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The Representative Theory Of Perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

J. B. Maund
J. B. Maund*
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia
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Extract

In this paper I wish to propose and defend a form of the Representative Theory of Perception (RTP). According to this version of the theory, when a subject perceives some object x to be in a state P1 he does so by being aware of some modfication M1 (from a range M1,M2, … Mn) of some object E. The subject's way of perceiving any one of a range of objects x,y,z, … is that of being aware of some modification of E (leaving it open whether E is the subject himself, a person, an ego or a sense-field, e.g., a visual field). It will be a necessary condition of someone's perceiving x to have property P1 that E be modified in some way. And in order for the modifications of E to be representations, a given property P1 will need to be causally related, characteristically, to one or more specific modifications, M1,M2, … Mn, of E. (For simplicity, instead of taking the physical states or modifications P1,P2, … Pn to be states of individual physical objects, I shall assume them to be modifications of the physical world (in toto) symbolized by ‘X'.)

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , September 1975 , pp. 41 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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