Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-16T09:59:15.214Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

In Defence of Theory in Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Torbjörn Tännsjö
Torbjörn Tännsjö*
Affiliation:
Gothenburg University, Dicksonsgatan 4, 412 56Göteborg, Sweden
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Particularism is in vogue in ethics today. Particularism is sometimes described as the idea that what is a sufficient moral reason in one situation need not be a sufficient moral reason in another situation. Indeed, it has been held, on particularism, what is a reason for an action in one situation might be a reason against the same type of action, or might not be a reason at all, in another situation. However, this description is insufficient. Even a generalist, such as a utilitarian, may admit that, what is in one situation a sufficient reason for the rightness of an action may, in another situation, be a sufficient reason for its wrongness. For example, the fact that if I shoot at a certain person, I kill him, may, in one situation, be a sufficient reason not to shoot at him. It is sufficient for the wrongness of shooting at him if, in the situation, shooting at him suffices to guarantee that welfare does not get maximized. He is killed, say, and deprived of future pleasure, with no positive ‘side-effects’ whatever.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , December 1995 , pp. 571 - 593
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 This is a characterization given by Dancy, Jonathan in his recent book, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell 1993), 55-8Google Scholar et passim.

2 Jonathan Dancy, 78-9, does accept that, if two situations are exactly similar in all empirical (natural) respects, they must be similar also in moral respects. He does not seem to think that this deviation from strict particularism is very important, however, since no situations, according to Dancy, are similar in all empirical (natural) respects.

3 It is debatable whether classical hedonistic utilitarianism does provide us with a clearly empirical criterion of rightness. I discuss this problem in ‘Classical Hedonistic Utilitarianism,’ Philosaphical Studies (forthcoming), where I argue that the utilitarian formula must be buttressed with some normative stipulations, lest it tum out, upon inspection, to be empty.

4 For an instructive monograph on reflective equilibrium, see Tersman's, Folke Doctoral Dissertation, Reflective Equilibrium (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell Intemational 1993).Google Scholar

5 Cf. his ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation,’ Philosophical Review 70 (1965) 88-95.

6 I discuss this in my book Moral Realism (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1990) 39-43.

7 Cf. Prichard, H.A. ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ Mind 21 (1912) 21–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Several thinkers have put forward the claim that coherence leads towards truth. For a recent review of their arguments, and for a defense of their claim, see Folke Tersman, Reflective Equilibrium, Chapter 5.

9 Cf. for example his book, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth 1981).

10 Cf. his book, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana 1985).

11 Cf. his ‘Virtue and Reason,’ initially published in The Monist 62 (1979) 331-50, here quoted from Clarke, Stanley G. and Simpson, Evan eds., Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (New York: State University of New York Press 1989).Google Scholar

12 Cf. their book, The Abuse Of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press 1988).

13 Dancy, Moral Reasons, 113Google Scholar

14 Ibid., 64. It should be noted that if this is correct, then there is little use for moral philosophers in a discipline such as medical ethics. Some of the questions raised there are general, and lack, on this conception, a solution altogether. Abortion in general is neither right nor wrong. Others are particular (‘Ought this clinical trial be continued or stopped?’), and should be decided by a moral expert. However, there is little reason to believe that such an expert could be found among us moral philosophers. Our education is not special.

15 Dancy, Moral Reasons, 113Google Scholar

16 ‘Virtue and Reason,’ 88

17 Dancy, Jonathan Moral Reasons, 64Google Scholar

18 These examples are given by Jonsen, Albert R. and Toulmin, Stephen The Abuse Of Casuistry, 45.Google Scholar

19 Drawing on one single example, a commission that both Jonsen and Toulmin worked in or with, set up to assess the Protection of Human subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974), the authors note that it was remarkable that the commission could agree on specific practical recommendations, in spite of the fact that the members of the commission did not share a common moral outlook (Ibid., 18). However, in many cases, this has not been a fact. To give just one example. People involved in the British Warnock Commission disagreed as to whether research on the pre-embryo should take place at all, and, if it should, for how long it should be allowed to go on. As a matter of fact, I think all sorts of disagreement come up in such commissions. Sometimes people disagree about particular recommendations because of different general moral outlooks. Sometimes people who share a common general moral outlook disagree about particular recommendations because of different factual beliefs.

20 Dancy, Jonathan Moral Reasons, 113Google Scholar

21 Ibid., 112

22 Ibid., 113

23 Harman, Gilbert The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press 1977), 6Google Scholar

24 Ibid.

25 Cf. for example his ‘Moral Explanations,’ in Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, Copp, David and Zimmerman, David eds. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld 1985).Google Scholar

26 Cf. his The View from Nowhere (Oxford, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press 1986), 145-9.

27 Cf. my Moral Realism about this, especially Chapters 3 and 4.

28 Cf. his ‘Utilitarianism and the Idea of Reflective Equilibrium,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (1991) 395-406.

29 A distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ rightness is made already by Sidgwick, Henry; cf. his The Methods of Ethics (New York: Dover Publications 1966), 207Google Scholar. The distinction as drawn by Sidgwick is too simplistic for the present purposes, however. According to Sidgwick, an action is ‘subjectively’ right (for a person) if it is believed (by this person) to be right. However, on Sidgwick's own view, in particular cases we had better suspend judgment about rightness or wrongness. But it should be possible for a rational person to hold justified beliefs about subjective rightness. It will not do either to identify ‘subjective’ rightness with (subjectively) probable rightness. For we want to say that it is reasonable for a person to perform a subjectively right action. And it might be too risky to perform an action that is probably right. The consequences of it, if it turns out to be wrong after all, may be disastrous. We have therefore to take both value and probability into account when we form a judgment as to what is subjectively right or wrong. So subjective rightness is a matter of proper weighing of subjective probability and value.

30 Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book 1986), 112.

31 Cf. his The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1960).

32 Henry Sidgwick's stricture should be kept in mind, however. According to Sidgwick we had better keep the utilitarian formula a secret, and stick to conventional morality (Ibid., 490). In my opinion this is too pessimistic. Traditionalism is not defensible as a decision method in general. There are some occasions, however, where a traditionalist stance may seem warranted. I discuss such situations in my Conservatism For Our Time (London and New York: Routledge 1990). In Chapter 2 of that book I defend (to some extent) the use of ‘traditionalism’ (rather than 'rationalism’) in some political contexts. By ‘rationalism’ I mean roughly what has here been called ‘the maximizing method.'

33 The idea that the notion of objective rightness is superfluous has been defended by Allan Gibbard; cf. his Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. A theory of Normative Judgment

34 Cf. my Moral Realism, Chapter 5.