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A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotle's Treatment of Greatness of Soul'

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Howard J. Curzer
Howard J. Curzer*
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX79409-4530, U.S.A.
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Extract

Once again it is becoming fashionable to ask ‘What character traits are virtues?’ Naturally, it behooves us to try to recapture the insights of our predecessors, as well as forging ahead on our own. In this paper I shall examine one such insight.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 20 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 517 - 537
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1990

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References

1 Other translations of megalopsychia include high-mindedness, pride, self-respect, dignity, and magnanimity. Of course, the Greek concept of megalopsychia, like their concepts of other virtues, fluctuated significantly. SeeR A Gauthier, Mllgnanimite (Paris: Bibliotheque thomiste 28 1951).

2 All quotations from Aristotle are taken from The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford Translation, J. Barnes, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984) except that I use ‘virtue’ rather than ‘excellence’ to translate arete and ‘adornment’ rather than ‘crown’ to translate kosmos.

3 C. J. Rowe, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 3 [1971) 50)

4 The following commentators take megalopsychia to be primarily concerned with honor. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers 1947), 11-11, Q. 129, A. 1, 1728; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett 1985), 326; N. Cooper, ‘Aristotle's Crowning Virtue,’ Apeiron 22 (1989) 195-9; H. H. Joachim, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oarendon 1951), 124-5; T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Oarendon 1983), 75-81. The following interpreters claim that honor is central to the EE account of megalopsychia, but virtue is central to the NE account. E. A. Schmidt, ‘Ehre und Tugend. Zur Megalopsychie der aristotelischen Ethik,’ Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967) 163; D. A. Rees, “'Magnanimity” in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics,’ in P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger, eds., Untersuchungen zur eudemischen Ethik (Berlin: 1971) 243; Rowe, 50.

5 W. F. R. Hardie, “'Magnanimity” in Aristotle's Ethics,’ Phronesis 23 (1978) 69, 73-4; N. Sherman, ‘Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988) 103

6 Gauther-Jolif, Schmidt, and Stewart suggest this (R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, Aristote, L'Ethique a Nicomaque [Paris: Louvain 1970]; Schmidt, 161; J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1892]). Hardie disagrees, but offers as evidence only the observation that Aristotle does not explicitly reject the opinion (69).

7 At 1097b14-20 self-sufficiency seems to be a characteristic of goods and there is considerable controversy over what Aristotle means by it. But at 1125all-12 it is clear that Aristotle is merely using self-sufficiency in a non-technical sense. A person is self-sufficient if he or she requires only a few external goods. See also 1177a27-1177b1.

8 H. V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1952), 123-7

9 Could greatness be a consequence rather than a component of megalopsychia? Megalopsychia cannot be merely the belief that one is great plus the tendency to undertake great deeds because the vain person, from whom the megalopsychos is explicitly distinguished, also has this belief (1123b8-9) and this tendency (1125a27-9). Similarly, megalopsychia cannot be merely the knowledge of one's own abilities because the temperate person of small worth, from whom the megalopsychos is explicitly distinguished, also has this knowledge (1123b5-6). Aristotle combines these two accounts. Megalopsychia is the knowledge that one is great. But greatness is built into this definition (and the tendency to perform great deeds is built into greatness). Megalopsychia turns out to consist in selfknowledge plus greatness as we saw above. Thus, greatness is a component, not a consequence, of megalopsychia.

10 Joachim, 125

11 Cooper, 202; Hardie, 65; A. Macintyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan 1966), 78-9.

12 Engberg-Pedersen, 78; Hardie, 65; W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen 1923), 208; Sherman, 107.

13 Jaffa, 123-7

14 Engberg-Pedersen, 78; Sherman, 106-7

15 Hardie, 71-2; see also W. Jaeger, Paideia, trans. G. Highet (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1939), 11-12.

16 Both types of noble actions are not always found in the context of every virtue. For example, we all have some idea of what counts as an ordinary temperate action under extremely trying conditions, but it is not at all clear what would count as an extremely temperate action under ordinary conditions.

17 A parallel account could be given for great passions. What shall we say about people who possess only one or two of these three dispositions? Aristotle says nothing, so anything we say will be speculative. I suspect that there are very few such people, for these three dispositions tend to occur together, but I shall not defend this view here.

18 Note that what is extreme here is not just the great claims of the megalopsychos, but also the great virtues of the megalopsychos upon which these claims are based.

19 Hardie, 63

20 How are we to spell out the distinction between great and small honor? Hardie suggests that great honor is honor from good people while small honor is honor from ordinary people (Hardie, 76, n. 1). Aristotle does say, at honors that are great and conferred by good men [the megalopsychos] will be moderately pleased … but honor from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise …. (1124a5-11. See also EE 1232b17-19) But in this passage Aristotle is clearly separating in thought, though not in fact, great honors from honors ‘conferred by good men.’ Moreover, the analogy to small and large sums at 1107b24-30 suggests that the distinction between great and small honor is simply the distinction between lots of honor and a little bit of honor.

21 Of course, the megalopsychos desires honor rightly too, but only because he or she has all of the other virtues, including appropriate ambition.

22 This way of characterizing Aristotle's procedure owes much to Cooper (Cooper, 193-9), although my view is somewhat different from his.

23 Cooper finds the tension between (3) and (6) explicit in the EE but ‘underneath the surface’ in the NE. He suggests that ‘the fact that the EE offers a solution of the tension is further evidence that EE is the later work’ (Cooper, 1%). Since I think there is no tension between (3) and (6) in the NE I suggest that the fact that the EE offers a solution of the tension is evidence that EE is the earlier work. Consider the following scenarios. (A) Aristotle formulated the distinction between the two sorts of honors in order to solve a problem in the EE. Then in the NE he decided to drop (3), thereby eliminating the problem. He retained the distinction, however, because it seemed intrinsically important. (B) Aristotle formulated the distinctiQn in the NE to solve no problem. Then in the EE he discovered a problem for which the distinction happened to be a solution. Obviously (A) is a more plausible scenario than (B).

24 I do not mean to imply that the doctrine of moderation and the doctrine of the mean are the same a. 0. Urmson, ‘Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean,’ in A. 0. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics [Berkeley: University of California Press 1980] 160-3). But I do think that the latter is an outgrowth and generalization of the former.

25 Hardie, 64

26 I shall restrict myself to consideration of actions. A similar account could be given for passions.

27 I am assuming that instead of performing the tempting vicious action the person performs a virtuous action rather than some other vicious action. See Jaffa, 104££. for an interesting alternative interpretation.

28 P. Losin, ‘Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean,’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987) 331-2

29 Notice that this thesis is not undermined by Hursthouse's objections to the thesis that vicious actions are too much or too little of something (R. Hursthouse, ‘A False Doctrine of the Mean,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 [1980-81]60-2).

30 I have benefited from suggestions by A. Epstein, W. Schaller, T. Seung, R. Smith, and the editors and referees of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.