblos.it/news/allegati/Rosanna%20Ortu.pdf.

37. See Sini, supra note 30, Section 1. Indeed, certain animals, such as the ox, were expressly considered, by some authors at least, as cooperative partners of humans (i.e., “soci”); See Varro, cited in Pietro Paolo Onida, Studi sulla Condizione degli Animali non Umani nel Sistema Giuridico Romano (Giappichelli, 2012) at 100.

38. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art 86, where the notion of high seas is indeed defined only residually.

39. See Passerin d’Entrèves, supra note 31 at 33. For a more comprehensive literature review of these challenges, see Onida, supra note 37 at 127-53.

40. See Passerin d’Entrèves, supra note 31 at 33.

41. On the difference see, e.g., Passerin d’Entrèves, supra note 31; Michel Villey, Le Droit et les Droits de l’Homme (Presses Universitaires de France, 2008).

42. D. 1.1.1.3 (Ulpianus 1 inst.).

43. See Cicero in his De Officiis. See Onida, supra note 37 at 108-10.

44. D. 1.1.1.3 (Ulpianus 1 inst.).

45. Indeed, “turtles [act] in turtle ways; humans [act] in human ways.” James V Schall, “Natural Law and the Law of Nations: Some Theoretical Considerations” (1991) 15:4 Fordham Int’l LJ 997 at 1002.

46. Lucretius would indeed suggest that the relation between humans and non-human animals can take a juridical character, see Pietro Paolo Onida, “Dall’animale Vivo all’Animale Morto: Modelli Filosofico-giuridici di Relazioni fra gli Esseri Animati” (2008) 7 Diritto@Storia: Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Giuridiche e Tradizione Romana, s II(1)(a), online: dirittoestoria.it/7/Tradizione-Romana/Onida-Animale-vivo-morto-modelli-relazioni-esseri-animati.htm.

47. See, for example, Seneca in his De Clementia. See Onida, supra note 37 at 111-12.

48. The term ‘bestia’ (i.e., beast) was by contrast used to emphasize the distance between human and non-human beings, see Onida, supra note 46, s II(2)(a).

49. See, generally, Pietro Paolo Onida, “Il Divieto dei Sacrifici di Animali nella Legislazione di Costantino. Una Interpretazione Sistematica” in Francesco Sini and Pietro Paolo Onida, eds, Poteri Religiosi e Istituzioni: il Culto di San Costantino Imperatore tra Oriente e Occidente (Giappichelli, 2003) 73.

50. See Onida, supra note 37 at 153.

51. See, e.g., Passerin d’Entrèves, supra note 31 at 31 and, for a more comprehensive literature review, Onida, supra note 37 at 127-53.

52. Passerin d’Entrèves, supra note 31 at 33.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. See, generally, Onida, supra note 37.

56. See, e.g., Burdon, Peter, Earth Jurisprudence: Private Property and the Environment (Routledge, 2014).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57. Convention on Migratory Species, Conservation Implications of Cetacean Culture, UNEP/CMS/COP11/Doc.23.2.4 (23 July 2014).

58. For a brief discussion of this landmark decision, see, e.g., De Lucia, Vito, “The Convention on Migratory Species Agrees on Measures to Protect Cetacean Culture” (24 November 2014) JCLOS Blog, online: site.uit.no/jclos/files/2014/11/The-Convention-on-Migratory-Species-Agrees-on-Measures-to-Protect-Cetacean-Culture.pdf.Google Scholar

59. Chapter 1 of Grotius’s Mare Liberum is entitled, for example, “By the law of nations navigation is free for any to whomsoever.” Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, translated by Richard Hakluyt and edited by David Armitage (Liberty Fund, 2004) at 10 [emphasis mine]. See also the discussion in Miele, supra note 13. It must be however also noted that prior to the 3rd Century A.D. the regime of the sea was usually included under jus gentium. See Ortu, supra note 36 at 175-76.

60. He did so, however, inspired by a similar dichotomic position present in some passages of the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, namely the Institutions of Gaius. See Passerin d’Entrèves, supra note 31 at 30.

61. At this point it must be noted how there were two trajectories along which the idea of natural law developed in Rome, both inspired by Greek philosophy. One, issuing from the philosophy of Pythagoras and Empedocles, considered jus naturale applicable equally to humans and animals. This is the trajectory that I am trying to retrieve in this article. See, e.g., Ernst Levy, “Natural Law in the Roman Period” in Maurice Le Bel et al, Natural Law Institute Proceedings Volume 2 (Notre Dame Law School, 1949) 43 at 49. See also, more comprehensively, Onida, supra note 37 and Michel Villey, La Formation de la Pensée Juridique Moderne (Presses Universitaires de France, 2003).

62. See, e.g., the still relevant Paolo Grossi, “La Proprietà nel Sistema Privatistico della Seconda Scolastica” in Paolo Grossi, ed, La Seconda Scolastica nella Formazione del Diritto Privato Moderno: Incontro di Studi Firenze, 16-19 Ottobre 1972 (Giuffré, 1972) 117.

63. See, e.g., Villey, supra note 41. See also Grossi, ibid. However, this has been a long and contested process that lasted five hundred years. See, e.g., Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625 (Eerdmans, 2001).

64. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 61; Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis”, Science 155:3767 (10 March 1967) 1203. As White recalled, “In Antiquity every tree, every spring, every stream, every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit. These spirits were accessible to men, but were very unlike men; centaurs, fauns, and mermaids show their ambivalence. Before one cut a tree, mined a mountain, or dammed a brook, it was important to placate the spirit in charge of that particular situation, and to keep it placated. By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects” at 1205.

65. The impious hypothesis was the suggestion that the framework of natural law Grotius articulated would remain valid even if God did not exist. This led commentators to consider that Grotius represent a watershed vis-à-vis the theological articulations of modern natural law that obtained in the Scholastic school of Salamanca. See Francis Oakley, Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights: Continutiy and Discontinuity in the History of Ideas (Bloomsbury Academic, 2005) at 63-65, but see the entire chapter 3.

66. See Irnerius, “Res communes communia omnium animalium dicuntur: publica hominum tantum” (res communes omnium are things in common to all animals; res publicae only to men). Sini, supra note 30.

67. Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, “Introduction: Towards A Global History of International Law” in Bardo. Fassbender & Anne Peters, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1 at 2.

68. See, besides the seminal paper of Christopher Stone (Christopher Stone, “Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects” (1972) 45 S Cal L Rev 450) among a growing literature, especially Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (Siber Ink, 2002); Peter Burdon, Earth Jurisprudence: Private Property and the Environment (Routledge, 2014); and Klaus Bosselmann & Massimiliano Montini, “The Oslo Manifesto: From Environmental Law to Ecological Law: A Call for Re-Framing Law and Governance”, adopted at the IUCN WCEL Ethics Specialist Group Workshop, IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Colloquium, University of Oslo, 21 June 2016.

69. See, e.g., Erin O’Donnell, “At the Intersection of the Sacred and the Legal: Rights for Nature in Uttarakhand, India” (2018) 30:1 J Envtl L 135; Lidia Cano Pecharroman, “Rights of Nature: Rivers That Can Stand in Court” (2018) 7:1,13 Resources.

70. As is the case in Bolivia, Ecuador, and New Zealand, for example. See, e.g., Maria Akchurin, “Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and Environmental Protection in Ecuador” (2015) 40:4 L & Soc Inquiry 937. See also Pecharroman, ibid.

71. The Constitution of Ecuador dedicates the entire Title II, Chapter 7 to the rights of nature, and article 71 recites that “Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes.” Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, 20 October 2008, retrieved from: http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/ecuador_constitution_english_1.pdf.

72. For a full overview of case law, ordinary legislation and Constitutional provisions, see the page maintained by the Harmony with Nature Initiative, retrieved on 2 September 2018: http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/rightsOfNature/.

73. UNGA, Harmony with Nature, UN Res A/71/232 (6 February 2017).

74. For a list of relevant UNGA resolutions and other UN documents from 2009 onwards, see the UN Harmony with Nature website, retrieved on 2 September 2018: http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/chronology, and: http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/UNdocs/.

75. UNGA Resolution A/RES/59/24 (17 November 2004) established an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction. The Ad Hoc Working Group released its first report in 2006 and its final report in 2015.

76. UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/292 (19 June 2015) established a Preparatory Committee with the mandate to prepare substantive recommendations on the elements of a draft text of an international legally binding instrument under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

77. See UNGA, International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, UN Res A/72/249 (24 December 2017).

78. See, e.g., Boyle, Alan, “Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change” (2005) 54:3 ICLQ 563.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

79. Whether evolutionary interpretation should be considered equivalent with interpretation under article 31(3)(c) VCLT is a question that remains open but exceeds the scope of this paper. For a review of the issues, see, e.g., Osamu Inagaki, “Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties Re-examined: The Two-Stage Reasoning” (2015) 22:2-3 J Int’l Cooperation Stud 127.

80. The term ‘ecocentrism’ is problematic in multiple ways which cannot be accounted for here, and its use should be understood to simply entail a generic reference to approaches that include, within the sphere of matters of concern (to use a Latourian expression), non-human entities. For a problematization of the idea of ecocentrism, see Vito De Lucia, “Beyond Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: A Biopolitical Reading of Environmental Law” (2017) 8:2 J Hum Rts & Env 181.

81. That the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment includes marine areas beyond national jurisdiction is a settled proposition. See, e.g., Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 276 or Myron Nordquist, Satya Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne, eds, “Article 192 – General Obligation (IV)”, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Brill-Nijhoff, 2013).

82. Despite the complexities and problems identified already in 1972 by Christopher Stone, who underlined the “problems involved in defining the boundaries of the ‘natural object’ […] from time to time one will wish to speak of that portion of a river that runs through a recognized jurisdiction; at other times, one may be concerned with the entire river, or the hydrologic cycle—or the whole of nature. One’s ontological choices will have a strong influence on the shape of the legal system.” Stone, supra note 68 at 456 n 26. For a summary of a larger set of issues affecting a rights-based approach, see, e.g., Vito De Lucia, “Towards an Ecological Philosophy of Law: A Comparative Discussion” (2013) 4:2 J Hum Rts & Env 167.

83. See, generally, De Lucia, Vito, “Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach in International Environmental Law” (2015) 27:1 J Envtl L 91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

84. Gaius, Inst. 1, 2.

85. See Paolo Maddalena, “La Scienza del Diritto Ambientale ed il Necessario Ricorso alle Categorie Giuridiche del Diritto Romano” (2011) 2 Rivista Quadrimestrale di Diritto dell’Ambiente 1 at 5.

86. Maddalena uses the term ‘meritevolezza’, which indicates desert. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Stone, for example, has observed that it is a mistake to imagine that each legal right must be mapped onto an underlying moral right. Christopher Stone, “Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective” (1985) S Cal L Rev 59:1 1 at 23.

89. See, e.g., Birnie, Patricia, Boyle, Alan & Redgwell, Catherine, International Law and the Environment, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 130.Google Scholar

90. On this public orientation of international environmental law, see, e.g., Ellen Hey, “International Institutions” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 749; Jutta Brunnée, “Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern”, ibid 550; and Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 115. By contrast, traditionally international law has been modeled on private law. Holland indeed famously observed how the “Law of Nations is but private law ‘writ large.’” Thomas Holland, Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press, 1898) at 152. Lauterpacht would further expose the depth of this private law pedigree in his seminal Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans, Green, 1927).

91. As opposed to the recognition of inherent rights of nature. See, e.g., “Adoption of Holistic and Rights-based Ocean Governance”, Earth Law Centre, online: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55914fd1e4b01fb0b851a814/t/5bafb7674785d39a15690c71/1538242428456/Ocean+Rights+Initiative+Sept+2018.pdf, which promotes the recognition of inherent rights of the ocean.

92. For some early arguments in an international legal context, though from a moral perspective, see, e.g., Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, “Taking Nature’s Rights Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law” (1994) 6:3 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 545.

93. A functional allocation would entail rights for nature as opposed to a moral allocation, entailing by contrast rights of nature (e.g., Earth Law Centre, supra note 91, which promotes the recognition of “the inherent rights of the ocean”). On the distinction, see, e.g., Schillmoller, Anne Louise & Pelizzon, Alex, “Mapping the Terrain of Earth Jurisprudence: Landscape, Thresholds and Horizons” (2013) 3:1 Envtl & Earth LJ 1.Google Scholar