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Consequentialism and History

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Paul Gomberg
Paul Gomberg*
Affiliation:
Chicago State University, Chicago, IL60628-1598, U.S.A.
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Extract

John Stuart Mill wrote in the opening chapter of Utilitarianism, ‘A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong,’ thus explaining why he thought the work to follow was practically important. In Chapter 3, ‘On the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility,’ he answers the question, ‘What are the motives to obey the principle of utility?’ This principle is presented as a morality to be adopted. Yet before the nineteenth century was over Henry Sidgwick was proposing that it may well be best, from a utilitarian view, that the utilitarian doctrine is not too widely adopted. Perhaps it should be an esoteric morality.

Moreover, Sidgwick argues, it seems contrary to self interest to adhere to an impartially benevolent morality. Devotion to utilitarian duty seems to require that the agent sacrifice his or her own happiness in a devotion to the relief of others that can only ‘partially mitigate’ their distress (502-3). Such a morality seems impossibly demanding. Sidgwick’s argument challenges Mill's claim that there is an adequate sanction for adoption of utilitarian morality.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 383 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1989

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References

1 Mill, John Stuart Utilitarianism in Acton, H. B. ed., Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (New York: Dutton 1976), 2, 24Google Scholar; Sidgwick, Henry The Methods of Ethics 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 1981), 490Google Scholar

2 Acton, 208-9 (On Representative Government, Ch. III); Sidgwick, 481-490

3 Acton, 30, 29 (Utilitarianism, Ch. III)

4 Sidgwick’s skepticism about social reform is implied in his final discussion of egoism and utilitarianism in the concluding chapter, which exhibits no hope that the two principles can be reconciled in human history. These conclusions are explained in greater detail in my ‘Self and Others in Bentham and Sidgwick,’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1986) 437-48.

5 The reason that act consequentialism must be qualified by considerations of a life strategy can be made clear by the following argument: consider the act of going to bed to sleep. On any single occasion, considered in isolation, there is probably something I can do that will have better results than going to sleep. This does not imply, however, that I should not go to bed. Sure, I could stay up this time and do more. But one must live one’s life according to routine. How do I develop a routine of life? I formulate a plan that allows me adequate rest. The plan and routine are guided by principles, although these are subject to constant revision. If one can formulate a principle that enables one to do more, then, indeed, by a consequentialist criterion, one should do it. This argument is akin to the more familiar argument that principles are essential to a social morality. Here the need for principles derives from the need for a regulated, planned life.

6 Singer, Peter ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972) 229–43. See esp. 238, 235Google Scholar.

7 Singer, Peter Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), Chapter 8Google Scholar

8 See Williams’ essay in Smart, J. C. C. and Williams, Bernard Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 116-17.

9 Wolf, Susan ‘Moral Saints,’ Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982) 419–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 The specific strategy I consider here is presented in Railton, Peter ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984) 134–71Google Scholar. Parfit, Derek Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984)Google Scholar contains an explicitly weaker argument that consequentialism is ‘indirectly collectively self defeating,’ which implies only that if we all attempt to conform to the consequentialist imperative the results will not be as good as they would be if we all had some other possible set of motives. However, Parfit believes his arguments that consequentialism is indirectly self defeating, and that there is blameless wrongdoing, have reduced the conflict between consequentialism and commonsense morality. He seems to believe that in its Practical Motive Theory (what we should to here and now, given the way the world is) consequentialism implies that ‘we should often be strongly disposed to act in the ways that [commonsense] morality requires,’ giving priority to the interests of those we love (112). This conclusion implies that Parfit thinks that he has shown that in the world we live in outcomes would be worse if we attempt to be conscious consequentialists (despite his disclaimer that he has not tried to show this; see 28, 31). So, given his remarks on p. 112, I will interpret Parfit as making an argument similar to Railton’s. Singer himself proposes an esoteric morality in Practical Ethics (180-1). The plan to reconcile commonsense morality with consequentialism has its ancestry in Mill’s point about limitations on our power (Acton, 17; Utilitarianism, Chapter II) and arguments in Sidgwick about limitations on knowledge, affection, and power (Sidgwick, 431, 433, 434).

11 A similar suggestion to Wolf’s, that someone devoted to morality will be ‘alienated’ in relationships with others, is given in Railton. The life of one sort of ‘fanatic,’ John Brown, who combined dedication to ending slavery with devotion to his children, is depicted brilliantly in Truman Nelson’s novel The Surveyor (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1960). Brown, as depicted here, is my ideal of someone who strives for integrity, in his case based on religious imperatives.

12 This seems to be the conception of life’s meaning implied in Conly, Sarah ‘The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985) 275–86Google Scholar and, as I understand it, this is also Williams’ and Wolf’s recommendation.

13 Susan Wolf’s perfectly wonderful person who is not perfectly moral (Wolf, 436) will not seem so wonderful if she stands aloof from a great opportunity to do good.

14 I discuss this interpretation of Bentham in the paper mentioned in note 4.

15 The inference here from people’s realizing that a goal is in their common interests to their participation in a movement for change naturally raises ‘free rider’ questions. I deal with these in the context of a Marxist conception of history in ‘Marxism and Rationality,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989) 53-62. Much of what I say there, however, can be embraced by someone who disagrees with Marxist views of history.

16 Evaluating our other projects and attachments by their contribution to history and making them contingent on that evaluation may seem to give our consequentialist ‘one thought too many.’ (This criticism is in Williams, Moral Luck [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981], 18 [from ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’ originally in Rorty, Amelie ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1976)Google Scholar] and quoted in Wolf, 430.) This is how an integrated life appears to the advocate of a compartmentalized life.

17 Issues raised in this paragraph and the previous one are discussed more fully in my paper ‘Marxism and Rationality,’ mentioned in note 15. The reader may have noticed that Marxist consequentialism is not obviously humanitarian: because it projects a future of violent conflict, it is not obvious that everyone’s interests enter into consequentialist calculations. It would seem that the relevant interests are of those whose long term interests tend to converge. Thus a conception of history is implied even in determining whose interests count in making a consequentialist determination of what to do.

18 As discussed briefly in note 10, we must not interpret Parfit to be arguing merely for the possibility that a person who conditions acts on their conformity to the consequentialist imperative will not act on strong desires. This would not tend to show that consequentialism and commonsense morality converge, which, as he makes clear in Chapter 5, is the strategic purpose of this argument.

19 See notes 10 and 18.

20 One may well be skeptical that he can succeed. Consider the cases where the best possible character one could hope to develop would cause one to do the thing that would not lead to the best results. If these cases are common or frequent, then one might well suppose that the best person will develop a character that would enable her to steel herself for foreseeable problems and do the right thing. We love our children, but heads of state in times of war are expected not to favor theirs over others’.

21 The Rejection of Consequentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982)Google Scholar

22 I confine the following point to a footnote because it is not central to the theme of this paper. Railton envisions character change as the unfolding of the potentials inherent in a particular character, not as the effect of one’s actions. He does this because he wishes to argue that the right thing for Juan to do is to send the check; he excludes the effects on Juan’s or Linda’s character from the relevant considerations, for if they were included it might not be right by a consequentialist criterion. Nevertheless it is essential to his argument that if Juan would send the check, he would become worse. The more natural view of actions and character, which has an ancient pedigree, is that character develops through practice. For a movement consequentialist, who believes that the struggle against hunger is a long term one requiring the commitment of many people, probably the most important consideration relevant to what Juan should do is the effect of what he does on the development of consequentialist commitment in Juan, Linda, and others.

23 The story of Leo Grossvogel can be found in Perrault, Gilles The Red Orchestra (New York: Simon and Schuster 1969), esp. 279, 330Google Scholar and Trepper, Leopold The Great Game (New York: McGraw-Hill 1977), esp. 200, 216Google Scholar. Grossvogel and his wife were both eventually killed by the Nazis in 1944. Grossvogel’s ‘heroism’ was not extraordinary. Hillel Katz was similarly threatened, but refused to talk. Both books document the silence of many other captured members of the Red Orchestra. One agent–Kent (real name Gurevich)–betrayed his comrades so he would be allowed to spend time with his mistress.

24 I am indebted to Michael Davis, Shelly Kagan, David Copp, an anonymous referee for CJP, and an editor of CJP for extremely useful criticisms of earlier drafts.