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Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mitchell S. Green
Mitchell S. Green*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA
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Extract

Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London. He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fines, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fiction; he's a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fictions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ from Angle Grinder Man. After all, Zeus throws thunderbolts but doesn't remove boots from cars; unlike Superman, Angle Grinder Man couldn't leap over a parked Mini, and all sightings suggest that he is a human being, not a horse.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , September 2007 , pp. 419 - 447
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2007

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