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The Social Character of Freedom of Expression

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2015

Colin Farrelly
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Extract

Richard Moon’s The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression is an insightful and comprehensive study of the right to freedom of expression in Canadian constitutional law. Moon begins by stressing the importance of the distinction between freedom of expression as a moral or political ideal and as a constitutional right. The former certainly informs the latter. But the general structure of constitutional adjudication will also play an important role in determining how these issues are resolved and this may, in turn, influence our understanding of the right as a moral and political ideal. Moon focuses on the most important Canadian freedom of expression decisions which cover a wide range of topics from the regulation of racist expression and pornography to access to state and private property.

Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , July 2001 , pp. 261 - 271
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2001

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References

1. Moon, R., The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression ISBN 0802008518 (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 3.Google Scholar

2. Ibid. at 3-4.

3. Ibid. at 4.

4. Sandel, M., Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996).Google Scholar

5. See Mill, J.S., On Liberty (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1982).Google Scholar

6. See Meiklejohn, A., Political Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965)Google Scholar and “The First Amendment is an Absolute” in Kurland, P.B., ed., Free Speech and Association: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).Google Scholar

7. See Scanlon, T., “A Theory of Freedom of Expression” in Dworkin, R., ed., The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)Google Scholar and Dworkin, R., A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

8. Supra note 1 at 21.

9. Ibid. at 22.

10. Supra note 4 at 11.

11. Ibid. at 82.

12. Regina, v. Oakes, (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) at 224-25.Google Scholar

13. Ibid. at 225.

14. Supra note 1 at 33.

15. Ibid. at 35.

16. Ibid. at 53.

17. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) (1986) 58 D.L.R. (4th) at 621.Google Scholar

18. Supra note 1 at 70.

19. Ibid. at 70.

20. Ibid. at 116.

21. Under s. 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code “everyone who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group” is guilty of an offence carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for two years.

22. Ibid. at 139.

23. Ibid. at 55.

24. Ibid. at 117.

25. Ibid. at 120.

26. Ibid. at 163.

27. Ibid. at 164.

28. Ibid. at 165.

29. Ibid. at 171.