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Ontological Progress in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Richard M. Burian  and
J.D. Trout
Richard M. Burian
Affiliation:
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburg, VA24061-7013USA
J.D. Trout
Affiliation:
Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL60626USA
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Extract

In the grand tradition, philosophical ontology was considered logically and epistemologically prior to scientific ontology. Like many contemporary philosophers of science, we consider this to be a mistake. There is two-way traffic between philosophical and scientific ontologies; the more we learn about what there actually is, the more we learn about what can be and what must be, and vice versa. But that is not the present topic; here we focus on the ontology or ontologies of science, not traditional philosophical ontologies or the traffic between scientific and philosophical ontologies.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 177 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1995

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References

1 Our position has benefited from discussions with many friends. We include particularly Richard Boyd, Michael Krausz, Larry Laudan, Jarrett Leplin, Joe Margolis, Deborah Mayo, Alan Musgrave, Joe Pitt, Bob Richardson, and Nils Roll-Hansen as well as various members of the Piedmont Philosophy of Science Discussion Group. We are also grateful to discussants at seminars in the Departments of Philosophy of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, the University of California, Davis, the University of Hawaii at Manoa, The Ohio State University, and the Universities of Tromso, Trondheim, and Oslo, and to many others for constructive suggestions. Finally, we would like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal.

2 Similar reservations about theory centrism can be found in the work of McMullin, Ernan ‘The Fertility of Theory and the Unit of Appraisal in the Philosophy of Science,’ in Cohen, S. Feyerabend, P. and Wartofsky, M. eds., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 39: Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Dordrecht: Reidel 1976) 395–432CrossRefGoogle Scholar and ‘The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy,’ in Stuewer, R. ed., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 5: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1970) 12–67.Google Scholar

3 A representative sample of the literature may be found in the following books: Cartwright, Nancy How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Churchland, Paul and Hooker, Clifford eds., Images of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1985)Google Scholar; Fine, Arthur The Shaky Game (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986)Google Scholar; Fraassen, Bas van The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989); Giere, Ronald Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hacking, Ian Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kitcher, Philip The Advancement of Science (New York: Oxford University Press 1993)Google Scholar; Laudan, Larry Progress and its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977)Google Scholar; Leplin, Jarrett ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Margolis, Joseph Pragmatism Without Foundations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986)Google Scholar; and Newton-Smith, W.H. The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Thus for more than a decade, W. Bateson and T.H. Morgan differed about the ultimate structure of genes. Bateson thought that they were some sort of stable resonances that could not be located on chromosomes while Morgan thought them to be material particles with chromosomal locations. In disagreements of this character there is no way to be certain which party, if either, will prove to be right, though (of course) both cannot be. Nonetheless, the fundamental disagreements between these two theorists did not prevent them from securing thorough, experimentally anchored agreement about the referent of such terms as ‘the gene for dwarfing in peas.’ Such agreement could discriminate between distinct genes with similar or identical effects. For a few more details and some references, cf. Burian, Richard ‘On Conceptual Change in Biology: The Case of the Gene,’ in Depew, D. and Weber, B. eds., Evolution at a Crossroads (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1985) 21–42, esp. 26 ff.Google Scholar

5 We Mean ‘law’ in no strong or more committed sense than that used here.

6 In particular, see Wimsatt's, William ‘Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account,’ in Cohen, R.S. et al., eds., PSA 1974: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 32 (Dordrecht: Reidel 1976) 671–710,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and ‘Reductionism, Levels of Explanation, and the Mind-Body Problem,’ in Globus, G. et al., eds., Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry (New York: Plenum Press 1976) 205-67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Proper development of this line of inquiry properly requires us to face a number of issues regarding the various modes of construction of wholes out of parts. The topic, however, is too large for the present occasion. Some useful preliminary steps have been taken by Richardson, Robert C. in ‘Grades of Organization and the Units of Selection Controversy,’ in Asquith, P. and Nickles, T. eds., PSA 1982, Vol. 1 (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association 1982) 324-40.Google Scholar The supervenience literature is concerned with the relation of parts to holes and with the construction of the latter from the former. For an overview by a major figure in the supervenience literature, see Kim, J. ‘Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,’ Metaphilosophy 21 (1990) 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; another valuable survey can be found in Teller, Paul ‘A Poor Man's Guide to Supervenience,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, supplement to 22 (1984) 137-62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Orthodox philosophical treatments of mereological analysis are provided by Strawson, P. Individuals (London: Methuen 1959)Google Scholar; Armstrong, D.M. Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978)Google Scholar and A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989); Lewis, O.K. The Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell 1986), esp. 211-13,Google Scholar and Parts of Classes (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1991); and Chisholm, R.M. Person and Object (La Salle, IL: Open Court 1976), esp. Appendix B.Google Scholar

8 This example is chosen with malice aforethought. Jade has two alternative mineral compositions. Contrary to the views of Hilary Putnam and others, we need not employ the chemical (mereological) analysis according to which jade must count as two distinct substances. It is up to us whether we do so or not. Our choice ought to depend on our purposes. What this shows is that the way in which jade enters into certain transactions may or may not be a function of its mineral composition and that, in certain instances at least, that composition is not the decisive issue to be faced even in the causal order.

9 With the resulting failures of micro-explanations for macro-phenomena. These Failures of reductive ‘micro-explanations’ are elegantly accounted for by Garfinkel, Alan in forms of Explanation (New Haven, CT: Yale University press 1981).Google Scholar When attempting to account for ‘higher-level’ phenomena, such a micro-explanation ‘gives us a false picture of the sensitivity of the situation to change. It suggests That, had the specific cause not been the case, the effect would not have occurred. This is false in such cases because there is redundant causality operating, the effect of Which is to ensure that many other states, perturbations of the original microcause, would have produced the same result. Microreductions cannot takes account of this reduuncy and to that extent cannot replace upper-level explanations’ (62).

10 This is a very informal version of an example elaborated with some care by Brandon, R. Adaptation and Environment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1990), 83-5.Google Scholar

11 Ernst Mayr has elaborated an interpretation of evolution as a two-step process since at least 1964. Cf., e.g., ‘The Evolution of Living Systems,’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA 51 (1964) 934-41, esp. 940-1 and many subsequent writings. One way in which Mayr reinforces his perspective is nicely brought out by his implicit criticism of T.H. Morgan's explanation of sexual dimorphism. Mayr argues that the existence of distinct tissues in male and female organisms cannot be explained by the difference in male and female responses to hormonal influences. It is not the proximal mechanisms, but the evolutionary and ecological context and the distinctive roles of males and females that must be understood if the existence of sexual dimorphism is to be (adequately) explained. (Cf. The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1982), 73.)

12 See chapter 11 of Nagel's, Ernest classic, The Structure of science (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 1961).Google Scholar

13 An argument with a similar conclusion can be found in Sober, Elliott and Lewontin, Richard ‘Artifact, Cause, and Genic Selection,’ Philosophy of Science 47 (1982) 157-80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 On the difficulty of substituting a biochemical for a functional explanation of such matters, an illuminating discussion can be found in Chapter 3 of Rosenberg, Alexander The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an important statement that classical genetics is not reducible to molecular genetics, see Kitcher, Philip ‘1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences,’ Philosophical Review 93 (1984) 335-73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 One reason for switching examples is to take advantage of Mayr's apparatus for arguing the insufficiency of explanations of evolutionary phenomena in terms of proximate mechanisms. Cf. n. 11 above.

16 More precisely, the reductionist must hold that there is no information bearing on the changing proportions of the relevant phenotypes that cannot be adequately reparsed in physico-chemical terms. Since the issue is not whether such reparsing could be carried out in practice (all sides grant that it cannot), but whether it can be carried out ‘in principle,’ the issue is not easily resolved. Rosenberg, in chapter 6 of Structure, provides a useful discussion of one of the principal reasons for skepticism in this regard, namely the supervenience of fitness on lower level properties.

17 E.g., in ‘The Levels of Selection,’ in Asquith, Peter and Nickles, Thomas eds., PSA 1982,Vol. 1(East Lansing, MI: philosophy of science association 1982) 315-23Google Scholar and Section (82ff) of Adaptation and Environment (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990).

18 Salmon, Wesley C. Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (Pittsburgh: University Of Pittsburgh press 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 Thus a higher-level cause must satisfy one of the pragmatist slogans — it must be a difference that makes a difference. The matter is slightly trickier than appears at first glance. Because of the (ineliminable) phrases ‘tends to be’ and ‘in the right circumstances,’ some version of a propensity interpretation of probability is required in order for the formula presented below to work properly.

20 Thus a higher-level cause must Satisfy one of the pragmatist slogans—it must be a differences that makes a differences. The matter is slightly trickier than appears at first glance. Because of the (ineliminable) phrases ‘tends to be’ and ‘in the right circumstances.’ Some version of a propensity interpretation of probability is required in order for the formula presented below to the work properly.

21 The offending argument by Larry Laudan is touched on later in the paper. Fraassen, Bas van offers his alternative, constructive empiricist gloss on the experimental manipulation of theoretical entities in The Scientific Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980), 75-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and & Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980), 230-2.

22 The latter point is the central subject of the next section, but it is already clear from the discussion of the differences between Bateson and Morgan inn. 4. It is possible to locate the cause of a phenomenon (the odd eye color of a fruit fly or the incremental alteration of the electrical charge of an oil droplet in the Millikan apparatus) without presupposing the descriptive apparatus of the most advanced theory pertinent to those phenomena.

23 To reinforce this point, an addendum regarding the outcome of the dispute between Morgan and Bateson is useful. With the victory of the Morgan school in mainstream genetics, by the late 30s and early 40s the dominant theory considered genes to be protein (or, perhaps, nucleoprotein) molecules located on chromosomes. The falsity of the protein theory of gene composition in no way undermined the inunense progress made from (say) 1915 to 1940 in devising richer criteria of identity for genes and in locating and characterizing large numbers of new genes. There is no question but that geneticist's ability to refer to the same genes was in no way affected by the replacement of the protein theory with the theory that genes are composed of DNA. It is a matter requiring substantive historical argument, but the extraordinary theoretical developments from 1915 to the present have raised very few doubts about the success of the pioneers of genetics in referring to particular genes. For some further details on the protein theory of gene composition, see Burian, R. ‘Unification and Coherence as Methodological Objectives in the Biological Sciences,’ Biology and Philosophy 8 (1993) 301-18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 Cf. Representing and Intervening, 22ff.

25 Such as have fascinated Larry Laudan and come to play an increasingly central role in his writings on these topics. (Cf. ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism,’ Philosophy of Science 48 (1981) 19-49 and subsequent papers.) From the fact that all major theories (except, perhaps, some of the most recent ones that have not yet been adequately tested) have been shown to be false, Laudan argues to the pessimistic conclusion that we have to expect the same fate for current theories. He then draws from this result the moral that science does not make referential progress of the sort here claimed. It is the last inference that we maintain is inadequately, indeed, ill supported. One is invited to arrive at a similarly negative appraisal of claims concerning the typical reliability of scientific methodology in Fine's, Arthur The Shaky Game (see esp. 119).Google Scholar The basis for this pessimistic expectation is Putnam's, Hilary famed meta-induction, set out in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge 1978), 24-5.Google Scholar

26 This stance against such exorbitant demands on realism is closely similar to that arrived at by Musgrave, Alan. Cf. ‘Realism versus Constructive Empiricism,’ in Churchland, P.M. and Hooker, C. eds., Images of Science, 197–221Google Scholar; also see ‘The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism,’ in Nola, R. ed., Relativism and Realism in Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988) 229-52CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The concordance in our views is not entirely accidental—discussions with Musgrave played a significant role in the preliminary work on this paper.