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Bernard Williams as a Philosopher of Ethical Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2020

Miranda Fricker
Miranda Fricker*
Affiliation:
The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, New York, USA
*
Email: mfricker@gc.cuny.edu
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Abstract

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom.

Keywords

Bernard Williamsinternal reasonsrelativism of distancetruthfulnessauthenticityethical freedom
Type
Distinguished Lecture
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 8 , November 2020 , pp. 919 - 933
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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