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On Basic Knowledge and Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Bredo C. Johnsen
Bredo C. Johnsen*
Affiliation:
University of Houston, Central Campus, Houston, TX77004
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Extract

Robert F. Almeder believes he has discovered a ‘pressing problem': ‘stating the conditions under which we determine whether a person's basic belief is true without introducing an evidence condition for knowledge’. He believes further that this is ‘a problem needing resolution before any ultimately satisfying explication of basic knowledge can be offered’.

My aim is to show that Almeder has failed to discover any problem at all, but I begin by asking: how could the question how we determine the (mere) truth of another's basic belief (regardless of how we do so) have any bearing on the correct explication of the concept of basic knowledge?

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 1985 , pp. 625 - 628
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1985

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References

1 Almeder, Robert F. ‘Basic Knowledge and Justification,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 13 (1983) 115–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar References in the text are to this paper.