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An epistemology for practical knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Lucy Campbell Open the ORCID record for Lucy Campbell [Opens in a new window]
Lucy Campbell*
Affiliation:
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
*
E-mails: lucy.campbell@philosophy.ox.ac.uk, lucypcampbell@yahoo.com
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Abstract

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.

Keywords

Practical knowledgespeculative knowledgeself-knowledgeintentionanscombeknowledge as an abilitytwo-tier epistemology
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , 2018 , pp. 159 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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