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How should utilitarians think about the future?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Tim Mulgan
Tim Mulgan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
*
Email: t.mulgan@auckland.ac.nz
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Abstract

Utilitarians must think collectively about the future because many contemporary moral issues require collective responses to avoid possible future harms. But current rule utilitarianism does not accommodate the distant future. Drawing on my recent books Future People and Ethics for a Broken World, I defend a new utilitarianism whose central ethical question is: What moral code should we teach the next generation? This new theory honours utilitarianism’s past and provides the flexibility to adapt to the full range of credible futures – from futures broken by climate change to the digital, virtual and predictable futures produced by various possible technologies.

Keywords

Utilitarianismrule utilitarianismfuture peopleintergenerational justicebroken worldmoral imaginationvirtual reality
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 2-3: Special issue: Ethics and Future Generations , 2017 , pp. 290 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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