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Cans and Counterfactuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 1979

Douglas N. Walton
Douglas N. Walton*
Affiliation:
University of Winnipeg
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Extract

In a critical study of some recent action theory Professor James Tomberlin [7] makes some insightful and suggestive remarks concerning the by now well known problem of "Smith and the airplane" formulated by Keith Lehrer and Richard Taylor [3]. While these remarks do significantly advance our knowledge of the nature of the problem, I would like to try to show why the strategy they indicate does not lead to a solution that represents any improvement on the one developed in [1], [8] and [2].

The problem of Smith and the airplane is posed by the following apparent inconsistency. Suppose it is now shortly before 3:30 and Smith is at a country airport. The 3:30 plane is the only possible means whereby Smith can arrive at the city at 4:00. There is nothing to prevent Smith from leaving on the 3:30 plane, but he in fact does not do so: Then each of the following statements are true.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 1980 , pp. 489 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1980

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References

[1] Hilpinen, Risto ‘Can and Modal Logic,’ Ajatus 32 (1970): 7–17.Google Scholar
[2] Lehrer, Keith ‘Comment on Walton's Paper,’ in Brand, Myles and Walton, Douglas (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976, 289–290.10.1007/978-94-010-9074-2_16CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Keith, Lehrer and Taylor, Richard ‘Time, Truth and Modalities,’ Mind: 74 (1965): 390–398.Google Scholar
[4] Lewis, David Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell, 1973.Google Scholar
[5] Pollock, John L. Subjunctive Reasoning, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976.10.1007/978-94-010-1500-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Stalnaker, Robert C. ‘A Theory of Conditionals,’ in Rescher, Nicholas (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell (APQ Monograph), 1968, 98–112.Google Scholar
[7] Tomberlin, James E. ‘Some Recent Work in Action Theory,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, to appear.Google Scholar
[8] Walton, Douglas ‘Time and Modality in the Can of Opportunity,’ in Brand, Myles and Walton, Douglas (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976, 271–287.10.1007/978-94-010-9074-2_15CrossRefGoogle Scholar