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Saying and doing: The role of semantics in the use of generic sentences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 June 2016

Bernhard Nickel*
Affiliation:
Harvard University

Abstract

This article discusses semantic theories of generic sentences that seek to tie their meaning closely to their use, rather than giving more traditional truth-conditional semantic treatments. It focuses on McConnell-Ginet’s recent work and defends truth-conditional approaches combined with a traditional semantics-pragmatics distinction.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article porte sur les phrases génériques et sur les analyses sémantiques qui tentent de lier l’interprétation de ces phrases à leur usage plutôt qu’en terme de conditions de vérité comme il est de mise dans les analyses traditionnelles. L’article vise en particulier le travail récent de McConnell-Ginet et défend les approches traditionnelles en termes de conditions de vérité tout en défendant la distinction ordinaire entre la sémantique et la pragmatique;

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Linguistic Association/Association canadienne de linguistique 2012 

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