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‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Thomas Khurana Open the ORCID record for Thomas Khurana [Opens in a new window]
Thomas Khurana*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
*
Thomas Khurana t.khurana@essex.ac.ukPhilosophy, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
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Abstract

The paper argues that Kant'sdistinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant'saccount interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.

Keywords

Kantapperceptioninner senseself-knowledgeself-objectificationpractical knowledgeintellectual intuition
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 7 , November 2019 , pp. 956 - 979
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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