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The self and the passions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Terence Penelhum*
Affiliation:
Department of Classics and Religion, University of Calgary 2500 University Drive, Calgary, ABT2N 1N4, Canada

Abstract

Jane McIntyre's authoritative presentation of the changes Hume makes in the Second Enquiry and the Dissertation on the Passions to the role of sympathy show that he has there left behind the centrality of the idea of the self in the Treatise, and made his philosophy less systematic but more comprehensive.

Keywords

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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References

Hume, David 1975. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by Selby-Bigge, L. A. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, David 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Selby-Bigge, L. A. and revised by Nidditch, P. H. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hume, David 2004. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Norton, David F. and Norton, Mary J. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hume, David 2006. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by Beauchamp, Tom L. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hume, David 2007. A Dissertation on the Passions and the Natural History of Religion, edited by Beauchamp, Tom L. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar