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The Inessentiality of Lockean Essences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Margaret Atherton
Margaret Atherton*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
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Extract

Locke, in his discussion of essences, makes extensive use of a distinction he introduces between nominal and real essences. This distinction has always been found interesting and important, and in fact, R.I. Aaron said of it that ‘there is no more important distinction in the Essay.’ Nevertheless, to say there has not been general agreement about what Locke was getting at is putting it mildly. Interpretations of Locke's point in making such a distinction have varied widely, depending upon whether the importance of the real or the nominal essence is stressed. Locke tells us we should distinguish the nominal essence, which is the abstract idea to which a general name is attached and for which it stands, from the real essence, which is the ‘real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend (3.3.15. See also 3.6.2).’

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 1984 , pp. 277 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1984

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References

1 Aaron, R.I. John Locke (Oxford University Press 1965), 194Google Scholar

2 All references are to the Clarendon edition, edited by Nidditch, P.H. (Minneapolis: Oxford University Press 1975).Google Scholar

3 Such an interpretation is very common in discussion of theories of meaning. See, for example, Alston, William P. Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1964)Google Scholar, or, for a recent example, see Schwarts, Stephen P. ‘Introduction,’ Naming Necessity and Natural Kinds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1977), 13–41.Google Scholar Such a view is also common in commentaries on Locke. See, for example, Aaron.

4 See, for example, Ayers, M.R. ‘The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke's Philosophy,’ revised version reprinted in Tipton, l.C. ed., Locke on Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977), 77–104Google Scholar; Bolton, Martha Brandt ‘Substances, Substrata and the Names of Substances in Locke's Essay,’ The Philosophical Review, 85 (1976) 488–513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See Troyer, John ‘Locke on the Names of Substances,’ Locke Newsletter, 6 (1975) 27–39.Google Scholar Mackie, J.L. points out resemblances between Locke's theory and Kripke's in Problems from Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Among those that seem to recommend the former are: 3.6.49, 3.2.5, 3.10.17-21, support for the latter come from, for example, 3.3.18, 3.3.15, and 4.4.11-12. Several of these passages are discussed in more detail below.

7 Aaron, 202

8 For a discussion of Locke's use of the difference between mixed modes and substances to make this distinction, see Martha Brandt Bolton.

9 So Hilary Putnam is doing an injustice to Locke in claiming that he used the word ‘gold’ as an example and ‘is not troubled by the idea that its meaning is a necessary and sufficient condition.’ ‘The Meaning of “Meaning” ‘, Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 1975), 271.

10 See Ayers, Bolton, Mackie, Troyer.

11 Note this claim will hold whether or not it should tum out that inner structures might in some cases resemble one another. A cold-in-the-head is whatever conforms to some general abstract idea of a cold, whether or not all colds have same or different internal structures. For more on this issue, see below.

12 For example, by Mackie.

13 Mackie, Bolton. There are others, for example, Ayers, who share their views that real essences are natural kinds of substances, but whose arguments do not depend upon the use to which Locke puts the distinction between nominal and real essences. Ayers recognizes that Locke argues for the dependency of any classification on nominal essences, but still thinks that Locke recognizes natural kinds of broad sorts.

14 I am grateful to Robert Schwartz, Robert Cummins, Richard Feldman and John Koethe for comments on earlier versions of this paper.