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Are Workers Forced to Work?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Douglas Ehring
Douglas Ehring*
Affiliation:
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX75275, U.S.A.
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Extract

G. A. Cohen, in his ‘The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,’ addresses the classical Marxist claim that workers are forced to sell their labour power under capitalism. This claim has been the object of much debate and controversy. Cohen brings his very considerable analytical skills to bear on this question with the result that he supports, in distinctive but non-conflicting ways, both sides of the controversy. On Cohen’s analysis this claim is ambiguous, i.e., the term ‘proletariat’ has two importantly different senses. In the distributive sense, workers need not be coerced, but in the collective sense, they are coerced, i.e., each individual worker is free to leave the working class, but the class of workers' as a whole does not possess a similar freedom. In this paper, I will argue that Cohen’s argument does not establish that the proletariat qua individuals are not forced to sell their labour power. It will also be argued that, in fac;t, there is no definite answer to the question of whether or not workers are forced to sell their labour power. Freedom and coercion are matters of degree, for the relevant range of cases, and, hence, it is not appropriate to ask whether or not the workers are coerced. I will, however, attempt to show that, contrary to the spirit of Cohen’s thesis, proletariat as individuals suffer from a diminished degree of freedom in the sale of their labour power.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 1989 , pp. 589 - 602
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1989

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References

1 Cohen, G.A. ‘The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,’ in Roemer, John ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986) 237-59Google Scholar. All references in paretheses in the text are to this work.

2 Cohen’s response to the objection that since there is no one forcing the workers to sell their labour power, though collectively unable to escape their class, they are not unfree is fourfold: (1) people may be forced even in the absence of human forcing; (2) even if human agency is required for forcing, workers who leave their class closing off further exists may fulfill the ‘human agency’ role; (3) the activities of capitalists in enforcing their property rights also serves to satisfy this requirement; and (4) even if not unfree the workers collectively suffer from a regrettable disability (247).

3 I owe this point to the comments of an anonymous referee.

4 It might be objected at this point that there is an important disanalogy between the worker case and the situation of the prisoner. In the case of the prisoner his efforts to gain release from prison are made while he is still a prisoner, whereas at least some of the efforts of the worker to secure his escape from his class are made after having left the class, during the initial period of attempting to establish his business. In other words, if we grant Cohen’s claim that any worker can through hard work, saving, and borrowing purchase a small business, then there is this disanalogy: the worker can escape from his class at least for a time but the same is not true of the prisoner. But the prisoner example can be brought more into line with the worker case. We can introduce an analogue to the time the worker spends attempting to make a go of his business at the early stages. Suppose that any prisoner can, if he works hard and saves from his wages, leave the prison for a period of time (say for six months). If he chooses to remain in prison he has a 100% chance of a utility of 10 (again the expected utility is 10).

If the prisoner performs well on the outside and is chosen in a lottery, he is permanently released. His chance of working well and winning in the lottery is 5 percent and the utility attached to success is 50. If he fails to perform well or is not picked in the lottery (of which there is a 95 percent chance), he is sent back to prison at the end of six months, which has a utility of 5. The expected utility of entering the program is, thus, 7.25. Given that chances of being picked in the lottery are extremely low, the chances of successfully getting out of prison and remaining out are very small. There are very few permanent exits from this prison. However, given that the expected utility of entering the program is 7.25, we can suppose that this is not a particularly bad alternative. Upon returning to prison one is permitted to reenter the outside program only after working especially hard and saving for one year. Are the individual prisoners in this example forced to remain in prison? In one sense they are not forced to remain inside the prison since it is within their power, given a significant effort, to leave the prison for six months at a time. But these prisoners do not have it within their power to leave the prison permanently. At best these prisoners are free to leave prison, given strenuous efforts, for temporary periods. Hence, in some important sense the individual prisoner is forced to remain a prisoner. Similarly, it is argued here, that even if the worker is free to escape his class for temporary periods, it does not follow and is not true that the worker is free to escape permanently from his class.

5 I owe this point about ‘too risky’ non-serious alternatives to an anonymous referee.

6 Another case suggested by a referee runs as follows. There is a good chance of success in the alternative but the penalty for failure is high. However, given the specifics of the case the alternative is not particularly bad. Suppose, for example, that there is an 80% chance of success in the alternative which has a utility of 5. There is a 20% chance of failure with a utility of 1 (4 is the disaster level). The expected utility of the alternative will then be 4.2, which is above the disaster level. Assume that the action to which this act is an alternative guarantees a utility of 10. The referee suggests that although the probability of success in the alternative is high, the fact that the utility level of failure is below the disaster level makes this alternative too risky. If he is right, this alternative is serious but too risky to attempt.

7 I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.

8 I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful and perceptive comments.