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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Corijn van Mazijk
Corijn van Mazijk*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen, The Netherlands KU Leuven, Belgium
*
E-mail: c.m.a.van.mazijk@rug.nl, corijnvanmazijk@hotmail.com
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Abstract

This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content.

Keywords

Husserlintentionalityintentionalismrepresentationalismconsciousnessnon-representational contentnon-propositional content
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , 2017 , pp. 499 - 517
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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