Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T20:45:49.559Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Adaptive preferences: merging political accounts and well-being accounts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Rosa Terlazzo
Rosa Terlazzo*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA
*
*Email: rterlazzo@ksu.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, I appeal to the political project to show the shortcomings of the well-being accounts on which I draw.

Keywords

adaptive preferencesautonomylive optionsinformed desireindependenceendorsement
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 179 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Baber, H. E. 2007. “Adaptive Preference.”; Social Theory and Practice 33 (1): 105–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bruckner, Donald W. 2009. “In Defense of Adaptive Preferences.”; Philosophical Studies 142 (3): 307–324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Colburn, Ben. 2011. “Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences.”; Utilitas 23 (1): 52–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deneulin, Séverine. 2002. “Perfectionism, Paternalism and Liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability Approach.”; Review of Political Economy 14 (4): 497–518.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorsey, Dale. 2010. “Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias.”; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3): 535–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorsey, Dale. 2012. The Basic Minimum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawkins, Jennifer. 2008. “Well-being, Autonomy, and the Horizon Problem.”; Utilitas 20 (2): 143–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jaggar, Alison M. 2005. “‘Saving Amina’: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue.”; Ethics & International Affairs 19 (3): 55–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jaggar, Alison. 2006. “Reasoning About Well-being: Nussbaum’s Method of Justifying the Capabilities Approach.”; Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3): 301–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, Williams. 1979. “The Will to Believe.”; In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Khader, Serene J. 2011. Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khader, Serene J. 2012. “Must Theorizing about Adaptive Preferences Deny Women’s Agency?”; Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (4): 302–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khader, Serene J. 2013. “Identifying Adaptive Preferences in Practice: Lessons from Post-colonial Feminisms.”; Journal of Global Ethics 9 (3): 311–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levey, Ann. 2005. “Liberalism, Adaptive Preferences, and Gender Equality.”; Hypatia 20 (4): 127–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Narayan, Uma. 2002. “Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices, and Other Women.”; In A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, edited by Antony, Louise M. and Witt, Charlotte E.. Boulder: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha. 1992. “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism.”; Political Theory 20 (2): 202–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2001. “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options.”; Economics and Philosophy 17 (1): 67–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011. “Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism.”; Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 (1): 3–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Okin, Susan Moller. 1994. “Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences.”; Political Theory 22 (1): 5–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quong, Jonathan. 2011. Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 2005. Political Liberalism. Expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya. 1980. “Equality of What?”; In Tanner Lectures on Human Values, edited by McMurrin, S.. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya. 1993. “Capability and Well-being.”; In The Quality of Life, edited by Nussbaum, Martha and Sen, Amartya. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Stoljar, Natalie. 2000. “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition.”; In Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, edited by Mackenszie, Catriona and Stoljar, Natalie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sugden, Robert. 2006. “What We Desire, What We Have Reason to Desire, Whatever We Might Desire: Mill and Sen on the Value of Opportunity.”; Utilitas 18 (1): 33–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Superson, Anita. 2005. “Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests.”; Hypatia 20 (4): 109–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Terlazzo, Rosa. Forthcoming. “Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully: An Indirectly Substantive Account.”; Journal of Political Philosophy.Google Scholar