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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2014
The doctrine of judicial notice has been gaining attention in Canadian jurisprudence. This article begins with an examination of how the doctrine has been recently used in areas such as family law to bring a diversity of community interests into the legal decision-making process. The history of the doctrine in American and Canadian jurisprudence is reviewed along with its principal characterizations in the works of Thayer, Morgan, and Davis. The article goes on to uncover several epistemological problems to which the doctrine is prone and proposes a means of getting out of these philosophical dilemmas while keeping the integrity of the doctrine intact. The article concludes by alluding to the communitarian uses to which the doctrine might be put.
La doctrine de la connaissance judiciaire attire de plus en plus d'attention dans la jurisprudence canadienne. Cet article analyse d'abord comment la doctrine fut utilisée dans des champs comme celui du droit de la famille pour introduire divers intérêts communautaires dans le processus de décision judiciaire. L'histoire de la doctrine dans la jurisprudence américaine et canadienne est revisitée par rapport aux principales lignes de pensée exprimées dans les oeuvres de Thayer, de Morgan et de Davis. L'article débusque ensuite plusieurs problèmes épistémologiques auxquels la doctrine se prête et propose une voie pour sortir de ces dilemmes philosophiques tout en préservant son intégrité. Il conclut en soulevant les utilisations communautaires possibles de cette doctrine.
1. Moge v. Moge (1992), 43, RFL (3d) 345 [hereinafter Moge].
2. Spousal support should give effect to the three objectives of spousal support orders defined in s. 15(6) and s” 17(7) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.) c. 3, which are to:
a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;
c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
3. Thayer, J., A Selection of Cases on Evidence at the Common Law (Mass: Charles W. Server & Co., 1982) at 19–20.Google Scholar
4. Morgan, E. J., “Judicial Notice” (1944) 57 Harvard Law Review 269–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5. See Sopinka, J., Lederman, S.N. & Bryant, A.W., The Law of Evidence in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) [hereinafter Sopinka]Google Scholar; Schiff, S., Evidence in the Litigation Process, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1993)Google Scholar; Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence (prepared for the Uniform Law Conference of Canada) (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) [hereinafter “Federal/Provincial Task Force”].
6. Wolfson, L. H., Melamed, D.S. & Morris, S.J., “The Use of Judicial Notice in the Wake of Moge v. Moge” (1994) 11 Canadian Family Law Quart. 159Google Scholar, which provides an extensive list of related judicially notices facts in family law in the wake of Moge.
7. See appendix B, ibid.
8. Supra note 5.
9. L'Heureux-Dubé, C. “Re-examining the Doctrine of Judicial Notice in the Family Law” (1994) 26 Ottawa Law Rev. 551Google Scholar [hereinafter L'Heureux-Dubé].
10 Davis, K. C., “Judicial Notice” (1955) 55 Columbia Law Review 945CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Davis].
11. 32B Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Rules of Evidence §32.
12. Davis, supra note 10 at 952.
13. Ibid. at 949.
14. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
15. Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa: Canada Law Reform Commission, 1975) at 103.Google Scholar
16. L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9 at 559.
17. Ibid.
18. Delisle, R. J., Evidence: Principles and Problems, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell 1993) at 259.Google Scholar
19. Thayer cited in Davis, supra note 10 at 949.
20. Davis, supra note 10 at 978.
21. “Federal/Provincial Task Force”, supra note 5 at 45.
22. Ibid. at 45–6.
23. L'Heureux-Dubé supra note 9 at 558–59.
24. Ibid. at 559.
25. Delisle, supra note 18 at 258.
26. The leading case for treating social scientific material as adjudicative or social fact is Processed Plastic v. Warner Communications, 675 F. 2nd, 852 (Tth Circuit, 1982) in which the plaintiff adduced empirical testing on market responses to that particular car design in question to prove that trademark had been infringed. See Walker, L. & Monahan, J., “Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law” (1987) 73 Va. L. Rev. 562CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Walker & Monahan].
27. Walker and Monahan cite the leading case of Unites States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) which decided whether good faith violations of police search warrants violated the fourth amendment where social scientific proof was adduced to show statistically that in fact police did not take license to abuse due process when courts did not overturn good faith failures to comply with the requisite process for search and seizure warrants. Ibid. at 562.
28. Sopinka, supra note 5 at 977.
29. Walker & Monahan, supra note 26 at 589–90.
30. MacIntyre, A., After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 187.Google Scholar
31. Ibid. at 188–89.
32. Ibid. at 190.
33. L'Heureux-Dubé supra note 9 at 558.
34. Sopinka, supra note 5 at 986.
35. “Federal/Provincial Task Force”, supra note 5 at 43.
36. L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 9 at 558.
37. The following arguments should be taken to arise against a component of what Monahan and Walker have called “social authority” facts; I take it that their arguments and procedural proposals are compelling for what they have called social framework facts.
38. Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty (New York: Harper, 1969).Google Scholar
39. Ibid. at §257.
40. Ibid. at §222.
41. Ibid. at §310.
42. Supra note 19.
43. Wittgenstein, supra note 38 at §151 [emphasis added].
44. Ibid. at §341.
45. Bourdieu, P., Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) at 164CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Bourdieu].
46. Ibid. at 168.
47. Ibid. at 169.
48. Davis, supra note 10 at 951.
49. Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 282.Google Scholar
50. R. v. Zundel (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 97; R. v. Zundel (1990) 53 CCC (3rd) 161.
51. Bourdieu, supra note 45 at 168.