No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Truth in Virtue of Meaning
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
In recent work on a priori justification, one thing about which there is considerable agreement is that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning is bankrupt and infertile. (For the sake of more readable prose, I will use ‘TVM’ as an abbreviation for ‘the notion of truth in virtue of meaning.’) Arguments against the worth of TVM can be found across the entire spectrum of views on the a priori, in the work of uncompromising rationalists (such as BonJour (1998)), of centrist moderates (such as Boghossian (1997)), and of uncompromising empiricists (such as Devitt (2004)). My aim is to dispute this widespread opinion.
The outline is as follows: first, §§II-III consist of preliminary stage-setting. Then, in §IV I will argue that some of the most prevalent arguments against the worth of TVM — in particular, one which is given clear expression by Quine (1970), and is recently reinforced by Boghossian (1997) — do not engage with the core idea motivating TVM. After deflecting this charge of incoherence, the aim of §§V-VIII is to work toward developing a useful conception of TVM.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Authors 2008
References
Armstrong, D. 1996. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1997. ‘Analyticity.’ In Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. Hale, B. and Wright, C.. Oxford: Blackwell Press.Google Scholar
Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. eds. 2000. New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carnap, R. 1950. ‘Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology.’ Revue Intern. de Phil. 4 (1950): 20–40.Google Scholar
Cassam, Q. 2000. ‘Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori.’ In Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. eds.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coffa, J.A. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devitt, M. 2004. ‘There is No A Priori.’ In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Sosa, E. and Steup, M. eds. Oxford: Blackwell Press.Google Scholar
Field, H. 2000. ‘Apriority as an Evaluative Notion.’ In Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. eds.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 1994. ‘Essence and Modality.’ Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frege, G. 1884. Foundations of Arithmetic. Austin, J.L. trans. Oxford: Blackwell Press 1953.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. 2000. ‘Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge.’ In Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. eds.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gertler, B. 2002. ‘Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments.’ Nous 26 (2002): 22–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grice, H.P. and Strawson, P. 1956. ‘In Defense of a Dogma.’ Philosophical Review 65 (1956): 141–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. 2000. ‘Representation, Skepticism, and the A Priori.’ In Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. eds.Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1784. Critique of Pure Reason. Smith, N. Kemp trans. London: MacMillan Press 1929.Google Scholar
Kaplan, D. 1977. ‘Demonstratives.’ In Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J. Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989.Google Scholar
Katz, J. 1997. ‘Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics.’ Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 57 (1997): 1–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. 1980. ‘Preface’ to the 1980 edition of Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1998. ‘A World of Truthmakers?’ In The Times Literary Supplement 4950 (February 13, 1998): 30–3.Google Scholar
Loar, B. 1991. ‘Can We Explain Intentionality?’ In Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics, Loewer, B. and Rey, G. eds. Oxford: Blackwell Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. 1962. ‘It Ain't Necessarily So.’ Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962): 658–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V. 1935. ‘Truth by Convention.’ In Philosophical essays for Whitehead, Lee, O.H. ed. New York: Longmans.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. 1951. ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism.’ Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V. 1954. ‘Carnap on Logical Truth.’ In The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, Schilpp, P.A. ed. La Salle, IL: Open Court Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. 1991. ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 265–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reichenbach, H. 1920. The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge. Los Angeles: University of California Press 1965.Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1918. ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.’ In Logic and Knowledge, Marsh, R.C. ed. London: Unwin-Hyman 1956.Google Scholar
Russell, G. 2007. ‘The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.’ Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): 712–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sober, E. and Hylton, P. 2000. ‘Quine's Two Dogmas.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 74 (2000): 237–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stalnaker, R. 1972. ‘Pragmatics.’ In Semantics of Natural Language, Davidson, D. and Harmon, G. eds. Boston: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Sullivan, A. 2003. ‘Paging Dr. Lauben! Some Questions about Individualism and Competence.’ Philosophical Studies 115 (2003): 201–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar